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THE ILLEGALITY OF UNILATERAL TRADE MEASURES TO 
REsOLVE TRADE-ENVIRONMENT DISPUTES 
KEVIN C. KENNEDY· 
INTRODUCTION 
World trade and foreign investment have grown dramatically in the 
post-war era. Levels of environmental degradation and natural resource 
depletion have increased as well during that period. Some observers 
consider trade liberalization and environmental degradation to be locked in 
a direct cause-effect relationship.' Some commentators view this 
development with concern, while others, primarily environmentalists, 
view the poor fit between trade and environment with alarm.2 A few 
environmentalists have even demanded an end to free trade. They argue 
that with free trade comes economic growth, and with economic growth 
comes unacceptable levels of pollution. Because market mechanisms do 
not always take full account of environmental costs, some 
environmentalists argue, a legal climate that promotes unbridled free trade 
could contribute to the unrestricted, transborder movement of hazardous 
products and waste.3 The linkages and frictions, both legal and economic, 
between trade and the environment are undeniable.4 Admittedly, the fit of 
• Professor of Law, Detroit College of Law at Michigan State University. 
, See Steve Chamovitz, Exploring the Environmental Exceptions in GA IT Article XX, J. 
WORLD TRADE, Oct. 1991, at 39-43 [hereinafter Chamovitz I]; Scott Vaughan, Trade 
and Environment: Some North-South Considerations. 27 CORNELL INT'L LJ. 591 (1994); 
John Hunt, Free Traders Headingfor Clash with Greens, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 5, 1991, § I, 
at 6. 
2 See Steve Chamovitz, Environmentalism Confronts GA IT Rules, J. WORLD TRADE, 
Apr. 1993, at 37; Symposium, Greening the GATT: Setting the Agenda, 27 CORNELL 
INT'L LJ. 447 (1994); Symposium, Free Trade and the Environment in Latin America, 
15 Loy. L.A. INT'L & COMPo LJ. 1 (1992); Hamilton Southworth, III, Comment, GAIT 
and the Environment-General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Trade and the 
Environment, GATT Doc. 1529 (February 13, 1992),32 VA. J. INT'L L. 997 (1992). 
3 See Thomas 1. Schoenbaum, Free International Trade and Protection of the 
Environment: Irreconcilable Conflict? 86 AM. J. INT'L L. 700 (1992); Don't Green 
GATT. ECONOMIST, Dec. 26,1992, at 15. 
4 See World Trade Organization [hereinafter WTO], Comm. on Trade and Env't, Selected 
Bibliography on Trade and Environment, Doc. WT/CTE/w/49 (1997) (visited Oct. 25, 
1998) <http://www.wto.org/wto/ddf/ep/puhlic.html>. See generally DANIEL C. ESTY, 
GREENING THE GAIT: TRADE, ENVIRONMENT, AND THE FUTURE (1994). The WTO 
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international trade law and international environmental law is not well-
tailored. Trade and environment policies have proceeded at times on 
diverging tracks, at times on parallel tracks, and at other times on the same 
track but headed on a collision course. S Many environmentalists have been 
unrelenting in their World Trade Organization (WTO)-bashing, casting the 
General Agreement on Tarriffs and Trade (GATT)-WTO system6 in the 
role of environmental villain. The GATT has few friends among 
environmentalists, who vilify GATT and have made it their bite noire. 
Two events in the 1990s galvanized environmentalists in their antipathy 
toward GATT and free trade. The first was the 1991 GATT panel report 
in the Tuna/Dolphin dispute between Mexico and the United States.7 The 
Committee on Trade and the Environment has compiled a bibliography of over 150 
works on trade and the environment. Most WTO documents and decisions are available 
from the WTO web site at <http://www.wto.org> [hereinafter WTO Doc. Website]. 
In its 1992 report, Trade and the Environment: Conflicts and Opportunities, the 
congressional Office of Technology Assessment notes that" [t]he potential for conflict 
between environmental concerns and international trade is increasing." U.S. CONG., 
OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, TRADE AND ENVIRONMENT: CONFLICTS AND 
OPPORTUNITIES 3 (1992) [hereinafter OTA REpORT]. 
S See WORLD BANK, INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND THE ENVIRONMENT (1992); WORLD 
BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REpORT 1992: DEVELOPMENT AND THE ENVIRONMENT 
(1992); Jeffrey L. Dunoff, Institutional Misfits: The GATT. The ICJ & Trade-
Environment Disputes, 15 MICH. 1. INT'L L. 1043 (1994); Daniel C. Esty, GAITing the 
Green. Not Just Greening the GATT. 72 FOR. AFFAIRS 32 (1993); Charles R. Fletcher, 
Greening World Trade Law: Reconciling GA IT and Multilateral Environmental 
Agreements Within the Existing World Trade Regime, 5 J. TRANSNAT'L L. & POL'y 341 
(1996); Robert Housman & Durwood Zaelke, Trade. Environment and Sustainable 
Development: A Primer. 15 HASTINGS INT'L & COMPo L. REV. 535 (1992); Ernst-Ulrich 
Petersmann, International Trade Law and International Environmental Law: Prevention 
and Settlement of International Environmental Disputes in GA IT, J. WORLD TRADE, Feb. 
1993, at 43; Christopher Thomas & Greg A. Tereposky, The Evolving Relationship 
Between Trade and Environmental Regulation. J. WORLD TRADE, Aug. 1993, at 23. 
6 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1997, 61 Stat. A-II, T.1.A.S. 1700, 
55 U.NT.S. 194 [hereinafter GAIT]. 
7 See GAIT Dispute Panel Report on United States Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, 
Aug. 16, 1991, GAIT B.1.S.D. (39th Supp.) at 155 (unadopted, 1991) reprinted in 30 
1.L.M. 1594 [hereinafter Tuna-Dolphin I Panel Report]; see also Matthew Hunter 
Hurlock, The GATT. u.s. Law and the Environment: A Proposal to Amend the GA TT in 
Light of the Tuna/Dolphin Decision. 92 COLUM. L. REV. 2098, 2113-17 (1992); Frederic 
L. Kirgis, Jr., Environment and Trade Measures After the Tuna/Dolphin Decision. 49 
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1221 (1992). See generally Steve Charnovitz, Environmental 
Trade Sanctions and the GATT: An Analysis of the Pelly Amendment on Foreign 
Environmental Practices, 9 AM. UJ. INT'L L. & POL'y 751 (1994); Ted L. McDorman, 
The GA TT Consistency of u.s. Fish Import Embargoes to Stop Driftnet Fishing and Save 
HeinOnline -- 22 Wm. & Mary Envtl. L. & Pol’y Rev. 377 1997-1998
1998] ILLEGALITY OF UNILATERAL TRADE MEASURES 377 
second was the successful completion of the trilateral North American 
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) negotiations among Canada, Mexico, 
and the United States. Both of these developments are discussed below. 
Why have the GATT-WTO system and its progeny, NAFTA,8 
become the environmentalists' Whipping boy?9 The short answer is that 
the GATT-WTO system and NAFTA are viewed as at best indifferent to 
legitimate environmental concerns and at worst hostile to them.IO What 
are environmentalists' specific misgivings about the GATT-WTO system 
and free trade? In a nutshell, environmentalists fear that countries with 
comparatively more stringent environmental standards will relax them 
under pressure from domestic industries. In an environmental version of 
Gresham's law,11 stringent environmental standards will be lowered so that 
Whales, Dolphins and Turtles, 24 GEO. WASH. 1. INT'L L. & ECON. 477 (1991). 
For an overview of U.S. legislation that authorizes the imposition of unilateral 
trade sanctions on environmental grounds, see STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND 
MEANS, 105TH CONG., 1ST SESS., OVERVIEW AND COMPILATION OF U.S. TRADE 
STATUTES 131-35 (Cornm. Print 1997). 
8 North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 8, 11, 14, 17, 1992, U.S. - Can. - Mex., 
33 I.L.M. 289 (1993) (Parts I-III), 32 I.L.M. 605 (1993) (Parts IV-VIII) [hereinafter 
NAFTA]. 
9 See Steve Chamovitz, NAFTA's Link to Environmental Policies, CHRISTIAN SCI. 
MONITOR, Apr. 21, 1993, at 19; John Dillin, Trade-Pact Foes Sound Job Loss, Populist 
Alarms, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, May 19, 1993, at 1,4. 
10 For a comparative analysis of the way in which trade and environment issues are 
resolved within the WTO, the EU, and NAFTA, see Richard H. Steinberg, Trade-
Environment Negotiations in the EU, NAFTA, and WTO: Regional Trajectories of Rule 
Development, 91 AM. 1. INT'LL. 231 (1997). 
II The following is a non-exhaustive list of the grievances environmentalists have with 
GATT: 
1. GATT limits national sovereignty and thus restricts the environmental 
measures a country may wish to use. 
2. GATT rejects production-based grounds as a reason for excluding an 
imported product. 
3. GA TT does not permit the imposition of countervailing duties on imports 
from countries with lax environmental laws. 
4. GATT encourages harmonization of product standards which will lead to a 
lowering of standards rather than a ratcheting up. 
5. GATT prevents export bans on products (such as tropical timber), except in 
very narrowly defmed circumstances. 
6. GATT prevents the unilateral, extraterritorial imposition of environmental 
standards by one country on another. 
7. GATT's most-favored-nation obligation prohibits countries from treating one 
country differently from another on the basis of different environmental policies in the 
two countries. 
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domestic producers can remain competitive at home, relative to imports 
from countries with less demanding environmental standards, and remain 
competitive abroad in export markets. 12 In addition, environmentalists 
seem convinced that developed countries, long the leaders in protecting 
the environment, will roll back their standards to discourage capital and 
job flight to countries where environmental regulation is lax or non-
existent. 
Environment and trade policies co-exist against a backdrop of 
significantly different economic and legal philosophies. 13 The market 
economic model of government non-interference with the free flow of 
goods across national borders has shaped the GATT -WTO system. This 
same model has not found a comfortable niche in international 
environmental law. The market economy solution to the problem of 
pollution (i.e., "externalities" in the jargon of economists) is to let the 
market, not government, determine how and whether pollution is to be 
abated. But a market approach to abating environmental pollution has not 
worked well in practice. For that reason, international environmental law 
is more reflective of an economic model that invites and arguably requires 
government regulation of the market. 14 For example, one solution to the 
8. GA TT' s dispute settlement mechanisms are secretive and do not permit 
environmentalists to intervene to present environmental considerations in the decision 
making process. 
See A Catalogue of Grievances, ECONOMIST, Feb. 27, 1993, at 26. See also Frederick M. 
Abbott, Trade and Democratic Values, 1 MINN. 1. GLOBAL TRADE 9,31 (1992); Edith 
Brown Weiss, Environment and Trade as Partners in Sustainable Development: A 
Commentary, 86 AM. 1. INT'L L. 728, 729 (1992). 
12 See Kym Anderson, The Entwining of Trade Policy with Environmental and Labour 
Standards, in THE URUGUAY ROUND AND THE DEVELOPING ECONOMIES 435 (Will Martin 
& L. Alan Winters eds., 1995); Hilary F. French, The GATT: Menace or Ally?, WORLD 
WATCH, Sept.-Oct. 1993, at 12; U.S. Int'I Trade Comm'n, Trade Issues of the 1990s-
Part I. INT'L ECON. REV., Nov. 1994, at 17; Schoenbaum, supra note 3, at 701; U.S. Int'I 
Trade Comm'n, Trade Liberalization and Pollution, INT'L ECON. REV., Mar. 1995, at 17; 
The Race for the Bottom, ECONOMIST, Oct. 7, 1995, at 90. 
As Edith Brown Weiss points out, there is little empirical evidence to 
substantiate the claim that countries with lax environmental standards attract foreign 
industries that are heavily regulated. See Weiss, supra note 11, at 729. Environmental 
costs are just one of a host of factors that figure in the decision to make a foreign 
investment. Other factors include tax and labor laws, joint venture laws, political 
stability, performance requirements, the ability to repatriate profits, currency stability, 
and compensation in the event of expropriation. 
13 See generally ROBERT REPETTO, TRADE AND ENVIRONMENT POLICIES: ACHIEVING 
COMPLEMENTARITIES AND AVOIDING CONFLICTS (1993). 
14 See generally ALAN O. SYKES, PRODUCT STANDARDS FOR INTERNA TIONALL Y 
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pollution problem is to adopt the "polluter pays" principle. IS That is, firms 
that pollute should be required to pay for the clean up and either absorb the 
cost or pass it on to the buyer in the form of higher prices for their goods 
(i.e., "internalize the costs" in the jargon of economists). But polluters are 
not likely to abate their pollution or pay for the cost of pollution controls 
voluntarily. Why not? For the simple reason that they cannot rely on their 
competitors voluntarily to do likewise. As a consequence, the government 
must mandate that they do so. 
In short, disenchanted with market economy solutions to 
environmental problems, environmentalists challenge the assumption that 
markets are capable of protecting the environment effectively through 
prices. 16 
This article challenges the view that the United States and other 
Members of the WTO have a legal right under international law to engage 
in unilateral measures to resolve trade-environment disputes. On the 
contrary, as will be shown below, in light of the comprehensive legal 
regime created under WTO auspices to regulate all aspects of international 
trade in goods, the United States and all other WTO Members are 
forbidden from imposing unilateral measures to block imports of goods 
from other WTO Members in response to policies or practices that 
threaten the environment or the global commons. The legal permissibility 
of such unilateral measures aside, this article further rejects the view that 
unilateral approaches to resolving international environmental disputes is 
desirable as a policy matter, valid from a legal perspective, or necessary as 
a practical matter. The article begins with an overview of the core 
international environmental legal principles and treaties. It then examines 
INTEGRATED GOODS MARKETS (1995); John H. Jackson, World Trade Rules and 
Environmental Policies: Congruence or Conflict, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1227, 1231-
32 (1992). 
IS See generally Candice Stevens, Interpreting the Polluter Pays Principle in the Trade 
and Environment Context, 27 CORNELL INT'L LJ. 577 (1994). 
16 See Hennan E. Daly, From Adjustment to Sustainable Development: The Obstacle of 
Free Trade, 15 Loy. L.A. INT'L & COMPo L.J. 33-36 (1992); Patti A. Goldman, 
Resolving the Trade and Environment Debate: In Search of a Neutral Forum and 
Neutral Principles, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1279, 1290-92 (1992); Michael 1. Kelly, 
Overcoming Obstacles to the Effective Implementation of International Environmental 
Agreements, 9 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REv. 447 (1997); NAFTA Implementing Legislation 
Uncertain but Wilson Says No Plan to Delay Passage, 10 Int'! Trade Rep. (BNA), at 
415-16 (March 10, 1993). See generally DAVID W. PEARCE & JEREMY 1. WARFORD, 
WORLD WITHOUT END: ECONOMICS, ENVIRONMENT, AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 
( 1993). 
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environmental issues in the GATT -WTO context, beginning with GATT 
1947 and the GATT panel reports in the Tuna/Dolphin dispute. This 
article then analyzes how the Uruguay Round Agreements deal with trade-
environment issues, including the Agreement on Technical Barriers to 
Trade, the Agreement on Agriculture, the Agreement on Subsidies and 
Countervailing Measures, and the Agreement on the Application of 
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures. The work of the reactivated WTO 
Committee on Trade and Environment is also analyzed. 
Following the examination of environmental issues in the WTO-
GATT context, the article shifts focus to the NAFT A provisions dealing 
with trade and the environment, in particular the side agreement on 
environmental cooperation. It also discusses the bilateral environmental 
agreements concluded between the United States and Mexico. 17 It 
concludes that because a multilateral and trilateral framework for 
resolving trade-environment disputes exists to which the United States has 
made a legally binding commitment, multilateral and trilateral approaches 
to resolving trade-environment disputes is not only the preferable solution, 
but the only legitimate response. 
17 The subject of U.S. environmental protection legislation is beyond the scope of this 
paper. Briefly, the United States has in place several pieces of legislation dealing with 
endangered species, the international conservation of marine species, and import 
restrictions under these laws. See, e.g., Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972, 16 
U.S.c. §§ 1361-1421 (1994); International Dolphin Conservation Act of 1992, 16 U.S.c. 
§§ 1411-1418 (1994); Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. § 1538 (1994); 
Fishermen's Protective Act of 1967 ("Pelly Amendment"), 22 U.S.C. § 1978 (1994); 
High Seas Driftnet Fisheries Enforcement Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1826a (1994); Wild Bird 
Conservation Act of 1992, 16 U.S.c. §§ 4904, 4907 (1994). The Marine Mammal 
Protection Act of 1972 sparked the Tuna/Dolphin dispute. See generally John Alton 
Duff, Recent Applications of United States Laws to Conserve Marine Species Worldwide: 
Should Trade Sanctions Be Mandatory?, 2 OCEAN & COASTAL LJ. 1 (1996); Taunya L. 
McLarty, WTO and NAFO Coalescence: A Pareto Improvement for Both Free Trade and 
Fish Conservation, 15 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 469 (1996). 
Litigation involving the U.S. implementation of a shrimp import ban under 
amendments to the Endangered Species Act brought a WTO complaint by India, 
Malaysia, Pakistan, and Thailand. See WTO, United States-Import Prohibition of 
Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, WTIDS58 (1996), available in WTO Doc. 
Website, supra note 4. See also Earth Island Institute v. Christopher, 948 F. Supp. 1062 
(Cl. InCI Trade 1996). For an analysis of the CIT decision and the WTO dispute, see 
Paul Stanton KibeI, Justice for the Sea Turtle: Marine Conservation and the Court of 
International Trade, 15 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL'y 57 (1996-97). See also New Role 
for NAFTA: Saving Fish?, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Jan. 23, 1996, at 18; Timothy E. 
Wirth, Take the Final Step to Protect Dolphins, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Feb. 2, 1996, 
at 19. 
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I. INTERNA TIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 
A. Introduction 
As a threshold matter, it is important to dispel the notion that 
international environmental law, as piecemeal and fragmented as it is, is 
hostile or antagonistic to international trade and growth. In a 1991 report, 
the U.S. International Trade Commission identified over 160 multilateral 
and bilateral agreements for the protection of the environment and 
wildlife. IS Most of these agreements date from the 1970s.19 Of these 
scores of treaties and conventions, no single document emerges as the 
centerpiece international environmental "constitution" analogous to GATT 
1994 in the field of international trade. 20 International environmental law 
is, instead, a crazy quilt of treaties, conventions, and customary 
internationallaw.21 
Section 601 of the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations 
provides that under customary international law, states are obligated to 
prevent transboundary pollution that causes injury to another state.22 
Polluting states that violate this rule are liable for any injury caused by 
such transboundary pollution.23 Section 601 provides in part: 
§ 601. State Obligations with Respect to Environment of 
Other States and the Common Environment 
(1) A state is obligated to take such measures as 
may be necessary, to the extent practicable under the 
circumstances, to ensure that activities within its 
jurisdiction or control 
(a) conform to generally accepted 
IS See U.S. INT'L TRADE COMM'N, USITC Pub. No. 2351, INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS 
TO PROTECT THE ENVIRONMENT AND WILDLIFE (1991). 
19 See id. 
20 See Weiss, supra note 11, at 729. 
21 See generally Jeffrey M. Lang, Trade and the Environment, in CONFRONTING TRADE 
AND ENVIRONMENTAL CONFLICTS: PROSPECTS AND PRACTICAL ApPROACHES 8 (1993); 
Marc Pallemaerts, International Environmental Law in the Age of Sustainable 
Development: A Critical Assessment of the UNCED Process, 15 J.L. & COM. 623 
(1996). 
~~ RESTATEMENT [THIRD] OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 601 (1987). 
~3 See id. 
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international rules and standards for the 
prevention, reduction, and control of injury 
to the environment of another state or of 
areas beyond the limits of national 
jurisdiction; and 
(b) are conducted so as not to cause 
significant injury to the environment of 
another state or of areas beyond the limits of 
national jurisdiction. 
(2) A state is responsible to all other states 
(a) for any violation of its obligations 
under Subsection (l)(a), and 
(b) for any significant InJury, 
resulting from such violation, to the 
environment of areas beyond the limits of 
national jurisdiction.24 
[Vol. 22:375 
Outside of this customary rule of international law, no single document 
universally recognized as the international environmental law 
"constitution" exists. However, two closely related documents do emerge 
as international environmental law manifestoes. They represent a 
distillation of the basic principles of international environmental law and 
policy reflected in section 601 of the Third Restatement of Foreign 
Relations. The first is the 1972 Stockholm Declaration on the Human 
Environment,25 The second is the 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment 
and Development. 26 
B. The Stockholm and Rio Declarations. 
The Stockholm and Rio Declarations are a series of twenty-six and 
twenty-seven guiding principles, respectively. Under these principles 
states commit themselves to achieving the complementary goals of 
promoting sustainable development and protecting the global 
24 Id. 
25 Stockholm Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, 
June 16, 1972, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 48114 (1972),11 I.L.M. 1416 (1972) [hereinafter 
Stockholm Declaration]. 
26 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, June 14, 1992, U.N. Doc. 
A/CONF. 151/5 (1992), 31 I.L.M. 876 (1992) [hereinafter Rio Declaration]. 
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environment. Neither Declaration espouses environmental protection to 
the point of no economic growth.27 In other words, neither document takes 
the position of the environment uber alles. Rather, both Declarations take 
a balanced approach to the trade-environment issue. 
A distillation of the Declarations and their largely overlapping 
principles yields two potentially conflicting concepts: national 
sovereignty, on the one hand, and international cooperation, on the other. 
Representative of the sovereignty/cooperation dichotomy is Principle 21 
of the Stockholm Declaration: 
States have, in accordance with the Charter of the United 
Nations and the principle of international law, the sovereign 
right to exploit their own resources pursuant to their own 
environmental policies, and the responsibility to ensure that 
activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause 
damage to the environment of other States or of areas 
beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.28 
With the addition of "and developmental" to the phrase "pursuant to their 
own environmental policies," Principle 2 of the Rio Declaration tracks 
Principle 21 's language verbatim. 29 
The importance of the national sovereignty principle to the drafters 
of the Rio Declaration is reflected in Principles 11 and 13.30 These two 
Principles direct states to enact national legislation, rather than enter into 
international conventions, to deal with issues of environmental damage, 
liability, and compensation for victims ofpollution.31 
27 One economist has coined the acronym BANANA ("build absolutely nothing 
anywhere near anyone") to describe this position. Another popular acronym is NIMBY 
("not in my back yard"), which describes a far more restrained, and far from altruistic, 
environmental position. See Craig VanGrasstek, The Political Economy of Trade and the 
Environment in the United States Senate, in INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND THE 
ENVIRONMENT, supra note 5, at 227,233. 
28 Stockholm Declaration, supra note 25, at 1420. 
29 See Rio Declaration, supra note 26, at 876. 
30 See generally Jeffrey D. Kovar, A Short Guide to the Rio Declaration, 4 COLO. 1. INT'L 
ENVTL. 1. & POL'y 119 (1993); David A. Wirth, The Rio Declaration on Environment 
and Development: Two Steps Forward and One Back. or Vice Versa?, 29 GA. 1. REV. 
599 (1995). 
31 Principle II of the Rio Declaration provides in part that "[s]tates shall enact effective 
environmental legislation." Rio Declaration, supra note 26, at 876. In this same 
connection, Principle 13 states in part that "[s]tates shall develop national law regarding 
HeinOnline -- 22 Wm. & Mary Envtl. L. & Pol’y Rev. 384 1997-1998
384 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'y REv. [Vol. 22:375 
Relying exclusively on initiatives at the national level to address 
environmental issues is not likely to produce a comprehensive or 
coordinated international legal regime that adequately advances the goal of 
protecting the global environment. Recognizing this shortcoming, the 
Stockholm and Rio Declarations call upon states to cooperate with one 
another in developing international conventions to deal with issues of 
transboundary pollution.32 
Besides attempting to mix the oil-and-water issues of national 
sovereignty and international cooperation, the Stockholm and Rio 
Declarations also wrestle with accommodating international 
environmental protection and international trade. Neither Declaration is 
hostile to international trade. On the contrary, as discussed below, both 
documents are sensitive to the importance of an open trading system. 
They show an awareness that environmental regulations ostensibly 
designed to protect the environment can be a pretext for trade 
protectionism. 33 
C. Multilateral Environmental Agreements 
Three of the most important conservation and environmental 
conventions use trade restrictions and import bans as the vehicles for 
enforcing their terms. These conventions provide prima facie evidence for 
the current debate that multilateralism works, given sufficient political 
will. The first of these conventions is the Convention on International 
Trade in Endangered Species (CITES) that regulates or prohibits 
international trade in the scheduled endangered species.34 The second is 
liability and compensation for the victims of pollution and other environmental damage." 
Id. at 878. 
32 See Stockholm Declaration, supra note 25, at 1420 (princs. 22, 24); Rio Declaration, 
supra note 26, at 878 (princs. 13, 14). To further this cooperative effort, states also 
commit to sharing scientific information. See Stockholm Declaration, supra note 25, at 
1420 (princ. 20); Rio Declaration, supra note 26, at 827 (princ. 9). 
For a criticism of state sovereignty as a political obstruction to further progress 
in the development of international environmental law, see Mark Allan Gray, The United 
Nations Environment Programme: An Assessment, 20 ENVTL. L. 291, 315 (1990). 
33 See generally GARETH PORTER & JANET WELSH BROWN, GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL 
POLITICS (1996). 
34 See Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Flora and 
Fauna, Mar. 3,1973,27 U.S.T. 1087, 993 U.N.T.S. 243 (entered into force July 1, 1975) 
[hereinafter CITES]; William C. Bums, CITES and the Regulation of International Trade 
ill Endangered Species of Flora: A Critical Appraisal, 8 DICK. 1. INT'L L. 203 (1990); 
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the Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer/5 together 
with the 1987 Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone 
Layer.36 They provide for an eventual ban on imports of 
chlorofluorocarbons and halons, and an outright ban on imports from 
nonsignatory countries.37 The third is the Basel Convention on the Control 
of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal, 
prohibiting or restricting the export and import of scheduled hazardous 
waste.38 These three multilateral environmental agreements are 
incorporated by reference in NAFTA.39 None has been the subject of 
either a GATT or WTO panel proceeding.40 
1. CITES 
With 144 parties, the Convention on International Trade in 
Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES) is one of the most 
widely-subscribed international conservation agreements. CITES 
categorizes endangered species, and parts of those species, into three 
Dale Andrew, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Experience 
With the Use of Trade Measures in the Convention on International Trade in Endangered 
Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES), OCDE/GD(97)106 (1997) (visited Oct. 25, 
1998) <http://www.oecd.org/ech/docs/envi.htm>. 
3S Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, Mar. 22, 1985, UNEP Doc. 
IG.53/5, 26 I.L.M. 1529 (entered into force Sept. 22, 1988) [hereinafter Vienna 
Convention. ] 
36 Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, Sept. 16, 1987, S. 
TREATY Doc. No. 100-10, 26 I.L.M. 1541 (entered into force for the United States Jan. 
1, 1989) [hereinafter Montreal Protocol]. The Montreal Protocol is supplemented by the 
London and Copenhagen amendments that accelerate the timetable and broaden the 
coverage of the Montreal Protocol. See London Amendments to the Montreal Protocol 
on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, June 29, 1990, 30 I.L.M. 537 (1991) 
[hereinafter London Amendments]; Adjustments and Amendments to the Montreal 
Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, Nov. 25, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 874 
(1993) [hereinafter Copenhagen Amendments]. 
37 See Vienna Convention, supra note 35; Montreal Protocol, supra note 36. 
38 See United Nations Environment Programme Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the 
Global Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes, 
Final Act and Text of Basel Convention, Mar. 22, 1989, 28 I.L.M. 649 (1989) (entered 
into force May 5, 1992) [hereinafter Basel Convention]. 
39 See NAFT A, supra note 8, art. 104. 
40 See generally Steve Chamovitz, The World Trade Organization and Environmental 
Supervision. 17 INT'L ENV'T REP. 89 (1994); Ilona Cheyne, Environmental Treaties and 
the GATT, 1 REV. EUR. COMM. INT'L ENVTL. L. 14 (1992). 
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groups depending on how close they are to extinction.41 Appendix I lists 
species currently threatened with extinction that are or may be affected by 
trade.42 Appendix II lists two sub-groups of endangered species: (l) those 
threatened with extinction unless trade in them is regulated, and (2) those 
for which trade must be regulated if species at risk are to be protected.43 
Appendix III lists other flora and fauna that are protected by signatory 
countries.44 
For species listed in Appendix I, export is subject to permit.45 
Such permits may be granted only when the following conditions have 
been met: (1) a Scientific Authority of the exporting state has advised that 
such an export permit will not be detrimental to the survival of that 
species; (2) a Management Authority of the exporting state is satisfied that 
the specimen was not obtained in contravention of the laws of that state; 
(3) a Management Authority of the exporting state is satisfied that any 
living specimen will be shipped so as to minimize the risk of injury or 
damage; and (4) a Management Authority of the exporting state is satisfied 
that an import permit (which is subject to corresponding requirements) has 
been granted for the specimen.46 
Appendix II species are subject to the same export requirements, 
but no corresponding import requirements are imposed.47 Appendix III 
species may not be imported without a certificate of origin and an export 
permit from the country that listed the species in Appendix III.48 
2. The Montreal Protocol 
The 1985 Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone 
Layer49 and the 1987 Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the 
41 See CITES, supra note 34, art. II, 27 U.S.T. at 1092,993 U.N.T.S. at 245-46. 
42 See id. art.II:I, 27 U.S.T. at 1092,993 U.N.T.S. at 245. 
43 See id. art. II:2, 27 U.S.T. at 1092, 993 U.N.T.S. at 245. 
44 See id. art II:3, 27 U.S.T. at 1092,993 U.N.T.S. at 246. 
45 See id. art. III, 27 U.S.T. at 1093,993 U.N.T.S. at 246. 
46 See id. art. III:2, 27 U.S.T. at 1093, 993 U.N.T.S. at 246. Violations of CITES can 
result in the imposition of trade sanctions. Such sanctions were being considered by the 
United States against South Korea for its alleged importation of bear gallbladders and 
paws from North America. See Paula Dobbyn, Hunters Target Bears to Feed Asian 
Appetite, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Apr. 9, 1997, at 3. 
47 See CITES, supra note 34, art. IV, 27 U.S.T. at 1095-97,993 U.N.T.S. at 247-48. 
48 See id. art. V, 27 U.S.T. at 1097-98,993 U.N.T.S. at 248. 
49 Vienna Convention, supra note 35. 
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Ozone Layer, together with the London and Copenhagen amendments,50 
regulate trade in ozone-depleting gases in three respects: (1) they impose 
regressive import quotas on chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) and halons from 
parties to the Convention and Protocol; (2) they ban imports of such 
substances altogether from countries that are not signatories to the treaties; 
and (3) they impose domestic production controls.sl 
The 1990 London amendments add certain chemicals to the list of 
controlled substances.52 The 162 parties to the Montreal Protocol further 
agreed to terminate the domestic production and consumption of CFCs by 
2000.53 They established a fund, the Multilateral Ozone Fund, to finance 
technology transfers to developing countries. 54 
Before the ink was dry on the London amendments, it was reported 
that ozone depletion was worse than thought. The parties responded by 
amending the Montreal Protocol again under the Copenhagen amendments 
to accelerate the phase-out of CFCs, carbon tetrachloride, and methyl 
chloroform by the end of 1995.55 The Copenhagen amendments added 
methyl bromide, hydrochloroflourocarbons (HCFCs), and 
hydrobromoflurocarbons (HBFCs) to the list of controlled substances. 56 
3. The Basel Convention 
The Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary 
so Montreal Protocol, supra note 36; London Amendments, supra note 36; Copenhagen 
Amendments, supra note 36. 
SI See Bryce Blegen, International Cooperation in Protection of Atmospheric Ozone: The 
Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, 16 DENV. 1. INT'L L. & 
POL'y 413 (1988); Anne Gallagher, The "New" Montreal Protocol and the Future of 
International Law for Protection of the Global Environment, 14 Hous. 1. INT'L L. 267 
(1992); John Warren Kindt & Samuel Pyeatt Menefee, The Vexing Problem of Ozone 
Depletion in International Environmental Law and Policy, 24 TEX. INT'L LJ. 261 
(1989). See generally LAKSHMAN D. GURUSWAMY ET AL., INTERNATIONAL 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND WORLD ORDER 509 (1994). 
For an overview of the terms and operation of the Montreal Protocol, see WTO 
Comm. on Trade and Env't, The Montreal Protocol and Trade Measures-
Communication from the Secretariat for the Vienna Convention for the Protection of the 
Ozone Layer and the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, 
WT/CTEIW157 (Aug. 28,1997) available in WTO Doc. Website, supra note 4. 
S2 See London Amendments, supra note 36, at 552-53. 
S3 See id. at 540. 
S4 See id. at 549-51. 
S5 See Copenhagen Amendments, supra note 36, at 876-78. 
56 See id. at 885-86. 
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Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal lists certain 
hazardous wastes, the exportation or importation of which the parties must 
either prohibit or restrict. 57 Export of the scheduled hazardous wastes is 
prohibited to parties that prohibit their importation. In all other cases, 
export to another party requires the consent of the importing party in 
writing. 58 There are 112 parties to the Convention. 
The Conference of the Parties established under Article 15 of the 
Convention IS responsible for reviewing and evaluating its 
implementation.59 The Conference decided in 1994 to prohibit 
immediately the exportation of all hazardous waste for final disposal from 
OECD countries to non-OECD countries, and to extend that export ban in 
1997 to hazardous waste exported for recycling or recovery. 60 A 1992 
OECD Council Decision to harmonize OECD members' control regimes 
governing the movement of transboundary shipment of hazardous waste 
was implemented by the United States in 1996.61 
4. Other MEAs 
Although full implementation of the aforementioned multilateral 
agreements has been hamstrung by underfunding and a lack of 
commitment on the part of signatories, two other potentially important 
multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs) dealing with the protection 
of the global commons have been established. The Convention on 
57 See Basel Convention, supra note 38, art. 4, 28 I.L.M. at 661-63. 
58 See id. art. 4.1, 28 I.L.M. at 661. For an overview of the terms and operation of the 
Basel Convention, see WTO, Comm. on Trade and Env't, Recent Trade-Related 
Developments in the Basel Convention: Communication from the Basel Convention on 
the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal. 
WT/CTEfW/55 (Aug. 25, 1997), available in WTO Doc. Website, supra note 4. 
59 See Basel Convention, supra note 38, art. 15, 28 I.L.M. at 670-71. 
60 See Trade Measures in the Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary 
Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal (visited Feb. 15, 1998) 
<http://www.oecd.org/env/docs/en/com_env_ td9741 finale.pdf>. 
61 See Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development Council, Decision of the 
Council Concerning the Control of Transfrontier Movements of Wastes Destined for 
Recovery Operations, C(92)39/Final (Mar. 30, 1992); Transfrontier Shipments of 
Hazardous Waste for Recovery Within the OCED, 40 C.F.R. §§ 262.80-262.89 (1997). 
See also Joy Clairmont, Imports and Exports of Hazardous Waste: Implementation of 
OECD Council Decision C(92)39 Concerning the Transfi'ontier Movement of 
Recoverable Wastes, 3 ENVTL. LAW. 545 (1997). 
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Biological Diversity (the Biodiversity Convention),62 and "the Climate 
Change Convention63 represent continuing international efforts to protect 
the global environment. The Biodiversity Convention's raison d'elre is 
habitat conservation and the equitable distribution of intellectual property 
rights flowing from biotechnology.64 The Climate Change Convention 
seeks to reduce the volume of global greenhouse gas emissions in order to 
slow global warming.65 Neither of these Conventions obligates or 
commits the signatories to reach specific targets, although the 1997 Kyoto 
Protocol to the Climate Change Convention does take a modest first step 
to reduce greenhouse gas emissions 5.2 percent by 2012.66 
These ME As indicate that developing and developed countries so 
far appear to be working at cross purposes in addressing environmental 
priorities, with developing countries focused on water, housing, and 
poverty reduction, and the developed countries focused on ozone 
depletion, biodiversity, deforestation, and desertification.67 
62 See Convention on Biological Diversity, June 5, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 818 (1992) 
[hereinafter Biodiversity Convention]. The Convention has been described as a 
"remarkably weak instrument," principally because it lacks an adequate funding 
mechanism. See GURUSWAMY ET AL., supra note 51, at 855. See generally WTO, 
Comm. on Trade and Env't, Multilateral Environmental Agreements: Recent 
Developments, Part I. Convention on Biological Diversity, WT/CTEIW/44 (Mar. 20, 
1997), available in WTO Doc. Website, supra note 4; WTO, Comm. on Trade and Env't, 
The Convention on Biological Diversity and Its Relation to Trade, WT/CTEIW/64 (Sept. 
29, 1997), available in WTO Doc. Website, supra note 4. 
63 See United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, May 9, 1992, S. 
TREATY DOc. No. 38, 31 I.L.M. 849 (1992). [hereinafter Climate Change Convention]. 
See generally Sean T. Fox, Responding to Climate Change: The Case for Unilateral 
Trade Measures to Protect the Global Atmosphere, 84 GEO. LJ. 2499 (1996). 
64 See Biodiversity Convention, supra note 62, art. 1, 31 I.L.M. at 823. 
65 See Climate Change Convention, supra note 63, art. 2, 31 I.L.M. at 854. 
66 See Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 
Dec. 10, 1997 (visited Oct. 25, 1998) <http://www.unfccc.de/fccc/docs/protintr.html>. 
Thirty-eight industrialized countries committed to reducing greenhouse gas emissions. 
Because no developing country made such a commitment, the prospects for Senate 
approval of the Protocol are dim. The text of the Kyoto Protocol is available on the 
Internet at <http://www.unfccc.de/fccc/docs/cop3/protocol.htrnl> (visited Oct. 25, 1998). 
See generally James Cameron & Zen Makuch, Implementation of the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change: International Trade Law Implications. in 
TRADE AND THE ENVIRONMENT: THE SEARCH FOR BALANCE 116 (James Cameron et al. 
eds., 1994); Fletcher, supra note 5; Chris Wold, Multilateral Environmental Agreements 
and the GA TT: Conflict and Resolution?, 26 ENVTL. L. 841 (1996). 
67 See Robert M. Press, A Year After Rio. North and South Still Debate Priorities, 
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, May 19, 1993, at 3. 
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II. THE GATT -WTO SYSTEM: A COMPREHENSIVE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL 
REGIME FOR RESOLVING TRADE-ENVIRONMENT DISPUTES 
A. Introduction 
GATT and its policy of promoting liberal trade are in a broad sense 
resource conserving. By reducing trade barriers, resources are used more 
efficiently because the most efficient producers, regardless of their country 
of origin, are permitted to take advantage of their competitive edge. 
GATT strives for equal treatment of goods, regardless of their source of 
origin. GATT enforces this policy through a nondiscrimination principle 
that operates at two levels: (1) nondiscrimination by an importing country 
among importers, and (2) nondiscrimination between imported goods and 
the domestic like product. 68 At the same time, GATT does not prevent a 
country from setting its own domestic priorities regarding the level of 
environmental protection it wants to achieve at home.69 
Broadly stated, any government regulation of or interference with 
international trade that deviates from the liberal trade philosophy of GATT 
is disapproved.70 That is true, however, only as a general matter. Despite 
its commitment to the goal of liberal trade, GATT does permit government 
intervention in the market to regulate or prohibit the flow of goods across 
national borders under limited circumstances. Besides authorizing the 
imposition of tariffs on imported goods,7I GATT also permits deviations 
from the liberal trade paradigm in several noteworthy instances. 
First, notwithstanding Article XI's prohibition against quantitative 
restrictions, a WTO Member facing a balance-of-payments shortfall may 
impose "quantitative restrictions" (i.e., quotas) on imported goods 
temporarily until its balance-of-payments position improves.72 Second, 
domestic industries seriously injured by imports of competing products 
may receive "safeguard" relief from their home government (known in the 
United States as Section 20 I escape clause relief).73 Such relief can take 
68 See GAIT, supra note 6, art. III. 
69 See id. art. XX. 
70 For a thorough legal treatment of the GA IT-WTO system, see generally RAJ BHALA & 
KEVIN KENNEDY, WORLD TRADE LAW: THE GAIT-WTO SYSTEM, REGIONAL TRADE 
ARRANGEMENTS, AND U.S. LAW (1998). 
71 See GAIT, supra note 6, art. II. 
7, See id. art. XII. 
7J See Trade Act of 1974 § 201,19 U.S.c. §§ 2251-2254 (1994). 
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the fonn of a temporary increase in tariffs, the imposition of quotas, or 
both, on competing imports.74 Third, under the Article XX exceptions 
dealing with public health and safety measures, inter alia, and Article XXI 
dealing with national security, a Member may restrict or prohibit imports. 7s 
Of the various GATT exceptions to the MFN and national 
treatment commitments, the most important in the context of trade and the 
environment are the Article XX exceptions. 76 
B. The Article AX Exceptions 
In order to gain a better understanding of the scope of the Article 
XX general exceptions, they must be read against the backdrop of GATT 
Article 111:4, the national treatment obligation. Article 111:4 generally 
obligates WTO Members not to discriminate against imports vis-a-vis the 
domestic like product.77 It provides in part: 
The products of the territory of any contracting party 
imported into the territory of any other contracting party 
shall be accorded treatment no less favourable than that 
accorded to like products of national origin in respect of all 
laws, regulations and requirements affecting their internal 
sale, offering for sale, purchase, transportation, distribution 
or use. 78 
When an importing Member's health and safety standards discriminate 
against imported goods in favor of the domestic like product, the exporting 
74 See GATT, supra note 6, art XIX; 19 U.S.C. §§ 2251-54. 
7S See GATT, supra note 6, arts. XX, XXI. One recent use of these provisions occurred 
when Nicaragua filed a complaint with the GATT Secretariat challenging a 1985 U.S. 
trade embargo against Nicaragua. The United States invoked GATT Article XXI in 
defense of the embargo. It was lifted in 1990 when relations between the two countries 
improved. See generally Peter Kombluh, Uncle Sam's Money War Against the 
San din istas. WASH. POST, Aug. 27,1998, at Cl; Joanne Omang, Sanctions: A Policy by 
Default. WASH. POST., May 8, 1985, at AI. 
76 See GATT, supra note 6, art. XX. 
77 See Jackson, supra note 14, at 1235-39. A parallel provision dealing with the tax 
treatment of imports vis-a-vis the domestic like product is contained in GATT Article 
1II:2. See GATT, supra note 6. See generally Christian Pitschas, GA ITIWTO Rules for 
Border Tax Adjustments and the Proposed European Directive Introducing a Tax on 
Carbon Dioxide Emissions and Energy, 24 GA. 1. INT'L & COMP. L. 479 (1995). 
78 GATT, supra note 6, art I1I:4. 
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Member may have a legitimate complaint under GATT Article XXIII that 
a trade benefit has been nullified or impaired.79 Similarly, to the extent the 
importing Member's health and safety regulations purport to have 
extraterritorial effect, for example, by targeting the production processes 
and methods (PPMs) by which the imported product was manufactured or 
processed in the exporting Member, Article 111:4 also may be violated. 80 
GATT imposes practically no legal constraints, however, on a Member 
that has set for itself the goal of protecting its environment by regulating 
domestic industries that use polluting production processes and methods.sl 
Notwithstanding Article Ill's national treatment commitment and 
GATT's overall liberal trade philosophy, Article XX nevertheless permits 
WTO Members to restrict imports on a number of specific grounds. 82 Of 
the ten enumerated general exceptions, the public health and safety 
exception, the customs enforcement exception, and the exception for 
conservation of natural resources touch most directly on the enforcement 
of environmental laws and regulationsY These three exceptions provide: 
Subject to the requirement that such measures are 
not applied in a manner which would constitute a means of 
arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries 
where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction 
on international trade, nothing in this Agreement shall be 
construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any 
contracting party of measures: 
(b) necessary to protect human, animal or plant life 
79 See GATT, supra note 6, art. XXIII; Josh Schein, Comment, Section 301 and u.s. 
Trade Law: The Limited Impact a/the 1988 Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act on 
American Obligations Under GATT, PAC. RIM L. & POL'y J., Winter 1992, at 105, 123-
25. 
so See GATT, supra note 6, art. 1Il:4. 
81 See Schoenbaum, supra note 3, at 702. 
82 Article XX exceptions relate to protection of public morals, human, plant or animal 
life; national treasures; exhaustible natural resources; and importation and exportation of 
gold and silver. Additionally, Article XX permits restrictions related to protection of 
intellectual property rights and GATT-conforming intergovernmental commodity 
agreements. See GATT, supra note 6, art. XX. 
83 For an overview and inventory of GATT provisions dealing with environmental issues, 
see Robert F. Housman & Durwood 1. Zaelke, Trade. Environment. and Sustainable 
Development: A Primer. 15 HASTINGS INT'L & COMPo L. REV. 535 (1992). 
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or health; 
(d) necessary to secure compliance with laws or 
regulations which are not inconsistent with the provisions 
of this Agreement, including those relating to customs 
enforcement, ... the protection of patents, trademarks and 
copyrights, and the prevention of deceptive practices; 
(g) relating to the conservation of exhaustible 
natural resources if such measures are made effective in 
conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or 
consumption.84 
393 
Thus, in order for an importing country to impose a GATT -permissible 
health or safety import measure, that measure (1) must be necessary (i.e., 
no less trade-restrictive alternative is available), (2) must not arbitrarily or 
unjustifiably discriminate between countries where the same conditions 
prevail (i.e., it must be consistent with the MFN and national treatment 
obligations), and (3) must not be a disguised restriction on international 
trade.8S 
Considering the open-textured quality of the terms "necessary," 
"arbitrarily," and "unjustifiably," the health and safety exception has the 
obvious potential for being a rich source of formidable nontariffbarriers to 
trade.86 For example, does the exception for human life and health cover 
persons within the importing Member only, or does it extend to human 
health and life globally? Can health and safety measures have 
extraterritorial application? Given the vagaries of the public health and 
safety exception, the potential for abuse by economically powerful 
countries anxious to foist their own brand of environmental protection on 
weaker trading nations is ever present.87 GATT practice generally has 
been to construe the Article XX exceptions narrowly in favor of open trade 
84 GAIT, supra note 6, art XX. 
85 See generally Chamovitz I, supra note 1; Schoenbaum, supra note 3, at 713. 
86 For the drafting history of GAIT Article XX, see 1 WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, 
ANAL YTICAL INDEX: GUIDE TO GAIT LAW AND PRACTICE 563-66 (1995) [hereinafter 
GUIDE TO GAIT]. 
87 See Jackson, supra note 14, at 1241. 
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and against protectionist barriers to trade. 88 
C. The Uruguay Round and the Environment 
When the Uruguay Round was launched in 1986, not only was the 
link between trade and the environment far from most negotiators' minds, 
but the environment was not even on the Uruguay Round agenda. 89 Well 
into the Round, the 1992 GATT Report on Trade and the Environment 
was published, which concluded that trade restrictions used for 
environmental purposes are likely to be counterproductive because they 
reduce world prosperity.90 Environmentalists were not pleased. 
Reeling from its setbacks in the two Tuna/Dolphin decisions,91 the 
United States successfully lobbied in the late stages of the Uruguay Round 
for the inclusion of environment-friendly provisions in several Uruguay 
Round texts.92 Despite the many thorny and seemingly insoluble issues 
vying for their attention, the Uruguay Round negotiators managed to turn 
their attention to the issue of trade and the environment in the closing 
months of the Round. Several Uruguay Round documents reflect the 
negotiators' efforts. 
First, the Preamble to the Agreement Establishing the World Trade 
Organization makes environmental protection a high priority for WTO 
Members. The Preamble states that the Members recognize: 
that their relations in the field of trade and economic 
endeavor should be conducted with a view to raising 
standards of living, ensuring full employment and a large 
88 See OT A REPORT, supra note 4, at 81-90; GUIDE TO GATT, supra note 86, at 561-96. 
These three GATT Article XX exceptions and the role of GATT Article XX as an 
environmental regulatory tool are discussed in Jackson, supra note 14, at 1239-45. 
8q For an overview of environmental issues in the Uruguay Round, see OFFICE OF U.S. 
TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, THE GATT URUGUAY ROUND: REPORT ON ENVIRONMENTAL 
ISSUES, in URUGUAY ROUND TRADE AGREEMENTS, STATEMENT OF ADMINISTRATIVE 
ACTION, vol. I, H.R. Doc. No. 316, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. I 163 (1994) [hereinafter 
USTR REPORT ON ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES)' 
90 For comprehensive discussion of this report, see Hamilton Southworth, III, GA TT and 
the Environment-General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Trade and the Environment, 
GATT Doc. 1529 (February 13, 1992), 32 VA. 1. INT'L L. 997 (l992). 
ql See Tuna-Dolphin I Panel Report, supra note 7; GATT Dispute Settlement Panel 
Report on United States Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, GATT Doc. No. DS201R (June 
1994), 33 I.L.M. 842 (1994) [hereinafter Tuna-Dolphin II Panel Report). 
Q~ See USTR REPORT ON ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES, supra note 89. 
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and steadily growing volume of real income and effective 
demand, and expanding the production of and trade in 
goods and services, while allowing for the optimal use of 
the world's resources in accordance with the objective of 
sustainable development, seeking both to protect and 
preserve the environment and to enhance the means for 
doing so in a manner consistent with their respective needs 
and concerns at different levels of economic development . 
93 
395 
The parallels with Principles 11, 12, and 16 of the Rio declaration are 
striking.94 For the first time in a multilateral legal instrument on trade, the 
congruence between trade and the environment is acknowledged. The 
Preamble provides that environmental protection and conservation are to 
serve as markers for WTO Members along the road to trade 
liberalization.9s 
Second, the Ministerial Decision on Trade and Environment issued 
at the conclusion of the Uruguay Round reiterates the views expressed in 
the Preamble to the WTO Agreement, and adds the following: 
[T]here should not be, nor need be, any policy contradiction 
between upholding and safeguarding an open, non-
discriminatory and equitable multilateral trading system on 
the one hand, and acting for the protection of the 
environment, and the promotion of sustainable 
development on the other.96 
In order to coordinate trade and environment policies, the ministers also 
93 AGREEMENT ESTABLISHING THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, Apr. 15, 1994, 108 
Stat. 4809, 4815, 33 I.L.M. 1125, 1144 (1994). 
94 See Rio Declaration, supra note 26, princs. 11, 12, 16. 
9S See generally Christine Cuccia, Protecting Animals in the Name of BiodiverSity: Effects 
of the Uruguay Round of Measures Regulating Methods of Harvesting. 13 B.U. INT'L 
LJ. 481 (1995); Shannon Hudnall, Towards a Greener International Trade System: 
Multilateral Environmental Agreements and the World Trade Organization. 29 COLUM. 
J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 175 (1996); Kelly 1. Hunt, Comment, International Environmental 
Agreements in Conflict with GA TT -Greening GA IT After the Uruguay Round 
Agreement, 30 INT'L LAW. 163 (1996). 
96 Ministerial Decision on Trade and Environment, April 14, 1994,33 I.L.M. 1125, 1267 
(1994). 
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established the Committee on Trade and Environment,97 Its tenns of 
reference include identifying the "relationship between trade and 
environmental measures" and making "recommendations on whether any 
modifications [to the GATT-WTO system] are required."98 The work of 
the Committee is discussed later in this Section. 
Third, four agreements directly bearing on environmental issues 
were concluded in the Uruguay Round. They are the Agreement on the 
Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures,99 the Agreement on 
Technical Barriers to Trade,loo the Agreement on Agriculture,101 and the 
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures. 102 A fifth 
agreement, the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the 
Settlement of Disputes,103 underscores that unilateralism IS an 
impennissible route for resolving trade-environment disputes. 104 
D. The SPS Agreement 
1. Introduction 
Experience has shown that sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) 
97 See id. at 1268. 
981d. 
99 Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, Dec. 15, 1993, 
GAIT Doc. MTNIF A ll-AIA-4 [hereinafter SPS Agreement], reprinted in RAJ BHALA, 
DOCUMENTS SUPPLEMENT TO INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS, at 
137 (1996). 
100 Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, Dec. 15, 1993, GAIT Doc. MTNIF A 11-
AIA-6 [hereinafter TBT Agreement], reprinted in BHALA, supra note 99, at 168. 
101 Agreement on Agriculture, Dec. 15, 1993, GAIT Doc. MTNIFA II-AIA-3 
[hereinafter Agriculture Agreement], reprinted in BHALA, supra note 99, at 110. 
102 Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Dec. 15, 1993, GAIT Doc. 
MTNIFA 11-12 [hereinafter SCM Agreement], reprinted in BHALA, supra note 99, at 
265. Environmental considerations are expressly mentioned in one other Uruguay 
Round Agreement. Article 27.2 of the TRIPS Agreement states that "Members may 
exclude from patentability inventions, the prevention within their territory of the 
commercial exploitation of which is necessary . . . to avoid serious prejudice to the 
environment." See M. Bruce Harper, TRIPS Article 27.2: An Argument/or Caution, 21 
WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'y REV. 381 (1997). 
103 Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Apr. 
15, 1994, WTO Agreement, Annex 2, 33 I.L.M. 1226 [hereinafter DSU]. 
104 See Todd S. Shenkin, Comment, Trade-Related Investment Measures in Bilateral 
Investment Treaties and the GATT: Moving Toward a Multi/atera/lnvestment Treaty, 55 
U. PITT. L. REV. 541, 566 n.131 (1994). 
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measures frequently are employed when other, more traditional barriers to 
trade, such as tariffs and quotas, are reduced or eliminated. 105 Many 
countries, including the United States, often have had the unhappy 
experience of negotiating tariff reductions and quota eliminations, only to 
be met with a suspect SPS measure that wipes out the benefit of the earlier 
bargain. 106 Before the Uruguay Round Agreement on the Application of 
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (the SPS Agreement) was made a 
part of the GATT -WTO legal regime, Article XX(b) was the only GATT 
provision-and at best a skeletal one-dealing expressly with the subject 
of sanitary and phytosanitary measures. 107 Until the SPS Agreement, no 
multilateral trade agreement existed with a fully articulated set of rules 
governing a country's use of SPS measures in connection with imported 
goods. \08 The SPS Agreement fills this gap by circumscribing WTO 
Members' use of such measures as a nontariff barrier to trade. 
2. Coverage 
The SPS Agreement applies to all sanitary and phytosanitary 
measures that may, directly or indirectly, affect international trade. 109 The 
SPS Agreement does not create any substantive sanitary or phytosanitary 
105 See Marsha A. Echols, Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures. in THE WORLD TRADE 
ORGANIZATION: THE MULTILATERAL TRADE FRAMEWORK FOR THE 21ST CENTURY AND 
U.S. IMPLEMENTING LEGISLATION 191, 191 (Terence P. Stewart ed. 1996). 
106 See Jennifer Haverkamp, Provisions of the Uruguay Round with a Potential Effect on 
U.S. Environmental Laws and Regulations. in THE GATT URUGUAY ROUND (Inst. on 
Current Issues in Int'l Trade ed. 1995). 
\07 See GATT, supra note 6, art XX(b). 
108 By the time the Uruguay Round was concluded, one regional agreement existed 
governing sanitary and phytosanitary measures, namely, NAFTA ch. 7:B. See NAFTA, 
supra note 8, 32 I.L.M. at 377. Its rules are derived in large part from earlier drafts of 
the Uruguay Round Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures. See Echols, 
supra note 105, at 193-94. 
109 See generally John 1. Barcelo, III, Product Standards to Protect the Local 
Environment-the GA IT and the Uruguay Round Sanitary and Phytosanitary 
Agreement, 27 CORNELL INT'L LJ. 755 (1994); Echols, supra note 105; Robert M. 
Millimet, The Impact of the Uruguay Round and the New Agreement on Sanitary and 
Phytosanitary Measures: An Analysis of the U.s. Ban on DDT, 5 TRANSNAT'L L. & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 449 (1995). 
The WTO Secretariat has published a booklet, UNDERSTANDING THE WORLD 
TRADE ORGANIZATION AGREEMENT ON SANITARY AND PHYTOSANITARY MEASURES 
(1996). It is available from the WTO's website at <http://www.wto.org/wto/goods/ 
spsund.htm> (visited Oct. 30, 1998). 
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measures per se. Instead, the Agreement sets forth a number of general 
procedural requirements to ensure that a sanitary or phytosanitary measure 
is in fact a scientifically-based protection against the risk asserted by the 
Member imposing the measure, and not a disguised barrier to trade. I 10 
The Agreement expressly recognizes that Members have a 
legitimate right to protect human, animal, and plant life and health, and to 
establish a level of protection for life and health that they deem 
appropriate. III The provisions of the SPS Agreement are designed to 
preserve the ability of Members to act in this area while at the same time 
guarding against the use of unjustified SPS measures that are primarily 
designed to protect a domestic industry from foreign competition. 1I2 The 
Agreement establishes criteria and procedures to distinguish the former 
from the latter, which is not always an easy task, as illustrated by the ten-
year dispute between the United States and the EU over the 1987 EU ban 
on U.S. beef from cattle fed with growth-inducing hormones. 113 
3. Definition ojSPS Measures 
The SPS Agreement provides a comprehensive definition of 
sanitary and phytosanitary measures. An SPS measure is any measure 
applied: 
(a) to protect animal or plant life or health within 
the territory of the Member from risks arising from the 
entry, establishment or spread of pests, diseases, or disease-
. . 
causmg organIsms; 
(b) to protect human or animal life or health within 
the territory of the Member from risks arising from 
additives, contaminants, toxins or disease-causing 
organisms in foods, beverages or feedstuffs; 
(c) to protect human life or health within the 
territory of the Member from risks arising from diseases 
110 See SPS Agreement, supra note 99; David A. Wirth, The Role of Science in the 
Urllguay Round and NAFTA Trade Disciplines, 27 CORNELLlNT'L LJ. 817 (1994). 
III See SPS Agreement, supra note 99, pmbl. 
112 See Richard H. Steinberg, Trade-Environment Negotiations in the EU, NAFTA. and 
WTO: Regional Trajectories of Rule Development, 91 AM. 1. INT'L. L. 231, 237 (1997). 
113 See WTO Panel Report, European Communities-EC Measures Concerning Meat and 
Meat Products (Hormones), WTfDS26/R/USA (Aug. 18, 1997) available in WTO Doc. 
Website, slIpra note 4. 
HeinOnline -- 22 Wm. & Mary Envtl. L. & Pol’y Rev. 399 1997-1998
1998] ILLEGALITY OF UNILATERAL TRADE MEASURES 
carried by animals, plants or products thereof, or from the 
entry, establishment or spread of pests; or 
(d) to prevent or limit other damage within the 
territory of the Member from the entry, establishment or 
spread of pests. 114 
399 
Sanitary or phytosanitary measures include all relevant laws, decrees, 
regulations, requirements, and procedures governing inter alia, (1) end 
product criteria; (2) processes and production methods; (3) testing, 
inspection, certification and approval procedures; (4) quarantine 
requirements including relevant requirements associated with the transport 
of animals or plants, or with the materials necessary for their survival 
during transport; (5) provisions on relevant statistical methods, sampling 
procedures and methods of risk assessment; and (6) packaging and 
labeling requirements directly related to food safety. I IS 
Whether a measure is an SPS measure depends on its intent. If a 
measure is not intended to protect against one of the risks just mentioned, 
then it is not an SPS measure. 116 
4. Scientifically-Based Measures 
The basic right of Members under the SPS Agreement is the ability 
to take SPS measures necessary for the protection of human, animal, or 
plant life or health. This right is qualified by three provisos. Such 
measures (1) must be applied only to the extent necessary, (2) must be 
based on scientific principles, and (3) must not be maintained without 
sufficient scientific evidence, except that such measures may be imposed 
temporarily, when evidence is insufficient, pending receipt of additional 
information necessary for a more objective assessment of risk. 117 
Article 2.3 reiterates the threshold inquiry of the GATT Article XX 
chapeau, namely, that SPS measures must not constitute a means of 
arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same 
conditions prevail and must not constitute a disguised restriction on 
international trade.1I8 A Member's failure to satisfy Articles 2.2 and 2.3 
114 SPS Agreement, supra note 99, Annex A, para. l(a)-(d). 
liS See id. Annex A, para 1. See also Echols, supra note 105, at 194. 
116See Echols, supra note 105, at 213 n.22. 
117 See SPS Agreement, supra note 99, arts. 2.2, 5.7. 
118 See GAIT, supra note 6, art. XX; SPS Agreement, supra note 99, art. 2.3. 
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would in itself constitute a violation of GATT, regardless of the measure's 
consistency with the remainder of GATT. 
A Member is free to establish its own level of sanitary and 
phytosanitary protection, including a "zero risk" level if it so chooses."9 
Regardless of the level of risk a Member chooses to adopt, however, a 
measure must be based on scientific principles and on sufficient scientific 
evidence. 120 The judgments to be drawn from that evidence are left to the 
Member because scientific certainty is rare. Many scientific 
determinations require judgments among competing scientific views (e.g., 
whether or not global warming is taking place; if it is, whether the cause is 
attributable to humans; and, if so, what the proper response is). 
There is obviously a good deal of "play in the joints" of the SPS 
Agreement. 
5. Use of International Standards 
The SPS Agreement requires Members to harmonize their SPS 
measures by adopting international standards where such standards exist. 121 
Such international standards, guidelines, and recommendations are 
developed by several international bodies. The most important are (1) the 
Codex Alimentarius Commission (the Codex), established in 1963 and 
jointly administered by the World Health Organization and the U.N. Food 
and Agriculture Organization, with over 130 members; 122 (2) the 
119 See SPS Agreement, supra note 99, arts. 2.2, 5; Zane O. Gresham & Thomas A. 
Bloomfield, Rhetoric or Reality: The Impact of the Uruguay Round Agreement on 
Federal and State Environmental Laws, 35 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1143, 1147 (1995). 
120 See SPS Agreement, supra note 99, art. 2.2. 
121 See SPS Agreement. supra note 99, art 3.1 (" [m]embers shall base their sanitary and 
phytosanitary measures on international standards ... ") (emphasis added). These 
international standards, guidelines, and recommendations are further defined in Annex 
A:3 of the SPS Agreement to include those of the Codex Alimentarius Commission, the 
International Office of Epizootics, and the Secretariat of the International Plant 
Protection Convention. 
1~2 The Codex Alimentarius Commission has issued more than 200 commodity standards 
and approximately 2,000 maximum limits for pesticide residues. See WTO, Comm. on 
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, Complete List of Codex Standards. Codes of 
Practice. Guidelines and Related Texts, G/SPS/GEN129 (Oct. 1, 1997), available in 
WTO Doc. Website, supra note 4. 
General information about the Codex Alimentarius Commission, including the 
contents of the Codex Alimentarius, is available from the Commission's website at 
<http://www.fao.org/waicentlfaoinfo/economic/esnlcodex!codex.htm> (visited Oct. 25, 
1998). 
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International Office of Epizootics (OlE), founded' in 1924 and charged 
with the tasks of developing a worldwide livestock reporting system and 
expediting trade in livestock without increasing livestock disease; 123 and 
(3) the Secretariat of the International Plant Protection Convention (IPPC), 
an agreement intended to prevent the spread of plant pests. 124 
Although the SPS Agreement generally obligates Members to 
adopt international standards where they exist, the Agreement further 
provides that Members may adopt more stringent standards if, based on 
scientific justification, the relevant international standard fails to provide 
an adequate level of protection. 125 
Article 3.2 of the SPS Agreement offers an incentive for the 
adoption of international standards by establishing a rebuttable 
presumption that a national SPS measure based on an international 
standard is not only necessary to protect human, animal, or plant life or 
health, but also is consistent with GATT.126 At the same time, the SPS 
Agreement recognizes the politically sensitive nature of SPS measures for 
Members that desire to give their consumers and environment the highest 
levels of protection. The drafters of the SPS Agreement bowed to pressure 
from environmental groups that feared that the SPS Agreement would lead 
to a ratcheting down of national standards if international standards 
became the mandatory maximum levels of protection a Member could 
123 See International Agreement for the Creation at Paris of an International Office for 
Epizootics, 57 U.N.T.S. 135 (entered into force Jan. 17, 1925). General information 
about the governing body, the International Committee, including its publications, is 
available from its website at <http://www.oie.org> (visited Oct. 25, 1998). 
124 International Plant Protection Convention, 150 U.N.T.S. 67 (entered into force April 
3, 1952). General information about the Convention is available from the Food and 
Agriculture Organization's website at <http://www.fao.org> (visited Oct. 25, 1998). See 
WTO, Comm. on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, International Standards for 
Phytosanitary Measures, G/SPS/GEN/31 (Oct. 1, 1997), available in WTO Doc. 
Website, supra note 4. 
125 See SPS Agreement, supra note 99, art. 3.3. The Committee on SPS Measures has 
established a system under which standards, guidelines, and recommendations developed 
by the Codex, OlE, and IPPC that have a major trade impact are to be monitored. A list 
of standards, guidelines, and recommendations that have a major impact on international 
trade is to be established by the Committee. It may invite the appropriate international 
standards-setting body to consider reviewing the existing standard, guidelines, or 
recommendation. See WTO, Comm. on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, 
Procedure to Monitor the Process of International Harmonization, G/SPS/ll (Oct. 22, 
1997). 
1~6 See SPS Agreement, supra note 99, art. 3.2. For a discussion on burden of proof in 
SPS disputes, see Barcelo, supra note 109, at 774-75. 
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adopt. This fear was based in part on the status of the Codex, the OlE, and 
the IPPC Secretariat as arbiters of food safety and animal and plant health 
issues. In the eyes of environmentalists, these organizations' deliberations 
are largely influenced by transnational corporations. '27 Thus, despite the 
encouragement to adopt international standards, Article 3.3 permits 
Members to adopt measures that result in a higher level of protection if a 
scientific justification exists. 128 Consequently, a Member's ability to adopt 
standards higher than those promulgated by these organizations is 
assured. 129 
6. Mutual Recognition of Standards 
Because a range of SPS measures may be available to achieve the 
same level of protection, there may be differences among Members' SPS 
measures at the same level of protection. Article 4 requires Members to 
accept the measures of other Members as equivalent, even if they differ 
formally from those of the importing Member, if the exporting Member 
demonstrates that its measures achieve the importing Member's 
appropriate level of protection. 130 Members are further obligated to enter 
into consultations with the aim of achieving bilateral and multilateral 
agreements on recognition of equivalence of specified SPS measures. 131 
Experience suggests that recognition of equivalence is indeed very 
difficult to achieve even among countries that are economically integrated. 
For example, consider the experience of the EU which in 1996 imposed a 
ban on exports of UK beef and related products from cattle possibly 
infected with "mad cow" disease. The EU imposed the ban over the 
objections of the UK that its beef products posed no health risk and a 
threat to withdraw from the ED.132 
In a more progressive vein, 1996 amendments to U.S. legislation 
on poultry and meat inspections authorized the Secretary of Agriculture to 
127 See PHILLIP EVANS & JAMES WALSH, THE EIU GUIDE TO THE NEW GAIT 23 (1994). 
128 See SPS Agreement, supra note 99, art. 3.3. 
129 See id. 
130 See id. art. 4. 
131 See id. art. 4.2. 
132 See Jeffrey Ulbrich, EU Lifts Export Ban on British Beef; London Must Institute Series 
of Safeguards Against Cattle Disease, WASH. POST, June 22, 1996, at A21; Fred 
Barbash, Britain Fights Back Over Ban on Beef Exports; Major Says He Will Buck 
European Union Until 'Mad Cow' Limits Are Suspended, WASH. POST, May 22, 1996, at 
An. 
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certify that poultry and meat inspection systems of other countries are 
equivalent to those of the United States. i3J In 1997, the EU and the United 
States reached a framework agreement on veterinary equivalency. 134 
7. Risk Assessment 
Because the levels of protection established by international bodies 
are regarded as the minimum level attainable, Article 5 permits Members 
to maintain higher levels of protection than those based on international 
standards.13S A Member must have scientific evidence to justify such 
higher levels of protection or must show that it is "the appropriate level of 
sanitary or phytosanitary protection" as determined under the criteria of 
Article 5. 136 As long as there is a scientific justification for a particular 
SPS standard, a Member is free to choose its own level of protection after 
determining that the health or safety risk is genuine.137 The SPS 
Agreement does not require "downward harmonization" through the 
adoption of less stringent SPS measures. 138 
An example of more stringent domestic standards are the U.S. 
Delaney Clauses, repealed in 1996, that prohibited the introduction of food 
or color additives in processed foods if the substances posed any risk of 
cancer in humans or animals. 139 The Delaney Clauses established a level 
of protection that reflected a congressional decision that there should be 
zero risk of cancer to humans from the substances those clauses covered. 
That congressional determination was based on scientific evidence 
available at the time of its enactment and a risk assessment (i.e., an 
I3J See Poultry Products Inspection Act § 17(d), 21 U.S.C.A. § 466 (1996); Federal Meat 
Inspection Act § 20(e), 21 U.S.C.A. § 620 (1996). The United States and the EU have 
been engaged in intense negotiations to conclude mutual recognition agreements on food 
and labeling requirements. See u.s.. EU Fail to Meet MRA Deadline; New Talks Slated 
for Later This Month. 14 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 225 (1997). See generally Elliot B. 
Staffin, Trade Barriers or Trade Boon? A Critical Evaluation of Environmental 
Labeling and Its Role in the "Greening" of World Trade. 21 COLUM. 1. ENVTL. L. 205 
( 1996). 
134 See u.s. and EU Agree on Framework On Veterinary Equivalency Exceptfor Poultry, 
14 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 807 (1997). 
135 See SPS Agreement, supra note 99, art. 5. 
136 See id. 
137 See id. 
138 See id. 
I3q See Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.c. § 348(c)(3)(A) (1994). See also 
21 U.S.c. § 376(b)(5)(B) (1994). 
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evaluation of the potential for adverse effects on human life or health, 
even though the risk of carcinogenesis was slight). The evidence and 
assessment resulted in a level of zero risk of carcinogenesis. 140 
Under pressure from domestic farm groups, Congress repealed the 
Delaney Clauses in the Food Quality Protection Act of 1996141 because 
advances in detection techniques had developed to the point that pesticide 
residues that fell far below levels considered to pose a serious health threat 
could be detected. A new health-based standard that permits less than a 
one in one million lifetime risk of cancer was enacted to replace the zero-
risk standard set by the Delaney Clauses. 142 
Article 5 of the SPS Agreement identifies specific criteria to be 
used in evaluating the assessment of risk to human, animal, or plant life or 
health: (1) available scientific evidence; (2) inspection, testing, and 
sampling techniques; (3) relevant ecological and environmental 
conditions; (4) the existence of pest- or disease-free areas; and (5) relevant 
product and production measures (PPMs).143 In the case of risks to animal 
and plant life and health, the economic impact and effectiveness of SPS 
measures for both the exporting and importing Members also are to be 
considered. 144 In all events, the objectives of minimizing negative trade 
effects, of avoiding discrimination or disguised restrictions on trade, and 
of adopting measures that are not more restrictive of trade than necessary 
to achieve the appropriate level of protection are to guide Members when 
imposing a level of protection higher than that provided under 
international standards. 145 
If a Member believes that another Member's SPS measure violates 
the Agreement, the burden rests on the complaining Member initially to 
identify a specific alternative measure that is reasonably available. A 
responding Member need not take steps that are deemed to be 
unreasonable. Next, the complaining Member must demonstrate that the 
alternative measure would make a significant difference in terms of its 
negative effect on trade. Once again, the responding Member is not 
expected to adopt an alternative measure if it would make only an 
insignificant difference on the impact on trade. 146 
140 See 21 U.S.c. § 348(c)(3)(A) (1994). 
141 Pub. L. No.1 04-170, § 405, 11 0 Stat. 1489 (1996). 
142 See id. 
143 See SPS Agreement, supra note 99, art. 5.2. 
144 See id. art. 5.3. 
145 See id. arts. 5.4-5.6. 
146 See id. arts. 5.6 n.3, 5.8. 
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8. Conformity Assessment Procedures 
Confonnity assessment procedures (i.e., control, inspection, and 
product approval procedures) are to be conducted under guidelines found 
in Annex C of the SPS Agreement. 147 These procedures closely parallel 
those contained in the TBT Agreement. 148 Procedures are to be undertaken 
and completed without undue delay and are to be nondiscriminatory vis-a-
vis the procedures for the domestic like product.149 
The concept of disease-free areas and zones within an exporting 
Member is to be recognized by importing Members. lso This concept 
ensures that exports of a particular product are not banned on a country-
wide basis, if it can be shown that the exporting Member has implemented 
effective quarantine or buffer zone measures. lSI 
9. Transparency 
Article 7 and Annex B establish a number of transparency 
obligations. Among them is a requirement that SPS measures be 
published promptly and that a period for comment be made available 
before SPS measures take effect. IS2 
10. Dispute Settlement 
As is the case for all WTO disputes, the consultation and dispute 
settlement procedures of GATT Articles XXII and XXIII, as amplified by 
the Dispute Settlement Understanding, apply to disputes under the SPS 
Agreement. ls3 If a dispute under the Agreement involves scientific or 
technical issues, the panel is directed to seek advice from experts chosen 
by the panel in consultation with the parties. IS4 
147 See id. art. 6. 
148 See id.; TBT Agreement, supra note 100, arts. 5-9. 
149 See SPS Agreement, supra note 99, Annex c: l(a). 
ISO See id. art. 6. 
lSI See id. 
IS2 See id. art 7, Annex B:5. 
IS3 See id. art. 11. 
154 See id. art. 11:2. For example, in the 1997 WTO Hormone Beef panel proceeding, the 
panel consulted scientific experts. See WTO, Panel Proceeding, European Communities 
Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormone!», WTIDS26fRIUSA at 112-
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11. Administration 
A Committee on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures is 
established to provide a forum for regular consultations. 155 The Committee 
is responsible for maintaining close contact with the relevant international 
bodies in the field of sanitary and phytosanitary protection. Articles 3.5 
and 12.4 of the SPS Agreement require the Committee to develop a 
procedure for monitoring the process of international harmonization and 
the use of international standards, guidelines, or recommendations. 156 
Members must notify the Committee on SPS Measures of new, or 
modifications to existing, SPS regulations that are not substantially the 
same as an international standard and that may have a significant effect on 
international trade. As of the end of 1996, the Committee had received 
396 such notifications from 31 WTO Members.1S7 Article 12.7 directs the 
Committee to review the operation and implementation of the Agreement 
three years after its entry into force. 158 
12. Implementation at Sub-Federal Level 
Under Article 13 of the Agreement, Members are responsible for 
ensuring that their sub-federal levels of government and non-governmental 
organizations responsible for setting standards comply with the provisions 
of the Agreement. 159 Members are required to formulate and implement 
positive measures and mechanisms in support of observance of the 
Agreement by sub-national government bodies. l60 
159, Annex (Aug. 18, 1997), available in WTO Doc. Website, supra note 4. See 
generally Wirth, supra note 110. 
155 See SPS Agreement, supra note 99, art. 12.1. 
156 See id., arts. 3.5, 12.1, 12.4. 
157 See WTO, Comm. on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, Report of the Committee 
on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, G/L/118 (Oct. 15, 1996), available in WTO 
Doc. Website, supra note 4. 
158 See SPS Agreement, supra note 99, art. 12.7; WTO, Comm. on Sanitary and 
Phytosanitary Measures, Procedure to Review the Operation and Implementation of the 
Agreement, G/SPSIIO (Oct. 21, 1997), available in WTO Doc. Website, supra note 4; 
OFFICE OF THE USTR, REVIEW OF THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION AGREEMENT ON 
THE ApPLICATION OF SANITARY AND PHYTOSANITARY MEASURES (May 1998), available 
in USTR Website, <http://www.ustr.gov>(visitedJan. 21,1999). 
159 See SPS Agreement, supra note 99, art. 13. 
160 See id. 
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State and local governments within the United States remain free 
to set their our SPS standards under the terms of the Agreement. 161 They 
are under no obligation to adopt federal standards, unless Congress so 
mandates under its commerce clause power. 162 
13. Extraterritoriality 
The definition of sanitary and phytosanitary measures in Annex A 
of the SPS Agreement-"measures to protect human or animal life or 
health within the territory of the Member"'63-settles an issue regarding 
the extraterritorial application of SPS measures that arose in the un adopted 
GATT panel report on Restrictions on Imports of Tuna. l64 The panel 
concluded that application of measures taken under Article XX(b) are 
limited to the territorial jurisdiction of the country imposing the 
measures. 165 Conceding that the U.S. ban on imports of tuna was not a 
disguised restriction on trade, but rather a bona fide measure designed to 
protect dolphins inadvertently caught with tuna in purse-seine nets, the 
panel still ruled that the U.S. measure could not extend beyond its 
territorial jurisdiction. As noted by the GATT panel, if the rule were 
otherwise, then 
each contracting party could unilaterally determine the life 
or health protection policies from which other contracting 
parties could not deviate without jeopardizing their rights 
under the General Agreement. The General Agreement 
would then no longer constitute a multilateral framework 
for trade among all contracting parties but would provide 
legal security only in respect of trade between a limited 
number of contracting parties with identical internal 
161 See id. 
162 In 1997, tension was building between twelve states and the EPA over allegedly lax 
enforcement of clean air and clean water regulations by the states. The EPA was 
threatening to cut off federal funds and to limit the authority of those states to enforce 
those laws. See States Feud with EPA Over Regulations, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Feb. 
19, 1997,at4. 
163 See SPS Agreement, supra note 99, Annex A (emphasis added). 
164 See Tuna-Dolphin I Panel Report, supra note 7, paras. 5.24-5.29, GAIT B.I.S.D. (39'h 
Supp.) at 198-200,30 I.L.M. at 1619-20. 
165 See id. 
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regulations. 166 
The GATT panel concluded that unilateral, extraterritorial 
application by the United States of health regulations under Article XX(b) 
is impennissible. 167 Nevertheless, under the SPS Agreement, a Member 
may insist, for example, that imported food meet its health and safety 
standards, provided those standards are based on science and risk 
assessment. 168 
14. Relationship With the Agreement on Agriculture 
Finally, the problem of misuse of SPS measures is especially acute 
in connection with imports of agricultural products that are frequently the 
target of legitimate, and not so legitimate, SPS measures. 169 There was 
concern in some quarters that as the Uruguay Round Agreement on 
Agriculture eliminates or reduces barriers to agricultural trade,170 a new set 
of SPS measures would be introduced as contingent protection, with the 
sole purpose of protecting domestic agricultural producers from import 
competition. To counter preemptively such a development the SPS 
Agreement was negotiated in tandem with the 1994 Agreement on 
Agriculture to ensure that the benefits of liberalized agricultural trade are 
not diluted. Indeed, Article 14 of the Agreement on Agriculture 
underscores the importance of not allowing unjustified SPS measures to 
undennine the gains of the Agriculture Agreement. It provides: 
"Members agree to give effect to the Agreement on the Application of 
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures. "171 
1661d. para. 5.27. 
167 See id. para. 7.1. 
168 See SPS Agreement, supra note 99, art. 5. 
169 See Echols, supra note 105, at 192. 
170 See Agreement on Agriculture, supra note 101; EDMOND MCGOVERN, INTERNATIONAL 
TRADE REGULATION § 14.22 (1995). 
171 Agriculture Agreement, supra note 101, art. 14. Article 14 of the SPS Agreement also 
provides that least-developed country members may delay the application of the SPS 
Agreement until 2000. Other developing countries were permitted to delay the 
application of the Agreement until January 1, 1997, if necessary because of a lack of 
technical expertise or infrastructure. No specific problems with regard to the 
implementation of the Agreement by developing country have been brought to the 
attention of the Committee on SPS Measures. See SPS Agreement, supra note 99, art. 
14. See also MCGOVERN, supra note 170, § 14.41. 
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E. The TBT Agreement 
A second Uruguay Round Agreement providing a multilateral 
response to trade-environment disputes is the Agreement on Technical 
Barriers to Trade (TBT Agreement).172 The TBT Agreement builds on the 
fifteen-year experience of the Tokyo Round Standards Code. 173 The TBT 
Agreement balances the ability of governments and the private sector to 
implement legitimate standards and the procedures for assessing product 
conformity with those standards against their unjustified use to protect a 
domestic industry. The TBT Agreement establishes rules on 
distinguishing legitimate standards and conformity assessment procedures 
from protectionist measures and procedures in three areas: (1) the 
preparation and adoption of technical regulations and standards; (2) 
conformity assessment procedures and mutual recognition of other 
countries assessments; and (3) information and assistance about technical 
regulations, standards, and conformity assessment procedures. 174 Like its 
predecessor, the TBT Agreement does not establish or prescribe standards, 
technical regulations, or conformity assessment procedures. Rather, it 
establishes general procedural requirements to be observed when adopting 
or using such measures so they do not create unnecessary obstacles to 
trade. 17s 
The TBT Agreement excludes from its scope of coverage sanitary 
and phytosanitary measures as defined in the SPS Agreement. 176 The SPS 
Agreement similarly provides that it does not affect Members' rights 
under the TBT Agreement with respect to measures outside the scope of 
the SPS Agreement. 177 Despite their mutual exclusivity, the substantive 
provisions of the two agreements mirror each other, in most respects. 178 A 
significant difference between the SPS and TBT Agreements is the test for 
determining whether a measure is impermissibly protectionist. Whereas 
the TBT Agreement relies on a nondiscrimination test,179 the inquiry under 
172 See TBT Agreement, supra note 100, Annex 1A. 
173 See MCGOVERN, supra note 170, § 1.11. 
174 See TBT Agreement, supra note 100, arts. 2-4 (Technical Regulations and Standards), 
arts. 5-9 (Conformity with Technical Regulations and Standards), arts. 10-12 
(Information and Assistance). See also MCGOVERN, supra note 170, § 1.11. 
175 See TBT Agreement, supra note 100, art. 2. 
176 See id. art. 1.5; SPS Agreement, supra note 99, Annex A, para. 1. 
177 See SPS Agreement, supra note 99, art. 1.4. 
178 See McGOVERN, supra note 170, § 7.2421. 
179 See TBT Agreement, supra note 100, art. 2.1. 
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the SPS Agreement is whether the measure has a scientific justification 
and is based on risk assessment. 180 A strict requirement of 
nondiscrimination would not be practicable for SPS measures that 
discriminate against imported goods based on their origin. Goods may 
pose a risk of disease precisely because the goods come from a Member 
where such disease is prevalent. The same risk might not be true for 
similar goods coming from another Member. Discrimination is, therefore, 
tolerated under the SPS Agreement, so long as it is not arbitrary or 
unjustifiable. 181 
1. Definitions 
Besides incorporating all of the core principles of the Standards 
Code, the TBT Agreement provides definitions of several key tenns in 
Annex 1 of the Agreement, thereby clarifying some ambiguities. The TBT 
Agreement defines a "technical regulation" as a "[ d]ocument which lays 
down product characteristics or their related production processes and 
methods ... with which compliance is mandatory."182 A "standard" in tum 
is defined as a "[d]ocument approved by a recognized body, that provides 
for common and repeated use, rules, guidelines or characteristics for 
products or related processes and production methods, with which 
compliance is not mandatory."183 The difference between the two is that 
the fonner, being mandatory, is promulgated only by a government body. 
The latter, being voluntary, may be issued not only by a governmental 
body but also by recognized non-governmental standardizing bodies, such 
as the Society of Automotive Engineers. 
Like its predecessor, the TBT Agreement does not cover services, 
sanitary and phytosanitary measures, or government purchasing 
specifications. 184 However, unlike the Standards Code, the TBT 
Agreement covers regulations and standards on production processes and 
methods (PPMs) to the extent they relate to product characteristics, but not 
as they relate to pollution caused by PPMs.185 
180 See SPS Agreement, supra note 99, art. 5.1. 
181 See id. art. 5. 
182 TBT Agreement, supra note 100, Annex 1, para. 1. 
183 Id. Annex 1, para. 2. 
184 See id. arts. 1.3-1.5. 
185 On the subject of PPMs and PPM-based trade measures, see OECD, PROCESSES AND 
PRODUCTION METHODS (PPMS): CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK AND CONSIDERATIONS ON 
USE OF PPM BASED TRADE MEASURES (1997). 
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2. Preparation, Adoption, and Application of Standards 
The TBT Agreement builds on the obligations of the Standards 
Code with regard to the preparation, adoption, and application of technical 
regulations and standards. 186 The TBT Agreement first restates the MFN 
and national treatment commitments. 187 The Agreement then directs 
Members not to prepare, adopt, or apply technical regulations that are an 
unnecessary obstacle to trade. 188 The Agreement defines "unnecessary" as 
a regulation that is "more trade restrictive than necessary to fulfill a 
legitimate objective, taking account of the risks non-fulfillment would 
create."189 Article 2.2 provides that in assessing risks, "relevant elements 
of consideration are, inter alia: available scientific and technical 
information, related processing technology or intended end-uses of 
products. "190 
Members are encouraged to base their technical regulations on 
international standards where they exist. 191 If Members do so, and the 
regulation is for one of the legitimate objectives (i.e., national security, the 
prevention of deceptive practices, the protection of human health or safety, 
animal or plant life or health, or the environment),192 then any other 
Member complaining about the regulation carries the burden of proving 
the regulation creates an unnecessary obstacle to international trade:93 
This Article establishes a burden of proof comparable to the one found in 
the SPS Agreement for Members challenging another Member's technical 
standards. 194 The complaining Member must show that another measure 
exists that (1) is reasonably available to the government; (2) fulfills the 
government's legitimate objectives, and (3) is significantly less restrictive 
to trade. 195 With respect to the third element, the United States delegation 
to the Uruguay Round negotiations sought to include a footnote similar to 
186 See TBT Agreement, supra note 100, Code of Good Practice for Preparation, 
Adoption, and Application of Standards, Annex 3. 
187 See id. art. 2.1. 
188 See id. art. 2.2. 
189 See id. 
190 See id. 
191 See id. art 2.4. 
In See id. art 2.2. 
193 See id. art. 2.5. 
194 See SPS Agreement, supra note 99, art. 4. 
195 See TBT Agreement, supra note 100, art. 2.2. 
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that in the sixth paragraph of Article 5 of the SPS Agreement. 196 Other 
delegations, however, were unprepared to add any language to the TBT 
Agreement in view of the time pressures to conclude the negotiations. 197 
The leading international body involved in the drafting and 
promulgation of international technical standards is the International 
Standards Organization (lSO).198 The ISO is a federation of ninety-one 
national standards organizations whose standards are voluntary. The ISO 
is currently developing two series of standards bearing directly on the TBT 
Agreement. One series is known as the ISO 14000 series for 
environmental management systems, environmental aUditing systems, life-
cycle analysis, and environmental labeling. 199 These standards will have a 
far ranging impact on environmental management programs of firms 
located in Members adopting these standards. 2OO 
The second series is known as ISO 9000, a series of quality 
standards. These standards cover five areas in the production and 
manufacturing process: (1) design, development, production, installation, 
and servicing; (2) build-to-print, installation, and servicing without design; 
(3) assembly and test; (4) implementation and control; and (5) 
implementation of ISO 9000 (audits, certification, and registration).20I The 
196 This footnote provides: 
[A] measure is not more trade-restrictive than required unless there is 
another measure, reasonably availabl6 taking into account technical 
and economic feasibility, that achieves the appropriate level of . 
protection and is significantly less restrictive to trade. 
SPS Agreement, supra note 99, art. 5.6 n.3. 
197 See URUGUAY ROUND TRADE AGREEMENTS, STATEMENT OF ADMINISTRATIVE 
ACTION, H.R. Doc. No. 316, vol. 1, 103d Cong., at 656, 780, 790-91, 1126 n.24 (1994). 
198 See MCGOVERN, supra note 170, § 7.23. 
199 See generally RICHARD BARRETT CLEMENTS, COMPLETE GUIDE TO ISO 14000 (1996); 
DON SAYRE, INSIDE ISO 14000: THE COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE OF ENVIRONMENTAL 
MANAGEMENT (1996); TOM TIBOR & IRA FELDMAN, ISO 14000: A GUIDE TO THE NEW 
ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT (1996); Paula C. Murray, The International 
Environmental Management Standard. ISO 14000: A Non-Tariff Barrier or a Step to an 
Emerging Environmental Policy?, 18 U. PA. 1. INT'L ECON. L. 577 (1997). 
200 Information on the ISO 14000 series is available from the ISO's website at 
<http://www.isoI4000.com> (visited Oct. 25. 1998). See generally Rafe Petersen, ISO 
14000 Internet Databases, 3 ENVTL. LAW. 613 (1997). Information on the work by the 
U.S. member of the ISO on ISO 14000, the American National Standards Institute, is 
available from its website at <http://www.ansi.orglhome.htrnl> (visited Oct. 25, 1998). 
201 See generally JAYANTHA K. BANDYOPADHYAY, QS-9000 HANDBOOK (1996); ROBERT 
T. CRAIG, THE No-NONSENSE GUIDE TO ACHIEVING ISO 9000 CERTIFICATION (1994); 
GREG HUTCHINS, THE ISO 9000 IMPLEMENTATION MANUAL (1994); JOHN T. RABBIT & 
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ISO 9000 standards have been adopted by the U.S. automobile industry 
where the Big Three require that suppliers of raw materials, component 
parts, subassemblies, and service parts meet ISO 9000 quality standards.202 
3. Regulations Based on Performance Characteristics 
Article 2.8 of the TBT Agreement retains the Code requirement 
that drafted technical regulations be based upon product performance 
rather than product design or descriptive characteristics.203 The TBT 
Agreement leaves it to each manufacturer to determine how best to 
accomplish the goal of ensuring that the product will perform in a certain 
manner. 204 
4. Sub-Central Levels of Government 
With respect to technical regulations and standards issued by state 
governments, central governments are required to give notice of such 
regulations and standards, thus enhancing transparency.20S Central 
governments are obligated further under Article 3 to "formulate and 
implement positive measures and mechanisms in support of the 
observance of the provisions of Article 2 (respecting the preparation, 
adoption, and application of technical regulations by local government and 
non-governmental bodies) by other than central government bodies."206 
5. Code of Good Practice 
Regarding the preparation, adoption, and application of standards, 
the TBT Agreement includes a Code of Good Practice for the Preparation, 
Adoption and Application of Standards207 that is binding on central 
PETER A. BERGH, THE ISO 9000 BOOK: COMPETITOR'S GUIDE TO COMPLIANCE AND 
CERTIFICATION (1993); Lisa C. Thompson & William 1. Thompson, The ISO 9000 
Quality Standards: Will They Constitute a Technical Barrier to Free Trade Under the 
NAFTA and the WTO?, 14 ARIZ. 1. INT'L & COMPo L. 155 (1997). Infonnation on ISO 
9000 is available from the ISO's website at <http://www.iso9000.com> (visited Oct. 25, 
1998). 
202 See BANDYOPADHYAY, supra note 201, at 4. 
203 See TBT Agreement, supra note 100, art. 2.8. 
204 See id. 
205 See id. art. 3.2. 
206 See id. art 3.5. 
207 See id. Annex 3. 
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governments.20B The Code of Good Practice was proposed by the EU 
during the Uruguay Round. 209 It reiterates the obligations of the 
Agreement applicable generally to central governments, and extends their 
application to local governmental and non-governmental standardizing 
bodies that elect to adopt the Code.210 Eighty-four standardizing bodies 
had accepted the Code of Good Practice at the end of 1997.211 
6. Conformity Assessment Procedures 
The TBT Agreement updates and expands disciplines on 
conformity assessment procedures. Whereas the Standards Code applied 
only to testing, Annex 1 to the TBT Agreement defines "conformity 
assessment procedures" to include all aspects of conformity assessment, 
including laboratory accreditation and quality system registration. 212 
Besides reiterating the national treatment commitment in carrying out 
conformity assessment procedures,213 the TBT Agreement encourages 
acceptance of conformity assessment procedures by other Members, even 
when those procedures differ from their own.214 
An issue of special concern to the United States was the formation 
in the EU of a regional certification system for the mutual recognition of 
quality assessments for electronics closed to outside suppliers. This 
development raised fears in the United States that countries outside the EU 
would not have open access to the certification procedures, thus putting 
United States electronics industries at a competitive disadvantage in a 
large and rapidly expanding market. Acceptance of test data generally by 
foreign laboratories was a high priority for the United States as it entered 
the Uruguay Round negotiations. Unless test results are mutually 
recognized, suppliers will be forced to repeat tests before their products 
can enter the territory of another Member. In this connection, Article 6.1 
208 See id. art. 4.1. 
~09 See U.S. INT'L TRADE COMM'N, USITC PUB. No. 2403, OPERATION OF THE TRADE 
AGREEMENTS PROGRAM 58 (1991). 
~IO See TBT Agreement, supra note 100, arts. 5-9. 
211 See WTO, Comm. on Technical Barriers to Trade, First Triennial Review of the 
Operation and Implementation of the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, 
G/TBT/5, at 3, para. 11 (Nov. 19, 1997) [hereinafter WTO, First Triennial Review], 
available in WTO Doc. Website, supra note 4. 
~I~ See TBT Agreement, supra note 100, Annex I, para. 3. 
~IJ See TBT Agreement, supra note 100, art. 5.1. 
21~ See id. art. 6.1. 
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directs Members to recognize other Members' test results, whenever 
possible.2ls As WTO Members adopt internationally-recognized 
accreditation standards for laboratory recognition that are promulgated by 
bodies such as the ISO and the International Electrotechnical Commission, 
the issue of mutual recognition of conformity assessment procedures 
should ultimately be defused. 
The Agreement makes the minimum derogation principle expressly 
applicable to conformity assessment procedures by providing that 
"conformity assessment procedures shall not be more strict or be applied 
more strictly than is necessary to give the importing Member adequate 
confidence that products conform with the applicable technical regulations 
or standards, taking account of the risks non-conformity would create."216 
To that end: procedures must be undertaken and completed as 
expeditiously as possible; the standard processing period must be 
published and the documentation promptly handled; the location of 
conformity assessments and sample selection must not be unnecessarily 
inconvenient; and a procedure must be established for reviewing 
complaints about the conformity assessment procedures.217 
As is the case with technical regulations and standards, central 
governments are obligated to take "such reasonable measures as may be 
available to them," ensuring compliance by state and local government 
bodies and non-governmental bodies with the Agreement's conformity 
assessment procedures.2ls 
Article 6.3 addresses accrediting persons, in the exporting 
Member, to perform conformity assessment procedures that are 
satisfactory to the importing Member. From the perspective of an 
importing WTO Member, unless the exporting Member's testing 
laboratories have been accredited by authorities of the importing Member, 
the validity of test data may be suspect. In this connection, Article 6.3 
encourages Members to enter into negotiations for the conclusion of 
agreements for the mutual recognition of results of each other's 
conformity assessment procedures. 219 Mutual recognition agreements 
eliminate the need for duplicative product testing, inspection, or 
certification in both the exporting and importing Member. To that end, the 
21S See id. 
~16Id. art. 5.1.2. 
217 See id. art. 5.2. 
m See id. arts. 7, 8. 
~19 See id. art. 6.3. 
HeinOnline -- 22 Wm. & Mary Envtl. L. & Pol’y Rev. 416 1997-1998
416 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'y REv. [Vol. 22:375 
United States and the EU concluded mutual recognition agreements in 
1997.220 
7. Enquiry Points 
Article 10 of the TBT Agreement endeavors to make national 
product regulations, standards, and conformity assessment procedures 
transparent by establishing "enquiry points" where all reasonable enquiries 
may be directed for obtaining relevant documents. 221 
8. The Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade 
Article 13 establishes the Committee on Technical Barriers to 
Trade to oversee the operation of the Agreement and to conduct an annual 
review.222 Pursuant to Article 14, disputes arising under the Agreement are 
resolved under the Dispute Settlement Understanding, the umbrella 
arrangement for resolving all GATT -WTO disputes. 223 
9. Triennial Review 
Finally, Article 15.4 of the TBT Agreement provides that "[n]ot 
later than the end of the third year of entry into force of the WTO 
Agreement and at the end of each three-year period thereafter, the 
Committee shall review the operation and implementation of this 
Agreement .... "224 The TBT Committee completed its first triennial 
220 In June 1997, the United States and the EU concluded a package of mutual 
recognition agreements (MRAs) in six sectors covering approximately $50 billion in two-
way trade. The MRAs will be phased in and fully implemented in 18 months for 
recreational craft, two years for telecommunication and electronic products, and three 
years for pharmaceuticals and medical devices. See Agreement on Mutual Recognition 
Between the United States of America and the European Communities (visited Feb. 15, 
1999) <http://www.ustr.gov/agreements/mra/mra l.pdf>. Under the 1993 Maastricht 
Treaty on European Union, the European Communities or "EC" became the European 
Union. The Maastricht Treaty, however, did not vest the EU with international legal 
personality. Consequently, the entity that represents the IS-member EU in its trade 
relations with third countries is still referred to as the European Communities or EC. 
221 See TBT Agreement, supra note 100, art. 13. See also MCGOVERN, supra note 170, § 
7.245. 
~22 See TBT Agreement, supra note 100, art. 13. 
22) See id. art. 14. 
~~~ Id. art. 15.4. 
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review at the end of 1997. In that review, the Committee reached a 
number of conclusions: (1) an adjustment of the rights and obligations of 
the Agreement and amendments to its text are not necessary; (2) insofar as 
transparency and notification of national regulations and administrative 
decisions are concerned, Members as a whole have not implemented their 
Article 15.2 commitments satisfactorily; and (3) mUltiple product testing 
and certification have a restrictive effect on trade and, therefore, the 
principles of "one standard, one test," and "one certification, one time" 
should be pursued.225 
F. The Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures 
Before the adoption of the Agreement on Subsidies and 
Countervailing Measures (SCM Agreement),226 the successor agreement to 
the Tokyo Round Subsidies Code, government subsidies to firms for the 
purpose of complying with pollution abatement laws received no special 
treatment. Products of firms receiving such subsidies, if not generally 
available to firms throughout the country, were subject to countervailing 
duties if they were exported to another GATT contracting party and 
caused injury to a domestic firm.227 The SCM Agreement changes this 
result on a limited basis. 
In the course of the Uruguay Round negotiations serious 
consideration was given to expanding the Tokyo Round Subsidies Code to 
authorize transitional assistance to firms for pollution abatement 
expenditures. That proposal was adopted in Article 8 of the SCM 
Agreement, which makes environmental subsidies non-actionable, 
provided narrowly drawn criteria are met. 
Article 8.2(c) of the SCM Agreement provides that assistance to 
promote adaptation of existing facilities228 to new environmental 
requirements imposed by law or regulation that result in greater 
constraints and financial burdens on firms are non-actionable, provided the 
assistance meets the following five criteria: 
(1) it is a one-time, non-recurring measure; 
225 See WTO, First Triennial Review, supra note 211, at 2, 7. 
226 SCM Agreement, supra note 102. 
227 See GAIT, supra note 6, art. VI. 
228 The term "existing facilities" is defined as "facilities which have been in operation for 
at least two years at the time when new environmental requirements are imposed." SCM 
Agreement, supra note 102, art. 8.2(c) n.33. 
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(2) it is limited to twenty percent of the cost of adaptation; 
(3) it does not cover the cost of replacing and operating the assisted 
investment, which must be fully borne by firms; 
(4) it is directly linked to and proportionate to a firm's planned 
reduction of nuisances and pollution, and does not cover any 
manufacturing cost savings which may be achieved; and 
(5) it is available to all firms which can adopt the new equipment 
and/or production processes.229 
All environmental subsidies must be notified in advance to the 
WTO Committee on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures in sufficient 
detail to permit monitoring for compliance with the SCM Agreement. 230 If 
a Member believes that an otherwise non-actionable environmental 
subsidy is having a seriously adverse effect on a domestic industry, then 
the Member may seek a determination of the matter from the SCM 
Committee.231 
The SCM Agreement contains a sunset provision on environmental 
subsidies of five years, unless the SCM Committee agrees to extend it. 232 
G. The Agreement on Agriculture 
A second Uruguay Round Agreement also permits environmental 
subsidies in limited circumstances.233 Under the Agreement on 
Agriculture, developed-country Members agree to reduce their domestic 
agricultural subsidies twenty percent from 1986-88 base-period levels by 
2000.234 These reductions are based on an Aggregate Measurement of 
Support (AMS), which is a calculation of support payments received 
during the base period. 235 Generally excluded from the AMS calculation 
are support programs that have minimal trade-distorting effects on 
agricultural production.236 Expressly excluded are payments received 
229 See id. 
230 See id. art. 8.3. The U.S. implementing legislation IS located at 19 U.S.c. § 
1677(5B)(D)(ii). 
231 See SCM Agreement, supra note 102, art. 9.1. 
m See id. art. 31. 
m The SCM Agreement's provisions on actionable domestic subsidies does not cover 
agricultural subsidies. See id. art. 5. 
23J See Agreement on Agriculture, supra note 101, art.6. 
235 See id. art. l(a). 
"36 See id. Annex 2: 1. 
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under environmental programs.237 
To qualify for exclusion from the AMS calculation, the 
environmental program payments must be made under a clearly defined 
government environmental or conservation program and must be 
dependent upon the fulfillment of specific conditions under the program.238 
The payment must be limited to the additional costs or loss of income 
involved in complying with the government program.239 
Under the Article 13 "peace clause" of the Agreement on 
Agriculture, no countervailing duty action may be brought against such 
environmental subsidies during the nine-year implementation period of the 
Agreement. 240 
H. The Dispute Settlement Understanding 
Criticisms of the dispute settlement process under GATT 1947 are 
numerous, and explain in part why unilateral measures were sometimes 
used in resolving trade-environment disputes. The most frequently 
recurring complaints about dispute settlement under GATT 1947 included 
the following: 
• GATT lacked an integrated dispute settlement procedure, 
with the Tokyo Round Codes containing separate dispute settlement 
mechanisms. 
• GATT disputes were sometimes resolved through the grant of 
waIvers. 
• Small countries were handicapped in achieving effective results 
against large countries. 
• The GATT panel process was lengthy and subject to delaying 
tactics. 
• GATT contained no provision for the automatic establishment 
ofa panel. 
• Inadequate staff and experts often hamstrung panels in their 
factfinding. 
• The insistence on approval of panel reports by consensus 
permitted the losing country to block adoption of reports. 
• Effective enforcement and sanctions were almost nonexistent, 
237 See id. Annex 2: 12. 
238 See id. 
239 See id. 
240 See id. art. 13. 
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with the exception of bilateral retaliation. 
• GATT did not require notification of the implementation of a 
panel recommendation. 241 
The Uruguay Round Understanding on Rules and Procedures 
Governing the Settlement of Disputes (the Dispute Settlement 
Understanding or DSU) addresses almost all of these criticisms. As noted 
in DSU Article 3.2, "[t]he dispute settlement system of the WTO is a 
central element in providing security and predictability to the multilateral 
trading system."242 To that end, the DSU establishes an integrated, rules-
based dispute settlement process with a right of appellate review. The 
DSU virtually assures that all panel or Appellate Body reports will be 
adopted expeditiously and without modification.243 
241 For an analysis of dispute settlement under GAIT 1947 and criticisms of that process, 
see generally William 1. Davey, The GATT Dispute Settlement System: Proposals for 
Reform in the Uruguay Round. in WORKSHOP ON THE MULTILATERAL TRADE 
NEGOTIA TlONS OF GAIT (1992); ROBERT E. HUDEC, ENFORCING INTERNATIONAL 
TRADE LAW: THE EVOLUTION OF THE MODERN GAIT LEGAL SYSTEM (1993); JOHN H. 
JACKSON, RESTRUCTURING THE GAIT SYSTEM 56-80 (1990); PIERRE PESCATORE, 
HANDBOOK OF GAIT DISPUTE SETTLEMENT (1992); U.S. INT'L TRADE COMM'N, 
REVIEW OF THE EFFECTIVENESS OF TRADE DISPUTE SETILEMENT UNDER THE GAIT AND 
THE TOKYO ROUND AGREEMENTS (USITC Pub. 1793, 1995); William J. Davey, Dispute 
Settlement in GATT, 11 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 51 (1987); Robert E. Hudec, A Statistical 
Profile of the GATT Dispute Settlement Cases: 1948-1989. 2 MINN. 1. GLOBAL TRADE 1 
(1993); Rosine Plank, An Unofficial Description of How a GA TT Panel Works and Does 
Not. 1. INT'LARB., Dec. 1987, at 53. 
Full texts of adopted GAIT 1947 panel reports are available from the WTO's 
website. See WTO Doc. Website, supra note 4. 
242 DSU, supra note 103, art. 3.2. 
243 For additional analyses of the WTO dispute settlement process, see generally FRANK 
W. SWACKER ET AL., WORLD TRADE WITHOUT BARRIERS: THE WORLD TRADE 
ORGANIZATION (WTO) AND DISPUTE RESOLUTION (1995); Grant Aldonas, The World 
Trade Organization: Revolution in International Trade Dispute Settlements, DISP. 
RESOL. 1., Sept. 1996, at 73; Judith Hippler Bello, The WTO Dispute Settlement 
Understanding: Less Is More. 90 AM. 1. INT'L L. 416 (1996); Judith H. Bello & Alan F. 
Holmer, Dispute Resolution in the New World Trade Organization: Concerns and Net 
Benefits, 28 INT'L LAW. 1095 (1994); John H. Jackson, The WTO Dispute Settlement 
Understanding-Misunderstanding on the Nature of Legal Obligation, 91 AM. 1. INT'L L. 
69 (1997); Azar M. Khansari, Searching for the Perfect Solution: International Dispute 
Resolution and the New World Trade Organization. 20 HASTINGS INT'L & COMPo L. 
REV. 183 (1996); Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Remedies Along with Rights: Institutional 
Reform in the New GATT, 88 AM. 1. INT'L L. 477 (1994); Curtis Reitz, Enforcement of 
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. 17 U. PA. 1. INT'L ECON. L. 555 (1996); 
Michael K. Young, Dispute Resolution in the Uruguay Round: Lawyers Triumph Over 
Diplolnats, 29 INT'L LAW. 389 (1995). 
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DSU Article 1 integrates the dispute settlement. process of the 
GATT -WTO system by extending the DSU's scope of coverage to all 
disputes brought under any of the GATT -WTO Agreements.244 With the 
exception of certain special or additional rules contained in eight of the 
WTO multilateral trade agreements (MTAs) listed in Appendix 2 of the 
DSU, the rules and procedures of the DSU apply to all disputes.24S 
In a flank attack on unilateral actions taken by the United States 
under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974/46 DSU Article 23, which is 
captioned "Strengthening of the Multilateral System," flatly prohibits 
Members from making unilateral determinations on the following matters: 
(1) whether an Uruguay Round agreement has been violated; (2) whether 
another Member has failed to implement a DSB recommendation within a 
reasonable period of time; or (3) whether the level of suspension of 
concessions is appropriate.247 The DSU is the exclusive mechanism for 
resolving these issues, absent the mutual agreement of the disputing 
Members.248 
The DSB observed in its 1996 annual report that "[t]here has been 
an evident tendency to use the DSU in settling trade disputes in 
accordance with the aim of Article 23 of the DSU .... "249 Trade areas that 
are not the subject of an MTA (e.g., foreign direct investment) are outside 
the scope of the DSU. They may, therefore, be the subject of a Section 
301 proceeding.250 Nevertheless, with regard to trade-environment 
244 See DSU, supra note 103, art. 1.1, app. I. The parties to the Civil Aircraft Agreement 
have not yet agreed to submit disputes arising under that Agreement to the DSB. 
245 See id. art. 1.2. For example, Article 11.2 of the Agreement on the Application of 
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures provides that in disputes involving scientific or 
technical issues, WTO panels should seek advice from experts chosen by the panel. See 
SPS Agreement, supra note 99, art. 11.2. 
246 19 U.S.c. §§ 2411-2420 (1994). 
247 See DSU, supra note 103, art. 23. 
248 DSU Article 25 authorizes disputing Members to agree mutually to resolve their 
dispute through binding arbitration in lieu of DSU panel proceedings. See id. art. 25. 
249 DSB 1996 Annual Report, on file with author. 
250 But see Uruguay Round Agreements Act § 102(a}(2) (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 
3512(a}(2» which provides: 
Nothing in this Act shall be construed-
(A) to amend or modify any law of the United States, including any 
law relating to--
(i) the protection of human, animal, or plant life or 
health, 
(ii) the protection of the environment, or 
(iii) worker safety, or 
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disputes, considering the breadth of the SPS Agreement, the TBT 
Agreement, and GATT Article XX, there is little room for argument that a 
trade-environment dispute is beyond the jurisdiction of the GATT -WTO 
system. 
I. The WTO Committee on Trade and Environment 
As the Uruguay Round negotiators became increasingly aware of, 
and perhaps embarrassed by, the lack of attention environmental issues 
received in the Round, the negotiators resolved that the interaction of trade 
and the environment should receive more systematic consideration by the 
WTO. To that end, the Decision on Trade and Environment was included 
in the Uruguay Round Final Act,251 The decision calls for the creation of a 
Committee on Trade and Environment (CTE), the successor body to the 
moribund GATT Committee on Trade and Environment.2S2 The CTE has 
the following terms of reference: 
• identify the relationship between trade 
measures and environmental measures in order to promote 
sustainable development; and 
• make appropriate recommendations on 
whether any modifications of the provisions of the 
multilateral trading system are required, compatible with 
the open, equitable, and nondiscriminatory nature of the 
system.m 
The CTE is charged with the tasks of investigating the links between trade 
and the environment, making recommendations on how to ease trade-
environment conflicts, and developing a work program.2S4 
(B) to limit any authority conferred under any law of the United States, 
including section 2411 of this title, unless specifically provided for in 
this Act. 
Id. See generally C. O'Neal Taylor, The Limits of Economic Power: Section 301 and the 
World Trade Organization Dispute Settlement System. 30 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 209 
( 1997). 
251 See WTO, Ministerial Decision of 14 April 1994 on Trade and Environment, 33 
I.L.M. 1267 (1994). 
m See id. at 1268. 
"5J Jd. 
"54 See Hunt, supra note 95, at 178-81; Jennifer Schultz, The GATTIWTO Committee on 
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1. WTO and CTE Relations with NGOs 
Many nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) within the 
environmental community complain that the work of the WTO and the 
CTE is closed to them.m The United States has pressed for making the 
work of the CTE, in particular, and the WTO in general, more open and 
transparent to the pUblic. In this connection, in July 1996, the WTO 
General Council adopted a decision, "Guidelines for Arrangements on 
Relations with Non-Governmental Organizations."2s6 Recognizing the 
important contribution that NGOs can make in increasing public 
awareness regarding its activities, the WTO agreed to improve 
transparency and to develop better lines of communication with NGOs in 
several respects. First, the WTO agreed to derestrict documents more 
promptly than in the past and to make them available on the WTO's on-
line computer network.2S7 Second, direct contacts with NGOs by the WTO 
Secretariat through symposia also are encouraged. For example, in May 
1997, the WTO Secretariat organized a symposium with NGOs on trade, 
environment, and sustainable development.2S8 Third, observer status at 
CTE meetings has been extended to the Secretariats of CITES, the 
Montreal Protocol, the Basel Convention, and the Framework Convention 
on Biological Diversity. 
The WTO Secretariat periodically has held informal meetings with 
NGOs concerned with matters relating to the WTO's work on trade, the 
environment, and sustainable development. The first such meeting was 
Trade and the Environment-Toward Environmental Reform, 89 AM. 1. INT'L L. 423, 
432-34 (1995); Kristin Woody, The World Trade Organization's Committee on Trade 
and Environment, 8 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REv. 459, 463 (1996). 
2SS See, e.g., Steve Charnovitz, Participation of Nongovernmental Organizations in the 
World Trade Organization, 17 U. PA. 1. INT'L ECON. L. 331 (1996) [hereinafter 
Charnovitz II]; Philip M. Nichols, Extension of Standing in World Trade Organization 
Disputes to Nongovernmental Parties, 17 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 295 (1996). 
2S6 See Trade and Environment Bulletin No. 16 (visited Oct. 25, 1998) 
<http://www.wto.org/wto/environ/teoI6.html>. 
257 Formal procedures for the circulation and derestriction of WTO documents were 
adopted by the General Council on July 18, 1996. See Procedures for the Circulation 
and Derestriction of WTO Documents, WT1L/1601Rev.1 (1996) (visited Mar. 20, 1998) 
<http://www.wto.org/wto/environ/teOI6.htm> . 
2S8 For a summary of the proceedings, see WTO Symposium on Trade. Environment and 
Sustainable Development, Press/TE 019 (Aug. 14, 1997) available in WTO Doc. 
Website, supra note 4. 
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held m September 1996, at which approximately thirty-five NGOs 
representing environment, development, and consumer interests 
attended. 2S9 Many participants expressed disappointment with the WTO's 
Guidelines to the extent they fall short of the NGOs' goal of complete 
WTO transparency and public accountability. Of special concern was the 
lack of access for NGOs to WTO meetings. Additionally, concern was 
raised regarding the number of documents that did not have to be 
. derestricted for up to six months. NGOs did, however, applaud the 
WTO's creation of the publication, Trade and Environment Bulletin, as a 
useful step toward increased transparency and improved dialogue. 26o 
Whether and how to accommodate the desires of NGOs for greater 
participation in the work of the WTO remains an unresolved issue, at least 
for NGOs. To what extent, if any, should NGOs participate in the policy 
work of the WTO and its committees? Second, to what extent, if any, 
should NGOs participate in the WTO dispute settlement process, either as 
parties, intervenors, amicus curiae, witnesses, or observers?261 
Regarding the first question, if the model for greater NGO 
participation in the policy work of the WTO is the role played by NGOs in 
other international organizations, such as the United Nations, the 
International Labor Organization, or CITES, then NGOs have a good 
argument for increased participation in that facet of the WTO's work. 
Regarding the second question, NGOs insist on participatory rights 
in the WTO dispute settlement process, even to the point of having 
standing to initiate panel dispute proceedings as complaining parties. 
Currently, NGOs have no right to participate formally in WTO dispute 
settlement proceedings. The ability to provide WTO panelists with 
additional information could hardly be a bad thing, if fully informed 
decision making is the desideratum. NGO participation in the WTO 
dispute settlement process as amicus curiae could prove useful. 
Permitting NGO participation at the party or intervenor level, however, 
could only have the effect of burdening an ever-growing WTO panel 
docket,262 delaying the dispute settlement process, and, even worse, 
259 See Trade and Environmental Bulletin No. 16, supra note 256. 
260 See id. 
261 See Chamovitz II, supra note 255, at 340; Glen T. Schleyer, Note, Power to the 
People: Allowing Private Parties to Raise Claims Before the WTO Dispute Resolution 
System, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 2275 (1997). 
262 As of December 1998, the WTO had received 154 consultation requests involving 117 
distinct matters. An overview of the state-of-play of WTO disputes is available from the 
WTO's website. See WTO Doc. Website, supra note 4. 
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creating disenchantment with that process amorig its intended users, WTO 
Members. Recalling that one of the major complaints about GATT 1947 
was the poor state of its dispute settlement process, avoiding the mistakes 
of the past is critical to the future success of the WTO Dispute Settlement 
Understanding. Thus, the argument for direct NGO participation in the 
WTO dispute settlement process is, on balance, not especially compelling. 
In the WTO panel proceeding, Regime for the Importation, Sale 
and Distribution of Bananas, 263 lawyers representing private parties 
attempted to attend the panel meetings. Consistent with GATT practice 
and WTO dispute settlement proceedings, only representatives of 
governments may attend panel meetings.264 Because private lawyers are 
not subject to DSU disciplinary rules, their presence in panel meetings 
could give rise to concerns about breaches of confidentiality. 
Although private parties representing private interests have no 
right to participate directly in WTO panel proceedings, in United States -
Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, several 
environmental NGOs submitted unsolicited amicus briefs with the panel 
that defended the U.S. import ban on shrimp. The panel concluded that 
under Article 13.2 of the DSU, only information that the panel seeks (i.e., 
actually solicits) may be considered by a panel. Nevertheless, the panel 
invited the United States, if it so desired, to include the NGO submissions 
as part of its own submission.26s The Appellate Body affirmed the panel's 
decision to permit the United States to include the NGO submissions as 
part of its own submission, but reversed the panel's other conclusion, 
holding that a panel is free to accept unsolicited submissions from 
interested groups if such information would be helpful to the panel In 
reaching its decision. 266 
2. The CTE's 1996 Report 
The CTE was directed to make a progress report at the WTO's first 
263 WTO, Panel Report, European Communities-Regime for the Importation, Sale and 
Distribution of Bananas, WTIDS27IR1USA, WTIDS27IR1ECU, WTIDS27IR1GTM, 
WTIDS27IR/HND, WTIDS271R1MEX (1997). 
264 See id. para. 7.11; DSU, supra note 103, app. 3:2. See generally Schleyer, supra note 
261. 
26S See Report of the WTO Panel, United States - Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp 
and Shrimp Products, WTIDS581R, para. 7.8 (1998). 
~66 See Report of the Appellate Body, United States - Import Prohibition of Certain 
Shrimp and Shrimp Products, AB-1998-4, WTIDS58/ABIR, at 39, para. 110 (1998). 
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biennial meeting of the Ministerial Conference held in Singapore in 
December 1996.267 The long-awaited inaugural report ofthe CTE came as 
a major disappointment for those observers who had expected more 
ambitious results. 268 In the view of traders, the CTE Report was very 
cautious in its conclusions and recommendations. Some WTO ministers 
expressed disappointment with the Report's failure to resolve most of the 
ten agenda items that the CTE addressed.269 Some environmental groups 
savaged the Report for giving the WTO dispute settlement process 
primacy over any applicable dispute settlement mechanism in an MEA in 
cases where the WTO and the MEA had concurrent jurisdiction over a 
trade-environment dispute.270 Regardless of one's political persuasion, the 
Report looks every bit the compromise document, that is, one designed to 
offend no one and thus guaranteed to displease everyone. 
Two important assumptions guided the work of the CTE in the 
preparation of its 1996 Report: (1) WTO competence for policy 
coordination in this area is limited to trade; and (2) if problems of policy 
coordination are identified by the CTE, then they are to be resolved in a 
way that upholds and safeguards the principles of the multilateral trading 
system. The CTE Report addressed the following ten items, offering 
conclusions and recommendations on several of them. 
First, the CTE addressed "[t]he relationship between the provisions 
of the multilateral trading system and trade measures for environmental 
purposes, including those pursuant to multilateral environmental 
agreements."271 Noting that governments endorsed Principle 12 of the Rio 
Declaration that unilateral actions to deal with environmental challenges 
outside the jurisdiction of the importing country should be avoided, the 
CTE endorsed multilateral solutions to trade concerns.272 The CTE urged 
267 See WTO, WTO Committee on Trade and Environment Concludes its Work and 
Adopts its Report to the Singapore Ministerial Conference, PREssrrE 015, para. 1 (Nov. 
18, 1996). 
268 See WTO, Comm. on Trade and Env't, Report (1996) of the Committee on Trade and 
Environment, WT/CTEII (Nov. 12, 1996) [hereinafter CTE 1996 Report], available in 
WTO Doc. Website, supra note 4. For a summary of CTE activities during 1995, see 
Comm. on Trade and Env't, Summary of Activities of the Committee on Trade and 
Environment (/995) Presented by the Chairman of the Committee. WT/CTEIWII7 (Dec. 
12,1995) available in WTO Doc. Website, supra note 4. 
269 See Ministers Voice Disappointment with Weakness of CTE Report, 13 InCI Trade 
Rep. (BNA) 1925 (l996). 
270 See id. 
271 CTE 1996 Report, supra note 268, item 1 & para. 171. 
212 See id. para. 171. 
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cooperation between the WTO and the institutions established under 
MEAs. 
Second, the CTE examined "[t]he relationship between 
environmental policies relevant to trade and environmental measures with 
significant trade effects and the provisions of the multilateral trading 
system."273 While this issue is perhaps the most important-and certainly 
the knottiest-of all the items addressed by the CTE, the CTE dodged it 
by noting that further examination and analysis of these policies and 
measures is required. The CTE made no conclusions or 
recommendation.274 
Third, the CTE considered "[t]he relationship between the 
provisions of the multilateral trading system and charges and taxes for 
environmental purposes,'>27S and "requirements for environmental purposes 
relating to products, including standards and technical regulations, 
packaging, labeling, and recycling. ,,276 Under this agenda item the CTE 
focused on voluntary eco-Iabeling programs. The CTE viewed such 
programs as a positive development, subject to concerns over transparency 
in their preparation, adoption, and application.277 
Fourth, the CTE reviewed "[t]he provisions of the multilateral 
trading system with respect to the transparency of trade measures used for 
environmental purposes and environmental measures and requirements 
which have significant trade effects."m The CTE concluded that no 
modifications to existing WTO transparency rules were required to ensure 
adequate transparency for existing trade-related environmental measures. 
The Committee recommended that the Secretariat compile all notifications 
of trade-related environmental measures and collate them in a single 
database accessible to WTO Members.279 
Fifth, the CTE discussed "[t]he relationship between the dispute 
273 Id. item 2 & para. 179. 
274 See id. paras. 180-81. 
27S Id. item 3A & para. 182. 
2761d. item 3B & para. 183. 
271 See id. paras. 183-84. See generally Staffm, supra note 133. In April 1997, the CTE 
published an overview of the current work being done within the Codex Alimentarius 
Commission, the International Trade Center, the OECD, UNCTAD, the United Nations 
Environment Program, the United Nations Industrial Development Program, and the ISO 
on eco-Iabeling. See WTO, Comm. on Trade and Env't, Eco-Labelling: Overview of 
Current Work in Various International Fora, WT/CTEIWI45 (Apr. IS, 1997) available 
in WTO Doc. Website, supra note 4. 
278 CTE 1996 Report, supra note 268, item 4 & para. 187. 
m See id. para. 189-92. 
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settlement mechanisms in the multilateral trading system and those found 
in multilateral environmental agreements."280 This agenda item was 
watched closely by NGOs, especially environmental groups. The CTE's 
resolution of it caused a stir. The CTE recommended that in the event a 
trade-environment dispute arises between WTO Members that also are 
parties to a controlling MEA, WTO Members have the right to bring the 
dispute to the WTO for resolution. The CTE noted: 
While WTO Members have the right to bring disputes to 
the WTO dispute settlement mechanism, if a dispute arises 
between WTO Members, Parties to an MEA, over the use 
of trade measures they are applying between themselves 
pursuant to the MEA, they should consider trying to resolve 
it through the dispute settlement mechanisms available 
under the MEA. 281 
The CTE thus encouraged such parties to resort to the dispute settlement 
mechanisms of the MEA, but gave primacy to the DSU. The United 
States took exception to the CTE's conclusion that "[t]here is no clear 
indication for the time being of when or how they [i.e., trade measures 
included in MEAs] may be needed or used in the future."282 From the 
United States' perspective, there is no legal impediment for WTO 
Members that also are parties to an MEA to abide by the dispute resolution 
mechanism of the MEA and bypass resort to the WTO Dispute Settlement 
Understanding.283 
Sixth, the CTE analyzed "[t]he effect of environmental measures 
on market access . . . and environmental benefits of removing trade 
restrictions and distortions. "284 This agenda item was the centerpiece of 
the CTE Report for developing-country Members. The CTE's focus was 
on ways in which the WTO can contribute to making international trade 
and environmental policies mutually supportive. Such policies, said the 
CTE, should include trade liberalization and development and 
environmental policies determined at the national level for the promotion 
280 Id. item 5 & paras. 170-79. 
281 Id. para. 178. 
2821d. para. 174(i). 
283 See Environment: EPA Hopes to Shift WTO Panel Focus Away from Trade Provisions 
in Environmental Pacts, 14 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 19 (1997). 
284 CTE 1996 Report, supra note 268, item 6 & para. 195. 
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of sustainable development.28S Recognizing that an open, equitable, and 
nondiscriminatory multilateral trading system and' environmental 
protection are essential to promoting sustainable development, the CTE 
expressed concern that environmental measures might be used to deny 
developing countries market access to developed-country markets. 286 The 
CTE offered no concrete recommendations, however. 
Seventh, the CTE dealt with the issue of exports of domestically 
prohibited goods.287 It recommended that the WTO Secretariat gather 
relevant information on this issue. The Committee also encouraged 
Members to provide technical assistance to developing countries, often the 
export target for such goods.288 
Eighth, the CTE examined relevant provisions of the TRIPS 
Agreement.289 The Committee noted the importance of technology transfer 
of environmentally-sound technologies and products to developing 
countries to enable them to meet the terms and conditions stipulated in 
MEAs.290 
Ninth, the CTE discussed "[t]he work program envisaged in the 
Decision on Trade in Services and the Environment,"291 but was unable to 
identify any measures that Members arguably might want to impose for 
environmental purposes to trade in services not covered already under the 
health and safety exceptions of GATS Article XJV(b).292 
In its final agenda item, the CTE considered "[i]nput to the 
relevant bodies in respect of appropriate arrangements for relations with 
intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations referred to in 
Article V of the WTO.,,293 The Committee acknowledged the benefit of 
closer consultations with NGOs, and urged greater transparency in the 
work of the Committee. The CTE extended observer status to 
intergovernmental organizations, including those responsible for one or 
more MEAs.294 
285 See id. para. 196. 
286 See id. para. 197. 
287 See id. item 7 & para. 200. 
288 See id. paras. 203, 205. 
289 See id. item 8 & para. 206. 
290 See id. para. 207. 
291 Id. item 9 & para. 210. 
292 See id. para. 210. 
293 Id. item 10 & para. 212. 
294 See id. para. 217, 
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3. The CTE's Work Program 
The Ministerial Declaration adopted at the conclusion of the 1996 
Singapore Ministerial Conference contains the following reference to trade 
and the environment: 
The Committee on Trade and Environment has 
made an important contribution towards fulfilling its Work 
Programme. The Committee has been examining and will 
continue to examine, inter alia, the scope of the 
complementarities between trade liberalization, economic 
development and environmental protection. Full imple-
mentation of the WTO Agreements will make an important 
contribution to achieving the objectives of sustainable 
development .... The breadth and complexity of the issues 
covered by the Committee's Work Programme shows that 
further work needs to be undertaken on all items of its 
agenda, as contained in its report.29S 
One of the highest priorities for the CTE should be better integration of the 
GATT -WTO system with MEAs. To that end, the work program of the 
CTE will have to address: (1) discrimination among products based on 
process and production methods (PPMs); (2) the relationship of GATT 
and the WTO Agreements to MEAs; (3) the circumstances under which 
trade measures may be used on environmental grounds; and (4) the scope 
of the Article XX exceptions when invoked on environmental grounds. 
None of these issues was thoroughly addressed or resolved in the CTE's 
1996 Report. The United States has identified these four issues as high 
priority items.296 The CTE's work program for 1997 included all of the 
agenda items listed in its 1996 Report.297 
1. GA TT and WTO Panel Reports Dealing with Environmental Disputes 
295 WTO, Singapore Ministerial Declaration, WTIMIN(96)/DEC, para. 16 (Dec. 13, 
1996) available in WTO Doc. Website, supra note 4. 
296 See USTR REPORT ON ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES, supra note 89, at 1291. 
297 See WTO, The WTO Committee on Trade and Environment Establishes Its Work 
Programme and Schedule of Meetings for 1997, PRESS/TE 017 (March 26, 1997) 
available in WTO Doc. Website, supra note 4. Updates on the progress of the CTE are 
available from Trade and Environment News Bulletins, which are posted on the WTO's 
website. See WTO Doc. Website, supra note 4. 
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While the trade-environment dispute settlement scorecard has sent, 
at times, environmentalists into apoplectic fits, the fact remains that an 
effective, binding dispute settlement mechanism exists for resolving trade-
environment disputes to which the United States has unequivocally 
committed itself. Even if the results of that process have left 
environmentalists shaking their heads, the process is one that strengthens 
multilateral approaches to resolving such disputes. 
1. The Tuna/Dolphin Dispute 
The most notorious GATT panel decision involving trade measures 
taken on environmental grounds concerned the United States' import ban 
on tuna from Mexico.298 The United States imposed the import ban under 
provisions of the Marine Mammal Protection Act limiting the number of 
dolphins that may be killed when harvesting tuna using the purse-seine 
method.299 The United States justified its ban as being a necessary 
measure to protect animal life and to conserve exhaustible natural 
resources under Article XX(b) and (g), respectively.3°O Mexico countered 
that the ban violated the national treatment obligation of Article III and 
was an illegal quantitative restriction in violation of Article XI.30I 
The panel agreed with Mexico that the United States violated the 
national treatment obligation insofar as the tuna harvesting regulations 
were concerned. The regulations did not cover tuna products per se, but 
rather the method by which tuna were caught.302 In the panel's view, the 
only regulations that are permissible under Article III are those that: (1) 
regulate the imported product and not the method used to produce or 
process the product; and (2) do not discriminate against the imported 
product in favor of the domestic produce03 The U.S. regulations did not 
pass muster under either prong of this test because the regulations 
condemned the method of harvesting tuna, rather than the imported 
product per se. 
298 See Tuna-Dolphin I Panel Report, supra note 7; see also Jeffrey L. Dunoff, 
Reconciling International Trade with Preservation of the Global Commons: Can We 
Prosper and Protect? 49 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1407, 1409-22 (1992). 
299 See Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972 § 101, 16 U.S.C. §1371 (1994). 
300 See GAIT, supra note 6, art. XX(b) & (g). 
301 See id. arts. III, XI. 
302 See Tuna-Dolphin I Panel Report, supra note 7, paras. 5.9, 5.11-5.12. 
303 See id. paras. 5.11-5.12. 
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In addition, the U.S. domestic tuna fleet knew in advance the 
allowable dolphin kill. The Mexican fleet, on the other hand, had to guess 
at that figure. The fleet could learn what the figure was only after it had 
caught its tuna because the figure for foreign catches was based on a 
percentage of the actual dolphins killed by the United States fleet during 
that fishing season. The GATT panel found that this methodology 
discriminated in favor of the domestic fleet and, therefore, further violated 
Article Ill's national treatment obligation.304 
Regarding the Article XX(b) and (g) exceptions, the panel 
conceded that those exceptions do not expressly prohibit the exercise of 
extraterritorial jurisdiction.305 At the same time, the panel noted that if the 
U.S. interpretation was accepted, that is, that United States regulations 
could be applied extraterritorially, then Country A could unilaterally 
impose on any other country its own health and safety measures "from 
which other contracting parties could not deviate without jeopardizing 
their rights under the General Agreement."306 The GATT panel rejected 
the unilateral approach that the United States took with Mexico, finding it 
contrary to GATT multilateralism, and thus making the ban not 
"necessary" within the meaning of Article XX(b).307 The United States 
should have taken a different tack, the panel suggested, such as attempting 
to negotiate an international agreement with Mexico.308 
Many of the legal issues analyzed in the 1991 panel report were 
reprised in 1994 in another dispute involving the United States embargo 
on imported tuna from countries that had unacceptably high dolphin-kill 
rates. In a complaint brought by the EU against the United States, a 
GATT panel once again agreed that the Marine Mammal Protection Act 
violates the national treatment commitment of Article III.309 
The postscript to the Tuna/Dolphin dispute is that pursuant to the 
1991 panel's suggestion that a bilateral or multilateral approach be taken 
by the United States, the Agreement for the Reduction of Dolphin 
304 See id. para. 5.15. 
305 The Mexican fishing did not occur in U.S. waters. See id. para. 5.24-5.29. 
306 Id. para. 5.27. 
307 See id. para. 5.28. 
308 See id. 
309 See Tuna-Dolphin I Panel Report, supra note 7; see also Steve Chamovitz, Dolphins 
and Tuna: An Analysis of the Second GATT Panel Report, 24 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,567 
(1994); Paul 1. Yechout, In the Wake of Tuna II: New Possibilities for GATT-Compliant 
Environmental Standards. 5 MINN. 1. GLOBAL TRADE 247 (1996). 
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Mortality in the Eastern Pacific Ocean was concluded in 1992.310 Mexico 
and the United States are active participants in the work of the Review 
Panel and Scientific Advisory Board established under that Agreement.3\1 
The Agreement establishes a per-vessel limit on dolphin mortalities that is 
reduced each year,J12 requires an observer on larger tuna purse-seine 
vessels,JIJ and establishes a research program to develop new fishing gear 
and technologies to reduce, and, if possible, to eliminate, dolphin 
mortality.314 
2. Other GATT Panel Reports 
Although the 1991 Tuna/Dolphin decision is the best-known of the 
Article XX(b) and (g) GATT panel reports, it was preceded by three 
GATT panel reports dealing with import bans taken ostensibly on 
environmental and/or resource conservation grounds.3\S Two of those 
earlier GATT panel reports involved the interpretation of Articles XX(g) 
(resource conservation measures) and XI (the general prohibition against 
quotas). 
In the first report, issued in 1982, Canada challenged a United 
States import ban on tuna from Canada.316 The United States defended its 
action as a measure taken under the Article XX(g) exception for 
conservation of fish stocks.317 Canada countered that the ban was imposed 
in retaliation for Canada's seizure of American-flagged fishing vessels 
caught taking tuna without permission within Canada's 200-mile exclusive 
economic zone off its Pacific coast.3\8 
The GATT panel concluded that the United States ban could not be 
defended under Article XX(g) because the United States had not taken any 
3\0 See Agreement for the Reduction of Dolphin Mortality in the Eastern Pacific Ocean, 
June 1992, 33 l.L.M. 936 [hereinafter Dolphin Mortality Agreement]. 
3\1 See id., apps. II & IV. 
312 See id., pmbl. 
3\3 See id. para. 12. 
314 See id. app. IV. 
315 For a discussion of the GATT dispute settlement process prior to 1994, see Judith H. 
Bello & Alan F. Holmer, Settling Disputes in the GA IT: The Past. Present. and Future. 
24 INT'L LAW. 519 (1990). 
316 See GATT Panel Report, United States- Prohibition of Imports of Tuna and Tuna 
Products from Canada, GATT B.l.S.D. (29th Supp.) at 91 (adopted Feb. 22, 1982) 
[hereinafter Tuna Restrictions Report]. 
317 See id. para. 3.5. 
318 See id. para. 3.13. 
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parallel domestic measures to limit the tuna catch of the United States 
domestic fleet. The ban, therefore, constituted an impermissible 
quantitative restriction in violation of Article XI.319 
The second GATT panel report also dealt with the interpretation of 
Article XX(g).320 In that 1988 report, the United States complained about a 
blanket export ban on unprocessed herring and salmon imposed by 
Canada. Because Canada had not placed any domestic restrictions on 
Canadian consumption of herring and salmon, the Canadian export ban 
was not "primarily aimed" at conservation, in the view of the GATT panel. 
The panel rejected Canada's argument that the so-called quality exception 
under Article XI:2(b) justified the ban.321 Canada's export ban was across-
the-board and did not permit shipments that might comply with the 
standards.322 
The third GATT panel report involved a Canadian and EC 
complaint against a U.S. surcharge imposed on imported oil and chemicals 
to fund the Superfund environmental cleanup law.323 Because the 
additional taxes on imported oil were higher than the comparable taxes on 
domestically produced oil, Canada argued that the Superfund tax violated 
GATT's national treatment obligation.324 
319 See id. para 4.1-4.16. 
320 See GAIT Panel Report, Canada-Measures Affecting Exports of Unprocessed 
Herring and Salmon, GAIT B.I.S.D. (35th Supp.) at 98 (adopted Mar. 22, 1988) 
[hereinafter Herring and Salmon Panel Report]. 
321 See id. para 4.2-4.3. 
322 In the aftermath of the GAIT panel report, Canada removed the export restrictions, 
but substituted regulations that required herring and salmon caught in Canadian waters to 
be landed in Canada before being exported. The United States brought a complaint 
under the Chapter 18 dispute resolution procedures of the Canada-U.S. Free Trade 
Agreement. The United States complained that although the new regulations were not a 
direct export ban, they had that effect because of the additional time and expense 
incurred in off-loading and processing the fish in Canada before export. The NAFT A 
panel concluded that the Canadian regulations were not primarily aimed at conservation, 
were not exempted under Article XX(g), and thus constituted an impermissible 
quantitative restriction in violation of GAIT Article XI, which the CUSFT A 
incorporated through Article 407. See Ted L. McDorman, International Trade Law 
Meets International Fisheries Law: The Canada-U.S. Salmon and Herring Dispute, 7 1. 
INT'L ARB. 107 (1990). 
32J See GAIT Panel Report, United States-Taxes on Petroleum and Certain Imported 
Substances, GAIT B.LS.D. (34th Supp.) at 136 (adopted June 17, 1987) [hereinafter 
Taxes on Petroleum Report). 
3"4 See id., para. 3.1; GAIT, supra note 6, art. III:2. Article III:2 prohibits the imposition 
of taxes that discriminate in favor of the like domestic product relative to imports. Article 
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The GATT panel accepted Canada's position with regard to the tax 
on imported oil.32S It agreed, however, with the United States that the tax 
on nonpetroleum chemical imports constituted a legitimate border-tax 
adjustment permitted under Article II:2(a).326 
The last Article XX(g) panel report issued under GATT 1947 was 
the unadopted Taxes on Automobiles report.327 The panel examined United 
States taxes on automobiles, domestic and imported, that are based on the 
fuel efficiency of the vehicle as determined under the Corporate Average 
Fuel Efficiency (CAFE) standards. The panel concluded that they were 
GATT -consistent in part when assessed on the basis of the product per 
se.328 However, the panel also concluded that penalties imposed under 
CAFE rules on producers failing to meet CAFE standards for their 
automobile fleets violated the Article III national treatment commitment. 
Those penalties were not tied directly to the specific imported product.329 
In summary, GATT panels have refused to give an importing 
country carte blanche to restrict trade on environmental and conservation 
grounds. They could not have done so without seriously compromising 
GATT's goal of promoting liberal trade. GATT 1947 never ruled out all 
trade-based responses to environmental concerns, provided those 
responses satisfied the criteria of either the health and safety exception of 
Article XX(b), or the natural resources conservation exception of Article 
III:2 provides in part: "The products of the territory of any contracting party imported 
into the territory of any other contracting party shall not be subject, directly or indirectly, 
to internal taxes or other internal charges of any kind in excess of those applied, directly 
or indirectly, to like domestic products .... " 
325 See Taxes on Petroleum Report, supra note 323, para. 5.1.12. 
326 See Taxes on Petroleum Report, supra note 323, para. 5.2.10. GATT Article II:2(a) 
provides: 
Nothing in this Article shall prevent any contracting party from 
imposing at any time on the importation of any product: 
(a) a charge equivalent to an internal tax imposed consistently 
with the provisions of paragraph 2 of Article III in respect of the like 
domestic product or in respect of an article from which the imported 
product has been manufactured or produced in whole or in part. 
GATT, supra note 6, art. II:2(a). 
327 See Report of the GATT Panel, United States-Taxes on Automobiles, WTIDS31/R 
(Mar. 14, 1994) available in WTO Doc. Website, supra note 4 [hereinafter Taxes on 
Automobiles]; Eric Phillips, Note, World Trade and the Environment: The CAFE Case, 
17 MICH. J. INT'L L. 827 (1996). 
328 See Taxes on Automobiles, supra note 327, para. 5.45. 
329 See id. paras. 5.39-5.55, 5.59-5.66; see also Steve Charnovitz, The GATT Panel 
Decision on Automobile Taxes, 17 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) 921 (Nov. 2, 1994). 
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XX(g).330 
Many of these issues were revisited in the first panel report issued 
under WTO auspices, Standards for Reformulated Gasoline. 331 
3. The Reformulated Gasoline Dispute 
Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline addressed 
the consistency of United States environmental rules regulating gasoline 
with Article XX of GATT. 332 
a. The Panel Report 
In 1995, Brazil and Venezuela complained to the United States 
about regulations promulgated by the United States Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA) under Clean Air Act amendments enacted by 
Congress in 1990.333 The EPA regulations, entitled Regulations on Fuels 
and Fuel Additives-Standards for Reformulated and Conventional 
Gasoline,334 provide that in geographical areas not meeting national ozone 
330 Dissatisfied with what they perceived to be too limited a range of responses to 
environmental issues, critics of GAIT proposed a variety of amendments both to GAIT 
and to U.S. trade laws during the Uruguay Round. A number of bills and resolutions 
were introduced in Congress to address not only purported environmental shortcomings 
of NAFTA, but also to refonn the GAIT-WTO system so that environmental issues 
would receive greater consideration. See OTA REPORT, supra note 4, at 91-92; Hurlock, 
supra note 7, at 2113 -17. 
331 See WTO, Panel Report, United States-Standards for Reformulated and 
Conventional Gasoline, WTfDS21R (Jan. 29, 1996) [hereinafter Reformulated Gasoline 
Panel Report], reprinted in 35 I.L.M. 274 (1996), available in WTO Doc. Website, supra 
note 4. 
m See id. The panel report was appealed to the DSU Appellate Body, which in tum 
affinned most of the panel's detenninations. For an analysis of the Reformulated 
Gasoline dispute, see Dominique M. Calapai, International Trade and Environmental 
Impact: The WTO Refonnulated Gasoline Case, 3 ENVTL. LAW. 209 (1996). The texts of 
WTO panel and Appellate Body reports are available from the WTO's website. See 
WTO Doc. Website, supra note 4. For a proposal on how environmental disputes should 
be resolved by the WTO, see Kazumochi Kometani, Trade and Environment: How 
Should WTO Panels Review Environmental Regulations Under GATT Articles 1/1 and 
XX?, 16 Nw. 1. INT'L L. & Bus. 441 (1996). 
333 The Clean Air Act amendments pertaining to "refonnulated gasoline for conventional 
vehicles" are codified at 42 U.S.c. § 7545(k) (1994). 
m 40 C.F.R. §§ 80.40-80.91 (1998). 
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requirements, only reformulated gasoline may be sold.m In other areas, 
the sale of conventional gasoline is permitted. Reformulated gasoline 
must meet at least three compositional and performance specifications: (I) 
its oxygen content must not be less than 2 percent;336 (2) its benzene 
content must not exceed 1 percent by volume;337 and (3) the gasoline must 
be free of heavy metals, including lead and manganese.338 The 
performance specifications require a fifteen percent reduction in emissions 
of certain organic compounds and toxic air pollutants, and no increase in 
emissions of nitrogen oxides.339 
The statute and implementing regulations establish separate toxic-
emission baselines for each refiner and blender, using 1990 as the baseline 
year and data supplied by the refiner or blender.340 An individual baseline 
is used for each refiner or blender to determine whether the refiner's and 
blender's gasoline is compliant. In the absence of reliable data, the EPA 
establishes a statutory baseline applicable to those refiners and blenders 
based on average gasoline quality in the United States in 1990.341 
Importers of gasoline were assigned the statutory baseline, unless 
they could establish their individual baselines using 1990 data. For 
domestic refiners unable to compile reliable 1990 data, two alternative 
methods for calculating individual baselines were permitted that were not 
made available to importers.342 In the EPA's view, those alternative 
methods inherently apply only to refiners (the "Gasoline Rule"}.343 For 
importers that are also foreign refiners, the alternative methods for 
determining individual baselines were made available to them, provided 
they exported seventy-five percent of their gasoline to the United States in 
1990 (the "75-percent Rule"}.344 
Venezuela and Brazil argued that the EPA regulations violated 
GATT in at least four respects. First, the regulations violate the Article I 
MFN commitment because they confer an advantage upon a particular 
335 See id. §§ 80.70-80.74. 
336 See id. § 80.4I(a) & (g). 
337 See id. 
338 See id. § 80.41 (h)(i). 
339 See id. § 80.41. 
340 See id. § 80.91 (a)(i). 
341 See Reformulated Gasoline Panel Report, supra note 331, para. 2.5. 
342 See id. para. 2.6. 
343 See id. para. 2.8. 
344 See id. para. 2.7. 
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group of countries (in this case, upon one country, Canada).34s Second, 
they violate the national treatment provision of Article III because 
imported gasoline has to comply with a more stringent statutory baseline, 
whereas domestic gasoline only has to comply with the less stringent 
United States refiner's individual baseline.346 Third, they violate the MFN 
and national treatment obligations of Articles 2.1 and 2.2 of the TBT 
Agreement347 because the Gasoline Rule creates an unnecessary obstacle to 
international trade.348 Fourth and finally, they are not justified under any 
of the GATT Article XX exceptions.349 
The United States responded, first, that the regulations are 
consistent with GATT Article I because they are neutral on their face and 
apply to all imported gasoline regardless of country of origin.3so Second, 
the United States argued that the regulations are consistent with Article III 
because on average both importers and domestic refiners have to satisfy 
approximately the same 1990 United States gasoline quality baseline.3s1 
Third, the United States claimed, the regulations are outside the scope of 
the TBT Agreement because they are not "technical regulations" within 
the meaning of the Agreement. 3S2 Fourth and finally, in any event, the 
regulations fall within the exceptions of GATT Article XX(b ), (d), and 
(g).3S3 
1. Consistency with Article III 
The panel first examined the contention that the Gasoline Rule 
violates Article III:4.3s4 At the outset the panel rejected the United States 
34S See id. para. 3.5-3.10. 
346 See id. para. 3.11-3.35. 
347 See TBT Agreement, supra note 100, arts. 2.1,2.2. 
348 See Reformulated Gasoline Panel Report, supra note 331, para 3.73-3.83. In view of 
its findings under GAIT 1994, the panel did not reach the issues raised under the TBT 
Agreement. See id. para. 6.43. 
34Q See id. para. 3.1,3.37-3.70. The EC and Norway made formal presentations in support 
of Venezuela and Brazil. See id. paras. 4.1-4.11. 
3S0 See id. para. 3.8. 
3S1 See id. paras. 3.17-3.20. 
m See id. paras. 3.74-3.79. 
3S3 See id. para. 3.4; GAIT, supra note 6, art. XX(b), (d) & (g). 
3S4 In considering whether the 75% Rule violates the MFN commitment, the panel 
deferred on the ground of "mootness," i.e., that the Rule was not currently in force 
because no importer had qualified under it by the deadline set by the EPA. See 
Reformulated Gasoline Panel Report, mpra note 331, para. 6.19. 
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argument that on average the treatment provided to imported gasoline is 
equivalent. The panel noted that this amounted to an argument that less 
favorable treatment in one instance could be offset by correspondingly 
more favorable treatment in another instance.JSS This same argument was 
advanced and rejected in the 1989 panel report in Section 337 of the Tariff 
Act of 1930. Such an interpretation of Article III, in the panel's view, 
"would lead to great uncertainty about the conditions of competition 
between imported and domestic products and thus defeat the purposes of 
Article III. "356 
n. Unjustified under Article XX(b) 
Having concluded that the EPA regulations violate the national 
treatment obligation of Article III, the panel turned to the question whether 
they nevertheless are justified under one or more of the Article XX 
exceptions. First, under the human health exception of Article XX(b), the 
United States had to satisfy the following three-prong test: 
(1) that the policy in respect of the measures for 
which the provision was invoked fell within the range of 
policies designed to protect human, animal or plant life or 
health; 
(2) that the inconsistent measures for which the 
exception was invoked were necessary to fulfil [sic] the 
policy objective; and 
(3) that the measures were applied in conformity 
with the requirements of the introductory clause of Article 
XX.357 
Regarding the first prong, it was undisputed that the United States policy 
was to reduce air pollution resulting from the consumption of gasoline, a 
policy squarely concerning the protection of human, animal and plant life 
or health. 358 Turning to the question of whether the inconsistent measure 
was "necessary," the panel relied on the interpretation of that term in the 
m See id. para. 6.14. 
356 GATT Panel Report, United States-Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, GATT 
B.I.S.D. (36th Supp.) at 345, para. 5.14 (1989) [hereinafter Section 337 Panel Report]. 
m Reformulated Gasoline Panel Report, supra note 331, para. 6.20. 
358 See id. para. 6.21. 
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Section 337 panel report in the context of Article XX(d): 
[A] contracting party cannot justify a measure inconsistent 
with another GATT provision as "necessary" in terms of 
Article XX(d) if an alternative measure which it could 
reasonably be expected to employ and which is not 
inconsistent with other GATT provisions is available to it. 
By the same token, in cases where a measure consistent 
with other GATT provisions is not reasonably available, a 
contracting party is bound to use, among the measures 
reasonably available to it, that which entails the least 
degree of inconsistency with other GATT provisions. JS9 
In other words, if consistent or less inconsistent measures were reasonably 
available to the United States, the "necessary" prong of the Article XX(b) 
test would not be met. For example, in the Section 337 case, the GATT 
panel condemned general exclusion orders issued by the International 
Trade Commission as not necessary because they were overly broad. On 
the other hand, that same panel approved limited exclusion orders as being 
justified even though they were otherwise inconsistent with Article III:4. J60 
The Reformulated Gasoline panel concluded that one alternative 
would be a unitary statutory baseline applicable to all refiners and 
blenders. In lieu of that, the panel suggested that the EPA compute 
individual baselines for gasoline importers derived from evidence of the 
individual 1990 baselines of foreign refiners with whom the importers 
currently deal. J61 Even though that methodology could result in formally 
different regulation of imported and domestic products, the panel added 
that Article III:4's requirement to treat an imported product no less 
favorably than the like domestic product is satisfied if the different 
treatment results in maintaining conditions of competition for the imported 
product no less favorable than those of the like domestic product. J62 
In response to U.S. objections that verification of foreign refiners' 
baselines was not administratively feasible, the panel replied that data 
JS9 Section 337 Panel Report, supra note 356, para. 5.26; accord GATT Panel Report, 
Thailand -Restrictions on Importation of Internal Taxes on Cigarettes, GATT B.I.S.D. 
(37th Supp.) at 200, para. 75 (1990) . 
.160 See Section 337 Panel Report, supra note 356, para. 5.32. 
lbl See Reformulated Gasoline Panel Report, supra note 331, para. 6.25. 
lb2 See id. 
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verification in other analogous international trade law enforcement 
contexts was demonstrably feasible. Consequently, the panel was 
unconvinced that any special difficulty existed in the imported gasoline 
context that was sufficient to warrant the United States statutory baseline 
method for importers.363 The panel noted, for example, that the data that 
would have to be verified under the panel's proposed alternative method 
for detennining importers' baselines was no less susceptible to verification 
than data submitted to the United States in enforcing domestic 
antidumping duty law.364 The United States relied on data in the 
antidumping duty context that would be similar to the data submitted to 
substantiate compliance with the Gasoline Rule. If importers failed to 
submit accurate or unverifiable infonnation, then the United States would 
be justified in resorting to a statutory baseline.365 In addition, the 
imposition of penalties on importers that submitted false or inaccurate 
infonnation would be an adequate deterrent, according to the panel.366 
lll. Unjustified Under Article XX(d) 
Having concluded that the EPA regulations were not justified 
under the Article XX(b) exception, the panel next focused on whether the 
regulations might nevertheless satisfy the Article XX(d) exception.367 In 
order to justify a measure otherwise inconsistent with Article 111:4 under 
the border enforcement exception of Article XX( d), the party invoking the 
exception bears the burden of proving the following three elements: (1) the 
measure must secure compliance with laws or regulations themselves not 
inconsistent with GATT; (2) the inconsistent measure must be necessary 
to secure compliance with those laws and regulations; and (3) the measure 
must be applied in confonnity with the Article XX chapeau, i.e., not 
applied in a manner which would constitute either a means of arbitrary or 
unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same conditions 
prevail, or a disguised restriction on international trade. 368 
The panel concluded that since the various baseline methods of the 
Gasoline Rule did not themselves "secure compliance" with the baseline 
363 See id. para. 6.26. 
364 See id. para. 6.28. 
365 See id. 
366 See id. 
367 See id. paras. 6.29, 6.30. 
368 See id. para. 6.31. 
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system, i.e., they were not a law enforcement mechanism or procedure per 
se, they failed to meet the first of the three criteria.369 The baseline 
methods, therefore, were outside the scope of the Article XX( d) 
exception.370 
IV. Unjustified under Article XX(g) 
The final argument raised by the United States in support of the 
Gasoline Rule was that it was justified under the exhaustible natural 
resources exception of Article XX(g).371 In order to prevail under this 
exception, a responding party has the burden of proving the following four 
elements: (I) the policy in respect of the measures for which Article 
XX(g) is invoked falls within the range of policies related to the 
conservation of exhaustible natural resources; (2) the measure is related to 
the conservation of exhaustible natural resources; (3) the measure is made 
effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or 
consumption; and (4) the measure is applied in conformity with the Article 
XX chapeau.m 
Turning to the first of these four elements, the panel agreed with 
the United States that its policy was related to the conservation of an 
exhaustible natural resource, namely, clean air, lakes, streams, parks, 
crops, and forests, all of which could be exhausted by air pollution. m In a 
critical concession to the United States, the panel agreed that even though 
air was a renewable resource if adequate pollution abatement controls 
were put in place (unlike, for example, fossil fuels), that did not preclude it 
from being an exhaustible natural resource for purposes of Article 
XX(g).374 
In addressing the second and third elements, the panel in essence 
conflated the analysis. The second element asks whether the baseline 
methods of the Gasoline Rule are "related to" the conservation of clean 
air. In answering this question, the panel agreed with the 1987 Herring 
369 See id. para. 6.33. 
370 See id.; accord GAIT Dispute Panel, EEC-Regulations on Imports of Parts and 
Components, May 16, 1990, GAIT B.LS.D. (37th Supp.) at 132, paras. 5.12-5.18 
(1991). 
371 See Reformulated Gasoline Panel Report, supra note 331, para. 6.35. 
372 See id. 
m See id. para. 6.36. 
374 See id. para. 6.37; accord Herring and Salmon Panel Report, supra note 320, para. 
4.4; Tuna Restrictions Report, supra note 316, para. 5.13. 
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and Salmon panel report that the term "related to" is synonymous with 
"primarily aimed at."37S While a trade measure does not have to be 
necessary or essential to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources 
in order to satisfy the Article XX(g) exception, it must at least be 
"primarily aimed at" the conservation of such resources in order to "relate 
to" conservation within the meaning of Article XX(g). 
By a parity of reasoning, the panel observed that the term "in 
conjunction with" used in the third element of the Article XX(g) exception 
has to be interpreted in a way that ensures that the scope of action under 
Article XX(g) is limited to the pursuit of policies aimed at the 
conservation of natural resources. 376 Accordingly, the panel reached a 
conclusion that can best be described as cryptic and circular: a measure is 
made effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or 
consumption if the measure also is aimed primarily at rendering effective 
such restrictions.377 
The panel then moved to the question of whether the Gasoline Rule 
was aimed primarily at the conservation of exhaustible natural resources. 
The panel was unable to see the connection between discriminatory 
treatment of imported gasoline chemically identical with its domestic 
counterpart, and the United States objective of improving air quality.378 
The panel therefore concluded that the Gasoline Rule that treated imports 
less favorably than the domestic like product was not primarily aimed at 
the conservation of clean air.379 
b. The Appellate Body Report 
Pursuant to Article 16 of the Dispute Settlement Understanding/80 
the United States notified the Dispute Settlement Body on February 21, 
1996, of its decision to appeal the ruling of the panel that the baseline 
methods of the Gasoline Rule do not constitute a measure relating to the 
375 See Reformulated Gasoline Panel Report, supra note 331, para. 6.39; accord Tuna 
Restrictions Report, supra note 316; Taxes on Automobiles, supra note 327; see also 
Herring and Salmon Panel Report, supra note 320, para 4.6. 
376 See Reformulated Gasoline Panel Report, supra note 331, para. 6.39. 
377 See id. 
378 See id. para. 6.40. 
379 [d. para. 6.40. In light of its finding, the panel deemed it unnecessary to detennine 
whether the measure was "made effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic 
production or consumption." [d. para. 6.41. 
380 DSU, supra note 103, art. 16. 
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conservation of clean air within the meaning of Article XX(g).381 The 
Appellate Body affinned the panel's report, but on different grounds. 382 
The Appellate Body criticized the panel's reasoning as opaque, 
observing that the panel incorrectly analyzed Article XX(g) by asking the 
wrong question. 383 In the Appellate Body's view, the panel had to first 
find that the measure provided less favorable treatment in violation of 
Article III:4 before it could even begin to consider whether the measure 
was excepted under Article XX(g).384 After answering that threshold 
question in the affinnative, the panel should not have asked again whether 
the less favorable treatment of imported gasoline was primarily aimed at 
the conservation of exhaustible natural resources. 38S Instead, the panel 
should have asked whether the "measure"-the baseline methodology of 
the Gasoline Rule-was aimed primarily at the conservation of clean air.386 
1. Measures "Relating To" Conservation 
The Appellate Body turned to the specific question of whether the 
baseline methodology "relates to," that is, whether it is "primarily aimed 
at," the conservation of clean air.387 It answered this question in the 
affinnative.388 Examining the baseline methodology against the backdrop 
381 See GATT Appellate Body Report, United States-Standards for Reformulated and 
Conventional Gasoline, WTIDS2/ABIR (Apr. 29, 1996), 35 I.L.M. 605, 613 (1996) 
[hereinafter Reformulated Gasoline Appellate Body Report] available in WTO Doc. 
Website, supra note 4. See also Maury D. Shenk, International Decisions-United 
States-Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, 90 AM. 1. INT'L L. 669 
(1996) (analyzing the Appellate Body report). 
A preliminary procedural issue addressed by the Appellate Body was whether 
Venezuela and Brazil properly raised on appeal the issue of the correctness of the panel's 
finding that clean air is an exhaustible natural resource. Neither country had cross-
appealed that finding, but instead raised it for the first time in their Appellees' 
Submissions. See Reformulated Gasoline Appellate Body Report, supra, at 615. The 
Appellate Body agreed with the United States that Venezuela and Brazil had raised this 
issue in a procedurally improper manner that was inconsistent with the Working 
Procedures for Appellate Review. WT/ABIWPII (Feb. 16, 1996) available in WTO Doc. 
Website, supra note 4. 
382 See Reformulated Gasoline Appellate Body Report, supra note 381, at 633. 
383 See id. at 619-20. 
384 See id. 
385 See id. 
386 See id. at 623. 
387 See id. 
388 See id. 
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of the Gasoline Rule as a whole, the Appellate Body found a substantial, 
not merely an incidental or inadvertent, relationship between the baseline 
methodology and the conservation of clean air.389 . 
ii. "In Conjunction With" Domestic Restrictions 
Because the panel did not consider it necessary to address the other 
elements of the Article XX(g) exception, the Appellate Body addressed 
the third element of Article XX(g) (i.e., whether such measures are made 
effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or 
consumption).390 The Appellate Body interpreted this phrase as requiring 
that the measures concerned must impose some restrictions on both 
imported gasoline and domestic gasoline.39I As the Appellate Body noted, 
"[t]he clause is a requirement of even-handedness in the imposition of 
restrictions, in the name of conservation, upon the production or 
consumption of exhaustible natural resources."392 That requirement did not 
demand, however, that the same restrictions be applied to both. In other 
words, equality of treatment is not required. If equal treatment were 
required, the Appellate Body noted, then the measure probably would not 
be inconsistent with Article III:4 in the first place, thus eliminating the 
need for the Article XX(g) exception.393 The only thing required to satisfy 
the third element is that some restrictions be placed upon the domestic like 
product.394 
The Appellate Body rejected Venezuela's suggestion that the 
measures must have some demonstrable effect on conservation.395 The 
Appellate Body did agree that if a specific measure could not in any 
possible situation have any positive effect on conservation goals, then the 
measure could not be "primarily aimed at" the conservation of natural 
reso urces. 396 
lll. The Article XX Chapeau 
389 See id. 
390 See id. 
391 See id. at 624. 
392 Id. at 625 (emphasis in original). 
393 See id. 
394 See id. 
395 See id. 
396 See id at 625-26. 
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Having concluded that the baseline methodology came within the 
tenns of Article XX(g), the Appellate Body took up the question of 
whether it also met the requirements of the Article XX chapeau that is 
applicable to all Article XX exceptions.397 Unlike the enumerated 
exceptions which address the substance of a challenged measure, the 
chapeau is concerned with the manner in which such measures are 
applied.398 The chapeau was added to Article XX in order to prevent 
"abuse of the exceptions" that might frustrate or defeat the other GATT 
obligations.399 
The chapeau prohibits the application of a measure, otherwise 
satisfying one or more of the Article XX exceptions, if it constitutes: (1) 
"arbitrary discrimination" between countries where the same conditions 
prevail; (2) "unjustifiable discrimination" between countries where the 
same conditions prevail; or (3) a "disguised restriction" on international 
trade.4°O One ambiguity in the chapeau is whether the phrase "between 
countries where the same conditions prevail" refers to conditions between 
an importing and exporting county (national treatment), conditions 
between two or more exporting countries (MFN), or both.40' At the oral 
hearing, the United States argued that the phrase refers to both 
alternatives.402 The Appellate Body agreed with the United States, 
considering that the opening clause of the chapeau provides that "nothing 
in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent the adoption or 
enforcement by any contracting party .... "403 In other words, the 
exceptions listed in Article XX relate to all of the GATT obligations-
national treatment, MFN, and others.404 
The Appellate Body agreed with the panel finding that more than 
397 See id. at 626. 
398 See id. 
399 See id. 
400 See id. at 627. 
401 See id. at 627 -28. 
402 See id. 
403 !d. at 628 ( citing GAIT, supra note 6, art. XX) (emphasis in original). 
404 See id. The Appellate Body also noted that the term "countries" is unqualified: it 
does not say "foreign countries" or "third countries." See id. at 628 n.46. This interpre-
tation contradicts two other GAIT panels that have considered the chapeau as being 
merely an MFN obligation and concluded that the measures in question were not 
discriminatory because they treated all exporting countries the same. See GAIT 
Conciliation Panel, United States-Imports of Certain Automotive Spring Assemblies, 
May 26, 1983, GAIT B.I.S.D. (30th Supp.) at 107, para. 55 (1984); Tuna Restrictions 
Report, supra note 316, at 91, para. 4.8. 
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one alternative course of action was available to the United States. The 
United States could have applied a statutory baseline across the board, or it 
could have made individual baselines available to importers.4os The 
Appellate Body, like the panel, rejected the United States argument of 
administrative burden and inconvenience in verifying the accuracy of 
information submitted by importers.406 While cooperation would be 
required on the part of importers and foreign refiners in this regard, the 
Appellate Body faulted the United States for not having first attempted to 
conclude some cooperative arrangement with the governments of 
Venezuela and Brazi1.407 The Appellate Body also faulted the United 
States for having taken into consideration the costs domestic refiners 
would have incurred had statutory baselines been applied to them 
immediately, while not giving the same consideration to foreign refiners.408 
The Appellate Body held, accordingly, that in its application the 
baseline methodology constituted "unjustifiable discrimination" as well as 
a "disguised restriction" on international trade.409 The United States 
measure thus failed to meet the requirements of the Article XX chapeau.4 \O 
c. Summary 
The Appellate Body's analysis of Article XX signals a fresh 
approach to resolving Article XX disputes. GATT panels had tended to 
focus on the enumerated paragraphs of Article XX, carefully parsing their 
language in answering the question whether a measure falls within the 
scope of one of those exceptions. Contrary to the practice of earlier GATT 
panels, which have tended to give the individual paragraphs of Article XX 
a narrow construction, the Appellate Body started with the language of 
Article XX(g) and gave it a fairly generous construction in favor of the 
United States. The Appellate Body did so in order to avoid hindering the 
pursuit of policies aimed at the conservation of exhaustible natural 
resources.411 
As generous as the Appellate Body was in giving the enumerated 
Article XX exceptions a construction favorable to the United States, the 
405 See Reformulated Gasoline Appellate Body Report, supra note 381, at 629. 
406 See id. at 629-630. 
407 See id. at 630-31. 
408 See id. 
409 See id. at 632-33. 
410 See id. 
411 See id. at 619 (citing Herring and Salmon Panel Report, supra note 320, para. 4.6). 
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Appellate Body was as grudging in its construction of the Article XX 
chapeau. It closely scrutinized the challenged measure under the Article 
XX chapeau to ensure that the paragraph (g) exception was not being 
abused.412 What struck the Appellate Body about the baseline 
methodology relative to the chapeau was that the measure was both 
patently discriminatory and clearly avoidable; that is, equally effective 
alternative measures were available that were nondiscriminatory and less 
trade restrictive.413 While prior GATT panels have reached the same 
conclusion in the context of specific Article XX exceptions, their analysis 
has been limited to the Article XX paragraphs that use the terms 
"necessary" or "essential. "414 The Appellate Body adopted the novel 
approach of making that same inquiry in the context of the chapeau, which 
does not use either of those terms. 
d. Epilogue 
In early 1997, Brazil and Venezuela complained that the United 
States was dragging its feet in bringing the Gasoline Rule into compliance 
with GATT.41S At the January 22, 1997 meeting of the Dispute Settlement 
Body, Venezuela and Brazil contended that the United States would not 
meet the fifteen-month deadline for compliance with the Appellate Body 
report. On August 20, 1997, the United States reported to Brazil, 
Venezuela, and the DSB that final regulations amending the regulations at 
issue had been implemented.416 The United States thus completed the 
implementation process within the fifteen months required under Article 
21.3 of the DSU. Under the EPA's new rule, foreign gasoline refiners are 
entitled to individual baselines, but only refiners in Brazil, Venezuela, and 
Norway have expressed an interest in having an individual baseline. 
412 See id. at 22-29,35 I.L.M. at 626-33. See also MCGOVERN, supra note 170, § 13.11. 
413 See Reformulated Gasoline Appellate Body Report, supra note 381, at 632-33. 
414 See. e.g. , GATT Conciliation Panel Report, Thailand-Restrictions on Importation of 
and Internal Taxes on Cigarettes, Nov. 7, 1990, GATT B.I.S.D. (37th Supp.) at 200 
(1991); GATT Dispute Panel Report, United States-Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, 
GATT B.LS.D. (39th Supp.) at 155 (unadopted, 1993); Section 337 Panel Report, supra 
note 356. 
415 See Brazil. Venezuela Claim Us. Slow to Implement Gasoline Ruling, 14 Int'I Trade 
Rep. (BNA) 161 (1997). 
416 See WTO, Status Report Regarding Implementation of the Recommendations and 
Rulings in the Dispute, United States-Standards for Reformulated and Conventional 
Gasoline, Panel Report (WTIDS2fR) (Jan. 29, 1996) and Appellate Body Report 
(WTIDS2/ABfR) (Apr. 29,1996) available in WTO Doc. Website, supra note 4. 
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4. The Hormone Beef Dispute 
The first WTO panel dispute to address the consistency of a 
Member's health measures under the SPS Agreement was decided in 
1997. The panel ruled in EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat 
Products (Hormones) (the Hormone Beef dispute),417 that EC measures 
restricting the importation of beef from cattle that were fed growth 
hormones violate the SPS Agreement. 
a. Background 
The events leading up to the WTO panel proceeding span ten 
years. Following consumer concerns over the safety of hormone-fed beef, 
in 1987 the EC imposed a ban on imports of animals and meat from 
animals fed six specific growth-promoting hormones.418 The United States 
objected to this ban on the ground that the six hormones had been found 
safe for use in growth promotion by every country that has examined 
them. Canada brought a nearly identical complaint against the EC. 
Furthermore, not only did the Codex Alimentarius Commission review 
five of the six hormones and find them to be safe, but the EC itself twice 
commissioned experts to review these same five hormones, and on both 
occasions the experts found them to be safe.419 Three of the hormones are 
417 GAIT Panel Report, EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones) 
Complaint by the United States, WTIDS26/RIUSA (Aug. 18, 1997) available in WTO 
Doc. Website, supra note 4 [hereinafter Hormone Beef Report-Us.]; GAIT Panel 
Report, EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones) Complaint by 
Canada, WTIDS48IRJCAN (Aug. 18, 1997) [hereinafter Hormone Beef Report-Can.). 
Both Canada and the United States brought WTO complaints against the EC's measures 
affecting livestock and meat. See generally Steve Chamovitz, The World Trade 
Organization. Meat Hormones. and Food Safety, 14 InCl Trade Rep. (BNA) 1781 
(1997). 
418 For additional background on the dispute, see generally Office of the USTR, WTO 
Hormones Report Confirms Us. Win, Press Release 97-76, Aug. 18, 1997; Kristin 
Mueller, Hormonal Imbalance: An Analysis of the Hormone Treated Beef Trade Dispute 
Between the United States and the European Union, 1 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 97 (1996); 
Wirth, supra note 110; Allen Dick, Note, The EC Hormone Ban Dispute and the 
Application of the Dispute Settlement Provisions of the Standards Code, 10 MICH. 1. 
INT'L L. 872 (1989). 
419 See Hormone Beef Report-Us., supra note 417, paras. 2.17-2.25, 2.33; Hormone Beef 
Report-Can., supra note 417, paras. 2.17-2.25, 2.33. 
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naturally occurring in animals and humans, while the other three are 
artificially produced. 
The United States raised the matter under the Tokyo Round 
Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (the Standards Code) in March 
1987. Bilateral consultations between the United States and the EC failed 
to resolve the dispute. Contending that the EC ban was not supported by 
scientific evidence, the United States requested the establishment of a 
technical experts group under Article 14.5 of the Standards Code to 
examine the question. The EC rejected this request, stating that the issue 
was outside the scope of the Code. 
On January 1, 1989, the United States imposed retaliatory 
measures of 100% ad valorem duties on imports of certain EC-origin 
goods. A joint U.S.-EC Task Force reached an interim agreement that 
permitted imports of United States beef that was certified hormone-free. 
The United States, in return, lifted some of its retaliatory tariffs. In June 
1996, the EC requested the establishment of a WTO panel to examine the 
matter. A month later the United States removed the balance of its 
retaliatory tariffs pending the outcome of the panel proceeding. To 
determine whether there was a scientific basis for the EC ban, the panel 
appointed three scientific experts to advise the panel, pursuant to Article 
11.2 of the SPS Agreement and Article 13 of the DSU.420 
b. The Panel Report 
1. Governing Law 
Both the United States and the EC invoked the SPS Agreement, the 
TBT Agreement, and GATT in support of their respective positions. As a 
threshold matter, the panel considered whether the SPS Agreement, which 
entered into force on January 1, 1995, could apply to measures that predate 
it. The panel concluded that under the general rules of treaty interpretation 
found in Article 28 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, the 
EC measures are continuing situations that were enacted before the SPS 
Agreement entered into force, but which did not cease to exist after that 
date. The panel found no contrary intention in the SPS Agreement; in fact, 
it found that the Agreement generally applies to measures enacted before 
~20 For the experts' analysis and conclusions, see Hormone Beef Report-u.s., supra note 
417, paras. 6.1-6.241; Hormone Beef Report-Can., supra note 417, paras. 6.1-6.240. 
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its entry into force but which are maintained in force after that date.421 
Having found that the SPS Agreement is applicable to the dispute, 
the panel next concluded that the TBT Agreement a fortiori was 
inapplicable. By their terms, the TBT Agreement and the SPS Agreement 
are mutually exclusive.422 
Finally, with regard to the applicability of GATT, the panel found 
that there is no requirement in the SPS Agreement that a prior GATT 
violation be established before the SPS Agreement applies. Moreover, 
even if a measure were to pass muster under GATT, it still would have to 
be examined for consistency with the SPS Agreement. Therefore, the 
panel limited its examination to the consistency of the EC measure under 
the SPS Agreement.423 
11. Burden of Proof 
The United States argued that the burden of proof rested on the EC 
to provide evidence that there is a risk to be protected against and that 
there has been a risk assessment. The EC responded that the burden of 
proof rests on the party challenging the consistency of a sanitary measure 
under the SPS Agreement to provide evidence that the use of the 
hormones in dispute is safe and without risk.424 The panel stated in this 
connection that: 
[T]he initial burden of proof rests on the complaining party 
in the sense that it bears the burden of presenting a prima 
facie case of inconsistency with the SPS Agreement. It is, 
indeed, for the party that initiated the dispute settlement 
proceedings to put forward factual and legal arguments in 
order to substantiate its claim that a sanitary measure is 
inconsistent with the SPS Agreement. In other words, it is 
for the United States to present factual and legal arguments 
that, if unrebutted, would demonstrate a violation of the 
421 See Hormone Beef Report-Us., supra note 417, paras. 8.25-8.26; Hormone Beef 
Report-Can., supra note 417, paras. 8.25-8.31. 
422 See TBT Agreement, supra note 100, art. 1.5; SPS Agreement, supra note 99, art. 1.4; 
Hormone Beef Report-US., supra note 417, para. 8.29; Hormone Beef Report-Can., 
supra note 417, para. 8.32. 
m See Hormone Beef Report-Us., supra note 417, paras. 8.31-8.42; Hormone Beef 
Report-Can., supra note 417, paras. 8.34-8.45. 
4'4 S H 
- ee ormone Beef Report-Us. , sllpra note 417, paras. 8.49-8.50. 
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SPS Agreement. Once such a prima facie case is made, 
however, we consider that, at least with respect to the 
obligations imposed by the SPS Agreement that are 
relevant to this case, the burden of proof shifts to the 
responding party. 425 
Accordingly, the United States had the burden of presenting a prima facie 
case of inconsistency with the SPS Agreement. Once that initial burden 
was met, the burden would shift to the EC to demonstrate that its measures 
did not violate the SPS Agreement. 
iii. Measures Based on International Standards 
The panel began its analysis with Article 3.1 of the SPS Agreement 
that requires Members "to base their [SPS] measures on international 
standards, guidelines or recommendations, where they exist . . . . "426 
Annex A:3(a) of the SPS Agreement defines "international standards, 
guidelines or recommendations" as those established by the Codex 
Alimentarius Commission relating to veterinary drug residues.427 In 
accordance with Article 3.1, if such Codex standards exist with respect to 
the six hormones in dispute, then, the panel stated, a sanitary measure 
taken by a Member should either be based on these standards or be 
justified under Article 3.3 of the SPS Agreement.428 
Unless a Member's measure reflects the same level of protection as 
the standard, it is not "based on" that standard and violates Article 3.1. 
The panel found that Codex standards exist for five of the six hormones in 
issue.429 The panel further found that the EC measures resulted in a 
different level of protection than would be achieved by measures based on 
the Codex standards.430 The EC measures, accordingly, were not based on 
the Codex standards for purposes of Article 3.1. 
iv. Measures Not Based on International Standards 
425 Id. para. 8.51. 
426 See id. para. 8.56; SPS Agreement, supra note 99, art. 3.1. 
m See Hormone Beef Report-u.s., supra note 417, para. 8.5; SPS Agreement, supra note 
99, Annex A:3(a). 
428 See Hormone Beef Report-u.s., supra note 417, para. 8.57. 
m See id. paras. 8.69-8.70. 
430 See id. paras. 8.72-8.73, 8.77. 
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Even though a Member's measures are not based on international 
standards, they are not inconsistent with the SPS Agre.ement ipso facto. 
Article 3.3 of the SPS Agreement provides an exception to Article 3.1. 
Article 3.3 pennits Members to introduce measures that result in a higher 
level of protection than would be achieved under international standards, if 
there is a scientific justification for them, or it is the level of protection a 
Member detennines to be appropriate after making a risk assessment under 
Article 5 of the Agreement. There is a scientific justification if, based on 
available scientific infonnation, a Member detennines that the 
international standards are not sufficient to achieve its appropriate level of 
protection.431 This concept is sometimes referred to as "the acceptable 
levelofrisk."432 
Once the United States established that the EC measures were not 
based on an international standard, the burden shifted to the EC to prove 
that its measures are justified under Article 3.3 and meet the risk 
assessment criteria of Article 5.433 A risk assessment is "the evaluation of 
the potential for adverse effects on human or animal health arising from 
the presence of ... contaminants ... in food, beverages or feedstuffs."434 
The EC thus had the burden of identifying the adverse effects on human 
health caused by the presence of honnones in meat products, and then, if 
any such adverse effects existed, evaluating the potential or probability of 
occurrence of these effects.435 
After considering all of the sources cited by the EC in support of 
the first prong of the two-pronged risk assessment test, the panel 
concluded that none of the scientific evidence cited by the EC indicated 
that an identifiable risk arises for human health from the use of the growth 
honnones in issue.436 In fact, all of the studies cited by the EC indicated 
that such honnones are safe when used in accordance with good practice. 
Once the risks are assessed, the next step is risk management (i.e., 
the decision by a Member as to what risks it can accept or its "appropriate 
level of sanitary protection"). If a risk assessment is based on scientific 
evidence, then a Member can set its own acceptable level of risk, provided 
the level is not arbitrary or unjustifiable, takes into account the objective 
431 See SPS Agreement, supra note 99, art. 3.3 n.2. 
432 See id. Annex A:5; Hormone Beef Report-Us., supra note 417, para. 8.79. 
433 See Hormone Beef Report-Us., supra note 417, paras. 8.87-8.89. 
434 SPS Agreement, supra note 99, Annex A:4. 
435 See Hormone Beef Report-Us., supra note 417, paras. 8.98-8.100. 
436 See id. para. 8.124. 
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of minimizing negative trade effects, and is not a disguised restriction on 
international trade.437 
Because there was no scientific evidence of an identifiable risk 
associated with the growth hormones, the panel found that no basis exists 
under the SPS Agreement for the EC's adoption of any measure to achieve 
any level of protection. If it were otherwise, then the obligations of 
Article 5 would be eviscerated. Assuming arguendo that such scientific 
evidence did exist, the panel continued, the EC measures were arbitrary, 
unjustifiable, discriminatory, and a disguised restriction on trade in 
connection with naturally occurring hormones.438 The panel concluded 
that the measures distinguished between products with higher hormone 
residues that are endogenous or naturally occurring, such as eggs and soya 
oil that were not subject to an import ban, and the imported meat and meat 
products with lower hormone residues that are endogenous as well.439 
With regard to the synthetic hormones, the EC measures set a "no residue" 
level for those hormones when used as growth promoters, but set an 
unlimited residue level for naturally occurring hormones. Because the EC 
could not justify the significant difference in treatment, the panel was 
drawn to the conclusion that the measure was arbitrary, unjustifiable, and 
discriminatory.44o 
The panel summed up: 
(i) The European Communities, by maintammg 
sanitary measures which are not based on a risk 
assessment, has acted inconsistently with the 
requirements contained in Article 5.1 of the 
Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and 
Phytosanitary Measures. 
(ii) The European Communities, by adopting arbitrary 
and unjustifiable distinctions in the levels of 
sanitary protection it considers to be appropriate in 
different situations which result in discrimination or 
a disguised restriction on international trade, has 
acted inconsistently with the requirements contained 
in Article 5.5 of the Agreement on the Application 
437 See SPS Agreement, supra note 99, arts. 2.3,5.4,5.5. 
438 See Hormone Beef Report-u.s., supra note 417, paras. 8.161, 8.197, 8.203, 8.206. 
439 See Hormone Beef Report-u.s., supra note 417, paras. 8.194, 8.197, 8.203. 
440 See id. para. 8.206. 
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of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures. 
(iii) The European Communities, by maintaining 
sanitary measures which are not based on existing 
international standards without justification under 
Article 3.3 of the Agreement on the Application of 
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, has acted 
inconsistently with the requirements contained in 
Article 3.1 of that Agreement. 44 1 
455 
Claiming that the panel had distorted the scientific evidence and 
misinterpreted several key articles of the SPS Agreement, the EC sought 
appellate review of the panel report. 442 
c. The Appellate Body Report 
On January 16, 1998, the Appellate body issued a lengthy report 
affinning, modifying, and reversing the findings and conclusions of the 
panel, but agreed that the EC import ban on meat products produced using 
growth-promoting honnones violates the SPS Agreement.443 The 
Appellate Body addressed ten issues on appeal: (1) whether the panel 
correctly allocated the burden of proof; (2) whether the panel applied the 
appropriate standard of review under the SPS Agreement; (3) whether the 
precautionary principle is relevant in interpreting the SPS Agreement; (4) 
whether the SPS Agreement applies to measures enacted before the entry 
into force of the WTO Agreement; (5) whether the panel made an 
objective assessment of the facts pursuant to DSU Article 11; (6) whether 
the panel acted within the scope of its authority in its selection and use of 
experts; (7) whether the panel correctly interpreted Article 3.1 and 3.3 of 
the SPS Agreement; (8) whether the EC measures are "based on" a risk 
assessment within the meaning of Article 5.1 of the SPS Agreement; (9) 
whether the panel correctly interpreted and applied Article 5.5 of the SPS 
Agreement; and (10) whether the panel appropriately exercised judicial 
economy in refraining from making findings on the consistency of the EC 
441 Id. para. 9.1. See Fare Trade, ECONOMIST, May 17, 1997, at 20. For criticisms of the 
panel's decision,see Charnovitz, supra note 255. 
442 See Appellate Body Report, EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products 
(Hormones), AB-1997-4, WTIDS26/ABIR, WTIDS48/ABIR (Jan. 16, 1998) paras: 1, 7 
[hereinafter Hormone Appellate Body Report]. 
W See id. para. 253. 
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measures with Articles 2.2 and 5.6 of the SPS Agreement.444 
i. Allocating the Burden of Proof under the SPS Agreement. 
In addressing the panel's allocation of burden of proof, the 
Appellate Body concluded that the panel erred in placing the initial burden 
on the EC to prove that its measures are justified under the exceptions 
provided for in Article 3.3 of the SPS Agreement.445 The panel put that 
burden on the EC because its measures were not based on international 
standards.446 The Appellate Body found that even though the EC measures 
were not based on international standards, that fact did not relieve the 
United States and Canada from the burden of establishing a prima facie 
case showing the absence of the risk assessment required by Article 5.1 
and the failure of the EC to comply with the requirements of Article 3.3.447 
ii. The Standard of Review 
The EC argued that the panel should have applied a standard of 
review in evaluating the consistency of the EC measures under the SPS 
Agreement that gives deference to the factual findings of the competent 
EC authorities.448 In response to the EC's argument, the Appellate Body 
found the SPS Agreement to be silent on this point and so turned to Article 
11 of the DSU.449 Article 11 provides in pertinent part that "a panel should 
make an objective assessment of the matter before it, including an 
objective assessment of the facts of the case and the applicability of and 
conformity with the relevant covered agreements .... "450 Thus, the 
applicable standard of review is neither de novo nor one of total deference, 
but rather an intermediate "objective assessment of the facts" standard. 
The Appellate Body concluded that the panel applied the appropriate 
standard ofreview.45 \ 
iii. Relevance of the Precautionary Principle 
444 See id. paras. 9-39. 
445 See id. para. 108. 
446 See id. paras. 103-104. 
447 See id. para. 108. 
448 See id. paras. 13-15. 
449 See id. paras. 114-18. 
450 DSU, supra note 103, art. 11. 
45\ See Hormone Appellate Body Report, supra note 442, para. 119. 
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The panel rejected the EC's contention that the precautionary 
principle should be adopted and used to override the explicit tenns of 
Articles 5.1 and 5.2 of the SPS Agreement.452 The EC argued that the 
precautionary principle has become a customary rule of international law, 
that its measures were precautionary in nature, and that they, therefore, 
satisfied the risk assessment requirements of the Agreement.4S3 
The Appellate Body refused to take a position on whether the 
precautionary principle is a customary rule of international law or merely 
an emerging principle that has yet to ripen into such a rule.454 The 
Appellate Body did find that the precautionary principle is reflected in 
various provisions of the SPS Agreement, especially in Article 3.3 that 
recognizes a Member's right to establish its own appropriate level of 
sanitary protection, which may be higher than international standards.4S5 
The Appellate Body nevertheless concluded that, whatever its legal status, 
the precautionary principle cannot override the express tenns of Articles 
5.1 and 5.2.456 
IV. Application o/the SPS Agreement to Pre-1995 Measures 
The EC measures were enacted before the entry into force of the 
WTO Agreement on January 1, 1995. The Appellate Body rejected the 
EC's argument that the temporal application of the SPS Agreement is 
restricted to events that occurred after 1995. The EC cited Article 28 of 
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties that "[a]bsent a contrary 
intention, a treaty cannot apply to acts or facts which took place, or 
situations which ceased to exist, before the date of its entry into force."457 
The Appellate Body continued that the SPS Agreement does not contain 
any provision limiting its temporal application.458 Moreover, Article XVI:4 
of the WTO Agreement provides that "[ e ]ach Member shall ensure the 
confonnity of its laws, regulations and administrative procedures with its 
452 See id. para. 125. 
453 See id. para. 121. 
454 See id. para. 123. 
455 See id. para. 124. 
456 See id. para. 125. 
457 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23,1969,1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (1969). 
See Hormone Appellate Body Report, supra note 442, para. 128. 
458 See Hormone Appellate Body Report, supra note 442, para. 128. 
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obligations as provided in the annexed Agreements."4s9 Accordingly, the 
Appellate Body affirmed the panel's finding with regard to the temporal 
application of the SPS Agreement. 460 
v. The Panel's Objective Assessment of the Facts 
The EC claimed that the panel disregarded, distorted, and 
misrepresented the evidence the EC submitted.461 The Appellate Body 
noted at the outset that under Article 17.6 of the DSU its scope of review 
is limited to questions of law. The Appellate Body added, however, that if 
the panel deliberately disregarded, distorted, or misrepresented such 
evidence, then it failed to make an objective assessment of the facts as 
required under Article 11 of the DSU.462 The Appellate Body noted that 
such conduct would be a denial of fundamental fairness and due process.463 
The Appellate Body reviewed the expert scientific evidence and 
the panel's analysis of it. The EC charged that the panel failed to refer to 
all of the evidence presented. The Appellate Body responded that "[t]he 
Panel cannot realistically refer to all statements made by the experts 
advising it and should be allowed a substantial margin of discretion as to 
which statements are useful to refer to explicitly."464 The Appellate Body 
reviewed the panel's assessment of the evidence and conceded that the 
panel had misquoted some experts and failed to consider some of the 
evidence.465 Nevertheless, the Appellate Body concluded that the mistakes 
the panel made did not amount to manifest misrepresentation, deliberate 
distortion, or egregious disregard of the evidence.466 In the end, the 
Appellate Body accorded the panel great deference in fact findings. 
VI. The Selection of Experts 
The panel consulted experts in their individual capacity rather than 
establish a review group to examine the scientific evidence. Noting that 
459 DSU, supra note 103, Art. XVI:4. See Hormone Appellate Body Report, supra note 
442, para. 128. 
460 See Hormone Appellate Body Report, supra note 442, para. 130. 
461 See id. para. 131. 
462 See id. paras. 132-33. 
463 See id. para. 133. 
464 ld. para. 138. 
465 See id. paras. 135, 138, 140-42. 
466Seeid. paras. 139, 141, 144. 
HeinOnline -- 22 Wm. & Mary Envtl. L. & Pol’y Rev. 459 1997-1998
1998] ILLEGALITY OF UNILATERAL TRADE MEASURES 459 
nothing in Article 11.2 of the SPS Agreement or Article 13.2 of the DSU 
prohibits a panel from seeking information from individual experts, the 
Appellate Body concluded that "both the SPS Agreement and the DSU 
leave to the sound discretion of a panel the determination of whether the 
establishment of an expert review group is necessary or appropriate."467 
The parties to the dispute acknowledged that the panel consulted with 
them in the appointment of the experts. 
Vll. The Interpretation oj Articles 3.1 and 3.3 
The Appellate Body rejected the panel's conclusion that the term 
"based on" in Article 3.1 is synonymous with "conform to" and that, 
therefore, Article 3.1 requires WTO Members to harmonize their SPS 
measures with international standards. "It is clear to us," the Appellate 
Body stated, "that harmonization of SPS measures of Members on the 
basis of international standards is projected in the Agreement, as a goal, 
yet to be realized in the Juture."468 
With regard to the panel's interpretation of Article 3.3, the 
Appellate Body noted that if there is scientific justification, Article 3.3 
permits a Member to adopt SPS measures that achieve a higher level of 
protection than would measures based on a relevant international 
standard.469 The EC contended that no risk assessment is necessary under 
Article 5.1, so long as there is a scientific justification for the higher level 
ofprotection.470 The Appellate Body noted that Article 3.3 is not a model 
of drafting clarity: it pointed to the last clause in the Article that requires 
that such measures "shall not be inconsistent with any other provision of 
this Agreement."471 Accordingly, the Appellate Body agreed with the 
panel that the EC must undertake a risk assessment to conform with 
Article 5 of the Agreement.472 
Vlll. Basing SPS Measures on a Risk Assessment 
The Appellate Board evaluated the EC's compliance with the 
467 [d. para. 147. 
468 [d. para. 165 (emphasis in original). 
469 See id. para. 172. 
470 See id. para. 174. 
471 See id. para. 175. 
m See id. para. 176. 
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Article 5.1 requirement of risk assessment, and it noted that for SPS 
measures to be "based on" a risk assessment, some rational nexus must 
exist between the supporting scientific evidence and an identifiable risk to 
human health or safety.473 Against that interpretative backdrop, the 
Appellate Body agreed with the panel that the EC relied upon scientific 
reports that did not rationally support the EC import prohibition.474 
IX. Article 5.5 and Discriminatory Trade Measures 
Three elements are necessary to establish a violation of Article 5.5 
of the Agreement.475 First, the Member imposing the measure must have 
adopted its own level of protection, rather than an international standard. 
Second, that level of protection must exhibit arbitrary or unjustifiable 
differences in its treatment of different situations. Third, the arbitrary or 
unjustifiable differences must result in either discrimination or a disguised 
restriction on trade.476 
The Appellate Body focused on the second and third prongs of this 
three-part test and agreed that the levels of protection established by the 
EC were arbitrary and unjustifiable in some instances, (e.g., the different 
levels of protection for carbadox and olaquindox).477 The Appellate Body 
next turned to the question of whether these levels of protection resulted in 
discrimination or a disguised restriction on trade, and it rejected the 
panel's conclusion that such discrimination existed: 
We are unable to share the inference that the Panel 
apparently draws that the import ban on treated meat and 
the Community-wide prohibition of the use of the 
hormones here in dispute for growth promotion purposes in 
the beef sector were not really designed to protect its 
population from the risk of cancer, but rather to keep out 
US and Canadian hormone-treated beef and thereby to 
protect the domestic beef producers in the European 
Communities. 478 
473 See id. para. 193-94. 
m See id. paras. 197, 200. 
475 See id. para. 214. 
476 See id. 
m See id. paras. 226-35. 
478 Id. para. 245. 
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Accordingly, the Appellate Body concluded that the panel's finding of 
discrimination was unjustified and erroneous as a matter oflaw.479 
x. Issues Reserved by the Panel 
The final issue the Appellate Body addressed was the panel's 
refusal to decide the claims of the United States and Canada under Articles 
2.2 and 5.6 of the SPS Agreement.48o The Appellate Body found this issue 
moot in view of the panel's other findings and conclusions.481 In the 
interests of judicial economy, the Appellate Body held that the panel did 
not err when it refrained from making findings on Articles 2.2 and 5.6.482 
d. Summary 
This important precedent requires an importer to show that 
scientific evidence suggests that a product poses a health risk. A rule that 
required the exporter to show that the product is safe would have dealt a 
serious blow to the SPS Agreement and open trade because such a 
standard would be nearly impossible to meet. These reports also show that 
the WTO dispute settlement mechanism is capable of resolving technically 
complex trade-environment disputes. 
5. The Shrimp/Turtle Dispute 
a. Background 
In a reprise of the issues addressed in the Tuna/Dolphin dispute, 
the WTO was asked to determine the GATT-consistency of a U.S. import 
ban on shrimp from India, Malaysia, Pakistan, and Thailand. The 
Endangered Species Act lists as endangered or threatened with extinction 
five species of sea turtles that live in U.S. waters and on the high seas. 
U.S. shrimp trawlers are required to use turtle excluder devices (TEDs) in 
their nets when they fish in areas where a significant likelihood of 
encountering sea turtles exists. Under Section 609 of the Endangered 
479 See id. 
480 See id. paras 247-52. The United States and Canada cross-appealed from that decision. 
481 See id. paras. 250-52. 
48~ See id. para. 252. 
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Species Act,483 shrimp harvested with technology that may adversely affect 
certain sea turtles may not be imported into the United States unless the 
harvesting nation is certified to have a regulatory program and an 
incidental turtle-take rate comparable to that of the U.S. shrimpers.484 For 
all practical purposes, in order to be certified under Section 609, countries 
having one of the five species of endangered sea turtle within their 
jurisdiction must require their shrimpers to harvest shrimp using TEDs.485 
b. The Panel Report 
1. NGO Submissions 
Several environmental NGOs submitted unsolicited amicus briefs 
with the panel that defended the U.S. import ban on shrimp. The panel 
concluded that under Article 13.2 of the DSU, only information that the 
panel seeks (i.e., actually solicits) may be considered by a panel. 
Nevertheless, the panel invited the United States, if it so desired, to 
include the NGO submissions as part of its own submission.486 
11. Unjustifiable Discrimination in Violation of Article XX 
Having found the import ban to be a violation of the GATT Article 
XI prohibition against quantitative restrictions on imports, the panel turned 
its attention to GATT Article XX. Employing a "chapeau-down" 
483 16 U.S.c. § 1537 (1994). 
484 See Report of the Appellate Body, United States-Import Prohibition of Certain 
Shrimp and Shrimp Products, AB-1998-4, WTIDS58/ABIR, paras. 2-6 (1998). 
485 Litigation involving the U.S. implementation of the shrimp import ban was brought in 
the U.S. Court of International Trade. See Earth Island Institute v. Christopher, 942 F. 
Supp. 597 (Ct. Int'I Trade 1996) (holding that State Department regulations allowing the 
import of shrimp from certain non-certified countries violates Section 609), vacated. 147 
F.3d 1352 (Fed. Cir. 1998); Earth Island Institute v. Christopher, 948 F. Supp. 1062 (Ct. 
Int'I Trade 1996) (holding that shrimp harvested by manual methods that does not harm 
sea turtles can be imported from non-certified countries), vacated, 147 F.3d 1352 (Fed. 
Cir. 1998). For an analysis of the CIT decisions and the WTO dispute, see Paul Stanton 
Kibei, Justice for the Sea Turtle: Marine Conservation and the Court of International 
Trade, 15 U.C.L.AJ. ENVTL. L. & POL'y 57 (1996-97). See also New Rolefor NAFTA: 
Saving Fish? CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Jan. 23, 1996, at 1; Timothy E. Wirth, Take the 
Final Step to Protect Dolphins, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Feb. 2, 1996, at 19. 
m See Report of the WTO Panel, United States-Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp 
and Shrimp Products, WTIDS581R, para. 7.8 (1998). 
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analytical approach, the panel did not inquire whether the U.S. measure 
was provisionally justified under either Article XX(b) or (g). Instead, the 
panel focused exclusively on the Article XX chapeau. With that focus, the 
panel concluded that the U.S. import ban unjustifiably discriminated 
against shrimp imports from the complaining Members, in violation of the 
Article XX chapeau. The panel rested its conclusion on the view that if 
the U.S. import ban was upheld, it could undermine the multilateral 
trading system. 
In our view, if an interpretation of the chapeau of 
Article XX were to b~ followed which would allow a 
Member to adopt measures conditioning access to its 
market for a given product upon the adoption by the 
exporting Members of certain policies, including 
conservation policies, GATT 1994 and the WTO 
Agreement could no longer serve as a multilateral 
framework for trade among Members as security and 
predictability of trade relations under those agreements 
would be threatened.487 
Accordingly, the panel stated, in light of the context of the term 
"unjustifiable" and the object and purpose of the WTO Agreement, the 
U.S. import ban constitutes unjustifiable discrimination between countries 
where the same conditions prevai1.488 
c. The Appellate Body Report 
1. NGO Submissions 
In connection with the NGO submissions, the Appellate Body 
found that the panel's reading of Article of the DSU was too narrow. 
We find, and so hold, that the Panel erred in its legal 
interpretation that accepting non-requested information 
from non-governmental sources is incompatible with the 
provisions of the DSU. At the same time, we consider that 
the Panel acted within the scope of its authority under 
487/d. para. 7.45. 
488 See id. para. 7.49. 
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Articles 12 and 13 of the DSU in allowing any party to the 
dispute to attach the briefs by non-governmental 
organizations, or any portion thereof, to its own 
submissions.489 
The Appellate Body thus concluded that a panel is free to accept 
unsolicited submissions from interested groups if such information would 
be helpful to the panel in reaching its decision. 
ll. The Article XX Analysis-Introduction 
The Appellate Body was critical of the panel's analytical approach 
to Article XX. First, the Appellate Body noted, the general design of a 
measure is to be distinguished from its application.490 The general design 
of a measure is relevant in determining whether the measure falls within 
one of the Article XX exceptions following the chapeau.49 \ The 
application of the measure is to be examined in the course of determining 
whether it violates the chapeau.492 The panel's analysis was flawed, 
according to the Appellate Body, because it "did not attempt to inquire 
into how the measure at stake was being applied in such a manner as to 
constitute abuse or misuse of a given kind of exception."493 
The Appellate Body reiterated that an Article XX analysis is a two-
step process: (1) determine whether the measure satisfies any of the 
exceptions listed in the paragraphs of Article XX following the chapeau, 
and (2) appraise the same measure under the chapeau.494 The sequence is 
important: "The standard of 'arbitrary discrimination', for example, under 
the chapeau may be different for a measure that purports to be necessary to 
protect public morals than for one relating to the products of prison 
labor. "495 
iii. The Article XX(g) Exception 
489 Report of the Appellate Body, United States-Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp 
and Shrimp Products, WTIDS58/ABfR, (Oct. 12, 1998) para. 110 [hereinafter Shrimp-
Turtle Appellate Body Report]. 
490 See id. para. 116. 
49\ See id. 
492 See id. 
49J Id. 
494 See id. para. 118. 
495 !d. para. 120. 
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Article XX(g) covers measures "relating to the conservation of 
exhaustible natural resources if such measures are made effective in 
conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or consumption."496 
First, the Appellate Body concluded that textually Article XX(g) is not 
limited to non-living natural resources, but extends to living resources as 
well.497 Rejecting Malaysia's "original intent" argument that Article 
XX(g) was intended to cover non-living resources only, the Appellate 
Body stated: 
The words of Article XX(g), "exhaustible natural 
resources," were actually crafted more than 50 years ago. 
They must be read by a treaty interpreter in the light of 
contemporary concerns of the community of nations about 
the protection and conservation of the environment. ... 
130. From the perspective embodied in the preamble of the 
WTO Agreement [explicitly acknowledging the objective of 
sustainable development], we note that the generic term 
"natural resources" in Article XX(g) is not "static" in its 
content or reference but is rather "by definition, 
evolutionary."498 
Moreover, the Appellate Body added, two adopted GATT 1947 panel 
reports499 found fish to be an "exhaustible natural resource" within the 
meaning of Article XX(g). Accordingly, the Appellate Body held that 
measures to conserve exhaustible resources, whether living or non-living, 
may fall within Article XX(g).500 The Appellate Body further found that 
sea turtles are an exhaustible natural resource. 
Turning next to the issue of whether the U.S. measure was one 
"relating to the conservation of' exhaustible natural resources, the 
Appellate Body found a substantial relationship between Section 609 and 
496 GAIT, supra note 6, art. XX(g). 
497 See Shrimp-Turtle Appellate Body Report, supra note 489, para. 128. 
498 Jd. paras. 129-130. 
499 See Tuna Restrictions Report, supra, note 316; Herring and Salmon Panel Report, 
supra note 320. 
500 See Shrimp- Turtle Appellate Body Report, supra note 489, para. 131. 
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its implementing regulations, on the one hand, and the conservation of sea 
turtles, on the other. "The means [TEDs] are, in principle, reasonably 
related to the ends [the conservation of sea turtles]. "501 
Addressing the last Article XX(g) criterion-that the measure is 
made effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or 
consumption-the Appellate Body found that this requirement was easily 
satisfied. s02 U.S. shrimpers who fail to use TEDs face serious civil and 
criminal penalties, including forfeiture of their trawlers. "We believe," the 
Appellate Body concluded, "that, in principle, Section 609 is an even-
handed measure. "503 
IV. The Article XX Chapeau 
Having concluded that Section 609 is provisionally justified under 
the Article XX(g) exception, the Appellate Body next tackled the thorny 
issue of whether Section 609 violates the Article XX chapeau. Reflecting 
on the preambular language of the WTO Agreement that calls for "the 
optimal use of the world's resources in accordance with the objective of 
sustainable development," and the creation of the Committee on Trade and 
Environment and its terms of reference, the Appellate Body noted that 
these developments "must add colour, texture and shading to our 
interpretation of the agreements annexed to the WTO Agreement, in this 
case, the GATT 1994."504 Nevertheless, the Appellate Body found it 
unacceptable 
for one WTO Member to use an economic embargo to 
require other Members to adopt essentially the same 
comprehensive regulatory program, to achieve a certain 
policy goal, as that in force within that Member's territory, 
without taking into consideration different conditions which 
may occur in the territories of those other Members.505 
The Appellate Body added that the protection and conservation of highly 
migratory species of sea turtles demands concerted and cooperative efforts 
SOlId. para. 141. 
502 See id. para. 144. 
503 ld. 
504 ld. para. 153. 
505 Id. para. 164 (emphasis in original). 
HeinOnline -- 22 Wm. & Mary Envtl. L. & Pol’y Rev. 467 1997-1998
1998] ILLEGALITY OF UNILATERAL TRADE MEASURES 467 
on the part of the many countries whose waters are traversed by sea turtles. 
With the exception of the Inter-American Convention for the Protection 
and Conservation of Sea Turtles, the United States had failed to exhaust 
multilateral efforts, in the Appellate Body's view.506 Rather than attempt 
to exhaust international mechanisms, the United States instead pursued the 
unilateral application of Section 609. In a footnote, the Appellate Body 
underscored this point with the observation that the United States, a party 
to CITES, made no attempt to raise the issue of sea turtle mortality due to 
shrimp trawling in the CITES Standing Committee.507 The Appellate Body 
also faulted the United States for acting in a discriminatory manner vis-a-
vis shrimp exporting Members,508 as well as for the lack of adequate 
transparency in the administration of the Section 609 certification 
procedures.509 
Anticipating the fire storm of criticism that its decision would 
create within the environmental community, the Appellate Body launched 
a preemptive first strike in the following closing observations: 
In reaching these conclusions, we wish to 
underscore what we have not decided in this appeal. We 
have not decided that the protection and preservation of the 
environment is of no significance to the Members of the 
WTO. Clearly, it is. We have not decided that the 
sovereign nations that are Members of the WTO cannot 
adopt effective measures to protect endangered species, 
such as sea turtles. Clearly, they can and should. And we 
have not decided that sovereign states should not act 
together bilaterally, plurilaterally or multilaterally, either 
within the WTO or in other international fora, to protect 
endangered species or to otherwise protect the environment. 
Clearly, they should and do. 510 
In sum, the Appellate Body found Section 609 flawed chiefly in the 
manner in which the United States administered it, not with the substance 
506 See id. paras. 167-168, 171-172. 
507 See id. para. 171. 
508 Central and South American shrimp exporters were given preferential treatment under 
Section 609 vis-a-vis shrimpers from the four Asian complaining Members. See id. para. 
175. 
509 See id. 
510 Id. para. 185 (emphasis in original). 
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of the law per se or its objectives. 
6. The Salmon Dispute 
a. Background 
In 1996 Australia imposed an import ban on uncooked salmon 
from the Pacific rim of North America ostensibly to prevent the 
introduction of certain exotic diseases in the country. Fresh, chilled, or 
frozen salmon could be imported into Australia only if it was heat treated 
prior to importation into Australia. Canada complained that the import 
ban violated the SPS Agreement to the extent that the Australian import 
prohibition was not based on a risk assessment conducted in conformity 
with Article 5 of the Agreement. 
b. The Panel Report 
The panel agreed with Canada that Australia violated Articles 5.1 
and 2.2 of the SPS Agreement by not conducting or relying on a proper 
risk assessment when imposing the import prohibition on ocean-caught 
Pacific salmon.SII The panel concluded that because the heat-treatment 
requirement was not based on a risk assessment, it violated the SPS 
Agreement. SI2 
The panel also concluded that Australia's import prohibition 
violated Article 5.5 of the SPS Agreement because it made an arbitrary or 
unjustifiable distinction between the SPS measures applicable to salmon 
products, which were subject to more onerous standards, and those 
measures applicable to four categories of other imported fish and fish 
products, which amounted to a disguised restriction on international 
trade. m 
c. The Appellate Body Report. 
The central question presented to the Appellate Body was the same 
as the one presented in the Hormone Beef dispute: Did Australia carry out 
511 Report of the WTO Panel, Australia-Measures Affecting Importation of Salmon, 
WTfDS 18/R (June 12, 1998) para. 8.59 [hereinafter Salmon Panel Report]. 
m See id. para 8.63. 
513 See id. paras. 8.133-8.134, 8.160. 
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a proper risk assessment under Article 5.1 of the SPS Agreement? While 
agreeing with the panel that Australia's import prohibition on Pacific 
salmon violates the SPS Agreement, the Appellate Body reversed the 
panel's finding that the SPS measure at issue was the heat-treatment 
requirement, rather than the import prohibition.sl4 Australia contended that 
a 1996 Final Report constituted a risk assessment for purposes of Article 
5.1 of the SPS Agreement.S1S Turning to the definition of "risk 
assessment" in Annex A of the SPS Agreement,Sl6 the Appellate Body 
found that a proper risk assessment must (1) identify the diseases whose 
entry or spread the Member wants to prevent, (2) evaluate the probability 
of entry of a pest or disease, not just the possibility of such entry, and (3) 
evaluate the likelihood of entry, establishment or spread of these diseases 
according to the SPS measures which might be applied.S17 Because the 
1996 Final Report did not contain (1) an evaluation of the likelihood of 
entry, establishment or spread of the diseases of concern, or (2) an 
evaluation of the likelihood of entry, establishment or spread of these 
diseases according to the SPS measures which might be applied, the 1996 
Final Report could not qualify as a risk assessment.S18 Australia, therefore, 
acted inconsistently with Article 5.1 of the SPS Agreement. 
The Appellate Body also upheld the panel's finding that 
Australia's import prohibition was arbitrary, unjustifiable, and a disguised 
restriction on international trade. sl9 The Appellate Body did, however, 
reverse the panel's finding that Australia violated Article 5.6 of the SPS 
Agreement relating to alternative SPS measures that are reasonably 
available to the Member. Because no evidence was offered to show what 
level of protection could be achieved by each of the four alternative SPS 
measures mentioned in the 1996 Final Report, it was not possible to state 
definitely that Australia had or had not violated Article 5.6. 
SI4 See Report of the Appellate Body, Australia-Measures Affecting Importation of 
Salmon, AB-1998-5, WTIDS18/ABIR, at 72, para. V.7 (1998) [hereinafter Salmon 
Appellate Body Report]. 
SIS See id. para. V.8. The 1996 Final Report concluded that imports of uncooked salmon 
should be prohibited in order to prevent the introduction and spread of exotic diseases 
within Australia. 
SI6 Annex A:4 defines "risk assessment" in part as "[t]he evaluation of the likelihood of 
entry, establishment or spread of a pest or disease within the territory of an importing 
Member according to the sanitary or phytosanitary measures which might be applied, and 
of the associated potential biological and economic consequences .... " 
S17See Salmon Appellate Body Report, supra note 514, para. V.10-12. 
SI8 See id. at 76, 79. 
519 See id. at 93. 
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In important dictum the Appellate Body reconfinned that Members 
have the right to detennine their own appropriate level of SPS protection. 
However, the "appropriate level" is to be distinguished from the actual 
SPS measure adopted. The SPS measure adopted has to be rationally 
related to achieving the appropriate level of protection. Also, whatever 
appropriate level of protection a Member chooses, a Member cannot 
choose "zero risk" as an appropriate level of protection under the SPS 
Agreement. The Appellate Body clarified that 
[I]t is important to distinguish . . . between the evaluation 
of "risk" in a risk assessment and the detennination of the 
appropriate level of protection. As stated in our Report in 
European Communities--Hormones, the "risk" evaluated in 
a risk assessment must be an ascertainable risk; theoretical 
uncertainty is "not the kind of risk which, under Article 5.1, 
is to be assessed." This does not mean, however, that a 
Member cannot detennine its own appropriate level of 
protection to be "zero risk. "520 
The Appellate Body's decision is instructive in answering the question of 
what constitutes a proper risk assessment in the context of the spread of 
pests and diseases. Together with the EC Hormones decision on what 
constitutes a proper risk assessment in the context of additives or 
contaminants to food, the Salmon decision is an important addition to 
WTO jurisprudence under the SPS Agreement. 
III. NAFT A AND THE ENVIRONMENT 
A. Introduction 
For proponents of free trade in North America, the 1991 GATT 
Tuna/Dolphin report521 could not have come at a more inopportune time. 
That report preceded by just a few months the conclusion of the NAFT A 
negotiations between Canada, Mexico, and the United States. It cast a 
dark shadow over its prospects in Congress. 
NAFT Am has been the target of spirited attacks, the most vigorous 
520 Id. at 75 (footnote omitted). 
521 Tuna-Dolphin I Panel Report, slipra note 7. 
522 NAFT A, supra note 8. 
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of which have come from labor and environmental groups. Labor groups 
emphasized that low wage jobs in the United States would move south to 
Mexico. Environmentalists also delivered heavy salvos. S2J They claimed 
that Mexico, whose environmental laws are not aggressively enforced, 
would become a pollution haven to which ~'dirty" U.S. industries would 
quickly relocate to avoid the more stringent U.S. air and water standards.524 
Environment and labor side agreements concluded in 1993 allowed 
NAFTA to ride out the storm of anti-trade sentiment that swept the United 
States following the Tuna/Dolphin decision.S2S In 1997, President Clinton 
released the three-year review of the operation and effect of NAFT A. 526 
523 See generally Environmental Groups Coalition Proposes Stronger NAFTA 
Safeguards, 9 Infl Trade Rep. (BNA) 1096 (1992); Public Citizen Says NAFTA 
Summary Falls Short on Many Key Environmental Issues. 9 Infl Trade Rep. (BNA) 1502 
(1992). Environmentalists even brought unsuccessful court challenges against NAFTA. 
Compare Public Citizen v. United States Trade Representative, 970 F.2d 916 (D.C. Cir. 
1992) (holding that the U.S. Trade Representative's Office is not required to prepare an 
environmental impact statement for NAFT A pursuant to the National Environmental 
Policy Act), and Public Citizen v. United States Trade Representative, 5 F.3d 549, 553 
(D.C. Cir. 1993) (holding that NAFTA is not fmal agency action and, therefore, not 
subject to the notice and comment requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act), 
with Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Massey, 986 F.2d 528 (D.C. Cir. 1993) 
(holding that the presumption against the extraterritorial application of U.S. statutes, 
including the National Environmental Policy Act, does not apply where the conduct 
regulated by the statute occurs primarily in the United States and the extraterritorial 
effect of the statute will be felt in Antarctica, a continent without a sovereign). See also 
Christina J. Bruff, NAFTA Meets NEPA: Trade and the Environment in the 1990s. 34 
NAT. REs. J. 179 (1994); Dana E. Butler, The Death Knell of the Legislative 
Environmental Impact Statement: A Critique of Public Citizen v. U.S. Trade 
Representative. 17 Loy. L.A. INT'L & COMPo LJ. 122 (1994); Peter Fitzgerald & Vania 
J. Leveille, When the National Environmental Policy Act Collides with the North 
American Free Trade Agreement: The Case of Public Citizen V. Office of the United 
States Trade Representative, 9 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMEN. 751 (1994). 
524 For an evaluation of Mexico's environmental laws, regulations, and their enforcement, 
see DANIEL MAG RAW, NAFTA & THE ENVIRONMENT: SUBSTANCE AND PROCESS 445, 
583 (1995). See generally USTR Hills Says There Will Be No "Downward 
Harmonization" Under NAFTA, 9 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1096 (1992); Brenda S. Hustis, 
The Environmental Implications of the North American Free Trade Agreement, 28 TEX. 
INT'L L.J. 589 (1993); Joel L. Silverman, The "Giant Sucking Sound" Revisited: A 
Blueprint to Prevent Pollution Havens by Extending NAFTA's Unheralded "Eco-
Dumping" Provisions to the New World Trade Organization, 24 GA. J. INT'L & COMPo L. 
347 (1994). 
m See MAG RAW, supra note 524, at 15. 
5~b See Letter of Transmittal from the President to Congress, Study on the Operation and 
Effect of the North American Free Trade Agreement (1997) (visited Oct. 1, 1998) 
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Chapter 4 of that review, The North American Environment: Cooperation, 
Institutions, and Enforcement, makes three assessments. First, it notes that 
Mexico is improving enforcement of its environmental laws. Second, two 
NAFT A institutions, the Border Enforcement Cooperation Commision 
(BECC) and North American Development Bank (NADBank) are helping 
communities along the U.S.-Mexico border area design and fund 
infrastructure projects that will improve conditions for border residents. 527 
Third, another NAFT A institution, the Commission for Environmental 
Cooperation (CEC) has launched a number of environmental projects that 
will benefit the North American environment.528 
B. NAFT A 's Environmental Provisions 
Originally NAFTA had no single chapter exclusively dedicated to 
environmental issues. The North American Agreement on Environmental 
Cooperation (NAAEC)S29 closed this gap.S30 NAFTA does, however, 
address trade and environment issues in its preamble and in the various 
chapters.s31 
1. The Preamble 
NAFTA's preamble identifies fifteen goals.m Four of them have 
important environmental aspects. These goals are: (1) to promote trade 
liberalization in a manner consistent with environmental protection and 
conservation; (2) to promote sustainable development; (3) to strengthen 
<http://www.ustr.gov/reports/index.html> [hereinafter Operation and Effect ofNAFTA]. 
527 See id. 
528 See id. 
529 North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, Sept. 8, 9, 12, 14, 1993, 
U.S.-Can.-Mex., 321.L.M. 1480(1993) [hereinafterNAAEC]. 
530 See MAGRA W, supra note 524, at 81. 
531 For additional analyses of these provisions and of the Environmental Side Agreement, 
see OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, THE NAFTA: REPORT ON 
ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES (1993), reprinted in MAG RAW, supra note 524; Joseph G. Block 
& Andrew R. Herrup, The Environmental Aspects of NAFTA and Their Relevance to 
Possible Free Trade Agreements Between the United States and Caribbean Nations, 14 
VA. ENVTL. L.J. I (1994); Colin Crawford, Some Thoughts on the North American Free 
Trade Agreement, Political Stability and Environmental Equity, 20 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 
585 (1995); Raymond B. Ludwiszewski, "Green" Language in the NAFTA: Reconciling 
Free Trade and Environmental Protection, 27 INT'L LAW. 691 (1993). 
m See NAFT A, supra note 8, pmbl. 
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the development and enforcement of environmental laws and regulations; 
and (4) to create new employment opportunities and improve working 
conditions and living standards within North America.S33 
2. Article 104 
Article 104, Relation to Environmental and Conservation 
Agreements, together with Annex 104.1, provides that in the event of any 
inconsistency between NAFTA and three MEAs (i.e., CITES, the 
Montreal Protocol, and the Basel Convention), or the U.S.-Mexican 
Agreement on Improvement of the Environment in the Border Area (since 
replaced by the Border XXI Program, described below), the obligations of 
the latter prevail. 534 
3. Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures 
NAFT A Chapter Seven, Agriculture and Sanitary and 
Phytosanitary Measures, contains two sections.S3S Section A deals with 
agricultural trade, including market access for agricultural products and 
government subsidies.536 Section B deals with sanitary and phytosanitary 
measures. S37 Like the Uruguay Round SPS Agreement, Chapter 7:B does 
not impose any specific standards on the Parties. Instead, Chapter 7:B 
establishes guidelines to ensure that parties take SPS measures for 
scientific reasons and not for trade protection.538 
Under Chapter 7:B, each Party has the right to adopt any SPS 
measure it deems necessary for the protection of human, animal, or plant 
life. A Party may establish any level of protection it desires, so long as 
scientific evidence exists to support the measure, and the Party has made a 
risk assessment appropriate to the circumstances.539 Once the Party has 
established a need for protection, the appropriate level is left to each Party 
to decide. 540 In other words, the appropriate level of protection is a value 
judgment, not a scientific one. 
533 See id. 
534 See id. art. 104 & annex 104.1. 
535 See id. art. 701-24. 
536 See id. art. 701-708. 
m See id. art. 709-24. 
538 See id. art. 712. 
539 See id. art. 712.1-.3. 
540 See id. arts. 712, 715. 
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The ability of a Party to set its own level of risk is tempered, 
however. The Parties agree that SPS measures will not be adopted and 
applied in a manner that arbitrarily or unjustifiably discriminates between 
domestic goods and imported products. 54 1 
Article 714.1 attempts to minimize differences among the three 
NAFTA Parties' SPS measures. It provides that an importing Party must 
accept a measure of an exporting Party as equivalent if the exporting 
Party's measure achieves the importing Party's level of protection.542 The 
Parties further agree that they will apply SPS measures only to the extent 
necessary to achieve the appropriate level of protection, taking into 
account technical and economic feasibility.543 
Although the agreement encourages Parties to adopt international 
standards where they exist, Article 713.3 permits the NAFTA parties to 
adopt SPS measures that are more stringent than international standards. 
This provision is important to environmental protection if a NAFT A Party 
considers international standards to be inadequate. SPS measures are 
presumptively valid if they conform to an international standard.544 
Nonconformity with an international standard alone, however, does not 
establish a presumption of invalidity under NAFTA.545 In either event, a 
Party challenging another Party's SPS measure bears the burden of 
establishing the inconsistency.546 
Article 717.4 provides that an importing Party may require 
governmental approval for the use of an additive or for establishing a 
tolerance for a contaminant prior to granting access to the importing 
Party's domestic market for food, beverages, or feedstuff containing that 
additive or contaminant.547 
Article 718 on transparency requires advance public notice and an 
opportunity to comment on proposed SPS measures or amendments to 
existing SPS measures. 548 Article 718.4 requires a delay between the 
publication of an SPS measure and its effective date. 549 
One key difference between Chapter 7:B and NAFTA Chapter 
541 See id. art. 712.4. 
542 See id. art. 714.2. 
543 See id. art. 712.5. 
544 See id. art. 713.2. 
545 See id. art. 713.2. 
546 See id. art. 723.6. 
547 See id. art. 717.4. 
548 See id. art. 718.1. 
549 See id. art. 718.4. 
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Nine on standards-related measures is the test used to determine whether a 
measure is protectionist and, therefore, illegal. As described below, 
Chapter Nine uses a test of non-discriminatory treatment. 550 Chapter 7:B, 
on the other hand, relies on a test of scientific evidence and risk 
assessment.551 As noted above in connection with the Uruguay Round SPS 
Agreement, a strict test of non-discrimination is not possible for SPS 
measures because SPS measures must at times discriminate against 
imported products from a particular country because such goods pose a 
different health or safety risk than the same product from another 
country.SS2 As long as the discrimination is not arbitrary or unjustifiable, it 
is permissible under Chapter 7:B. 
4. Standards-Related Measures 
NAFTA Chapter Nine, Standards-Related Measures, complements 
the Chapter 7:B environmental provisions. Article 903 affirms the Parties' 
rights and obligations to each other under environmental and conservation 
agreements to which they are a Party. Article 904.2 entitles each NAFTA 
Party to establish the levels of protection it considers appropriate in 
pursuing legitimate health, safety, and environmental protection objectives 
and to set those standards at a level to be determined by the Party. 
Unnecessary obstacles to trade are barred.SS3 So long as the demonstrable 
purpose of the measure is to achieve a legitimate objective, and the 
measure does not exclude imports from a Party that meet that legitimate 
objective, an environmental measure is not an "an unnecessary obstacle to 
trade. "554 
In contrast with Article 712.3(b), which requires the Parties to base 
SPS measures on an assessment of risk and scientific principles, Article 
904 does not obligate the Parties to conduct a risk assessment or to base 
their standards-related measures on a risk assessment. 555 A Party may, 
however, conduct such an assessment in pursuing its legitimate 
objectives.556 
550 See id. art. 904.3. 
551 See id. art. 712, 714. 
552 See supra notes 105 through 171 and accompanying text. 
SS3 See id. art. 904.4. 
554 See id. 
555 See generally id. art. 904. 
556 See id. art. 907.1. When conducting a risk assessment, Article 907.1 directs the 
Parties to consider (1) available scientific evidence; (2) intended end uses; (3) processes 
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Article 904 not only reserves to the Parties the right to establish the 
levels of protection they deem appropriate in pursuing legitimate 
objectives of health and safety/57 it also reserves to the Parties the right to 
prohibit the importation of another Party's goods that fail to comply with 
applicable standards-related measures of the importing Party. 558 
Furthennore, an importing Party has the right to continue to prohibit the 
importation of such products until completion of any domestic approval 
procedure. 559 
In order to ensure that existing levels of high protection do not 
move in a downward trajectory, Article 906.2 obligates the Parties to 
hannonize ("make compatible" in the language of the Article) their 
respective standards-related measures, but in doing so not to reduce the 
level of environmental protection.560 Article 906.2 ought to alleviate fears 
that NAFTA heralds the demise of effective environmental protection in 
North America, and, specifically, in the United States .. Article 906.2 is 
designed to prevent the feared "ratcheting down" of environmental 
standards and enforcement to the lowest common denominator. At a 
minimum, Article 906.2 establishes a standstill in existing environmental 
laws and regulations within the United States. It calls for a ratcheting up 
of such standards and enforcement levels in Mexico, to the extent that its 
standards and enforcement levels are lower than, and thus incompatible 
with, the standards and enforcement levels set in the United States. 
Article 906.4 obligates an importing Party to treat as equivalent to 
its own standards-related measures those of an exporting Party where it is 
demonstrated that the latter's technical regulations adequately fulfill the 
importing Party's legitimate objectives. 561 
Article 909 requires advance public notice and an opportunity to 
comment of at least sixty days (in the case of federal measures) on 
proposed new standards-related measures or modifications of existing 
standards-related measures. 562 
Article 914.4 on burden of proof parallels Article 723.6 by 
providing that in any dispute over a standards-related measure, the burden 
or production, operating, inspection, sampling or testing methods; and (4) environmental 
conditions. See id. 
m See id. art. 904.2. 
558 See id. art. 904.1. 
559 See id. art. 904.1. 
560 See id. art. 906.2. 
561 See id art. 906.4. 
562 See id. art. 909.1 
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of proving an inconsistency with or violation of NAFTA rests with the 
challenging Party.563 . 
Finally, to oversee the harmonization effort, Chapter Nine 
establishes a Committee on Standards-Related Measures whose functions 
include "facilitating the process by which the Parties make compatible 
their standards-related measures. "564 In addition, businesses and firms 
within the NAFTA Parties have decided not to wait for their governments 
to act and have taken the initiative. They are engaged in on-going 
negotiations to harmonize products standards and to conclude mutual 
recognition agreements. 565 
Before turning to the Environmental Side Agreement, the 
environmental provisions in two other NAFTA chapters, Investment and 
Dispute Settlement, will be analyzed. 
5. Investment 
One of the most serious mIsgIvmgs harbored by NAFTA's 
opponents-captured in part by Ross Perot's "giant sucking sound" 
metaphor-is that Mexico will not only draw low-wage jobs from the 
United States, but that it also will become a pollution haven for the 
"dirtiest" U.S. industries. In connection with the latter, the fear is that 
polluting U.S. industries will move operations to Mexico where they 
purportedly can pollute at will. The Labor Side Agreement,566 concluded 
concurrently with the Environmental Side Agreement567 after the NAFTA 
negotiations were closed, is designed to address at least in part the first 
concern. Chapter Eleven on investment deals with the second concern.568 
Article 1114, Environmental Measures, is an environmental sword 
and shield. The sword, Article 1114.1, provides that nothing in NAFT A is 
to be construed to prevent a Party from adopting, maintaining, or 
enforcing any measure otherwise consistent with Chapter Eleven that it 
considers appropriate to ensure that investment activity in its territory is 
563 See id. arts. 914.4, 723.6. 
564 Id. art. 913.2(b). 
565 See NAFTA Industries Meet to Harmonize Standards. 14 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 262 
(1997). 
566 North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation, Sept, 8, 9, 12, 14, 1993, U.S.-
Can.-Mex., 32 I.L.M. 1499 (1993). 
567 NAAEC, supra note 529. 
568 See NAFT A, supra note 8, arts. 110 1-39 & Annexes. 
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undertaken in an environmentally-sensitive manner.569 The shield, Article 
1114.2, bars the Parties from relaxing, waiving, or derogating from health, 
safety, or environmental measures as a way of encouraging foreign 
investment from another Party.570 
6. Chapter Twenty Dispute Settlement 
The NAFT A Chapter Twenty dispute settlement provisions carve 
out special procedures applicable to a challenge brought against a Party's 
environmental measures. These procedures were included in response to 
the Tuna/Dolphin panel report as a hedge against a replay of that GATT 
panel proceeding within the NAFT A context. 
As a general matter, NAFT A trade disputes may be resolved under 
either NAFTA or WTO auspices at the option of the complaining Party.571 
Two exceptions exist, however, to this choice-of-forum option. First, 
Article 2005.3 provides that if the responding Party claims that its action 
is governed by Article 104 (giving priority to the three MEAs and the 
Border XXI Program in the event of a conflict between them and 
NAFTA), and requests that the matter be resolved under Chapter Twenty, 
the complaining Party thereafter can have recourse solely to the NAFTA 
dispute settlement procedures.572 
Second, upon request of the responding Party, Article 2005.4 
channels disputes arising under Chapters 7:B or Nine into Chapter Twenty 
if they concern a measure: (1) that is adopted or maintained by a Party to 
protect its human, animal, or plant life or health, or to protect its 
environment; or (2) that raises a factual issue concerning the environment, 
health, safety, or conservation, including directly related scientific 
matters. 573 
What explains these special dispute resolution provisions giving 
NAFTA preference over the WTO or other international bodies as the 
forum for resolving the Parties' trade-environment disputes? At the time 
NAFT A was concluded in 1992, the Uruguay Round negotiations on the 
Dispute Settlement Understanding had not been completed. At that time it 
was not clear to anyone, including the NAFT A Parties, whether the much-
569 See id. art. 1114.1. 
570 See id. art. 1114.2. 
571 See id. art. 2005.1. 
m See id. art. 2005.3. 
573 See id. art. 2005.4. 
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maligned GATT dispute settlement process would be improved and, if so, 
whether dispute settlement under WTO auspices would present a 
hospitable or hostile forum for resolving trade-environment disputes. 
Given these uncertainties and the widespread dissatisfaction with the 
GATT dispute settlement process-a dissatisfaction fueled in large part by 
the Tuna/Dolphin decision574-the NAFT A Parties included exclusive 
jurisdiction provisions in Chapter Twenty for environmental disputes that 
otherwise would have fallen within the concurrent jurisdiction of NAFT A, 
the WTO, and/or some other international forum. 
Finally, environmental disputes also receive special treatment vis-
a-vis the NAFT A Free Trade Commission. The Commission, which is 
comprised of cabinet-level representatives of the Parties and charged with 
the task of supervising the implementation of NAFTA and resolving 
NAFT A disputes,575 must convene to resolve a NAFTA environmental 
dispute if a complaining Party so requests.576 The Commission may seek 
the advice of technical experts. 577 In the event the Commission is 
unsuccessful in resolving the dispute within thirty days, any Party may 
request the establishment of an arbitral panel whose reports are final and 
binding.578 Environmental disputes which are referred to a Chapter Twenty 
arbitral panel may in tum be referred to scientific review boards to answer 
factual issues concerning environmental, health, safety, or other scientific 
matters. 579 In preparing its report, the arbitral panel must take the board's 
report into account. 580 
C. The Environmental Side Agreement 
NAFTA has been called "the 'greenest' trade agreement ever."581 
The reason for this accolade is the NAAEC, or Environmental 
574 See Tuna-Dolphin I Panel Report, supra note 7. 
575 See NAFTA, supra note 8, arts. 2001.1, 2001.2(a) & (c). 
576 See id. arts.2007.1, 2007.2, 2007.4. 
577 See id. art. 2007 .S( a). 
578 See id. arts. 2008.1, 2008.2. 
579 See id. art. 20 IS. I. The board is selected by the panel from among highly qualified, 
independent experts, after consulting with the disputing Parties. See id. art. 201S.2. 
Panel proceedings also may involve the use of technical experts to provide information 
and advice. See id. art. 2014. 
580 See id. art. 201S.4. 
581 Daniel C. Esty, Making Trade and Environmental Policies Work Together: Lessons 
from NAFTA, in TRADE AND THE ENVIRONMENT: THE SEARCH FOR BALANCE 373, 379 
(James Cameron et al. eds., 1994). 
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Cooperation Agreement, signed one year after the conclusion of the 
NAFTA negotiations. S82 It augments the environmental provisions of 
NAFT A and its commitment to sustainable development. The NAAEC 
also delivered a preemptive strike against anti-NAFTA lobbying efforts in 
Congress by environmental and business groups in the United States. 
The USTR took the lead in developing many of the Environmental 
Cooperation Agreement's provlSlons, in collaboration with an 
environmental negotiating sub-group co-chaired by the Environmental 
Protection Agency and the Department of State, with representatives from 
the Departments of Agriculture, Commerce, Justice, and Interior. The 
sub-group consulted with concerned business and environmental groups. 
As an executive agreement, implementing legislation or 
congressional approval was not required. The NAFT A implementing bill, 
however, made NAFTA's entry into force contingent upon an exchange of 
582 NAAEC, supra note 529. The NAAEC has generated a flood of legal commentary. 
See generally PIERRE MARC JOHNSON & ANDRE BEAULIEU, THE ENVIRONMENT AND 
NAFTA: UNDERSTANDING AND IMPLEMENTING THE NEW CONTINENTAL LAW (1996); 
Raymond B. Ludwiszewski & Peter E. Seley, "Green" Language in the NAFTA: 
Reconciling Free Trade and Environmental Protection, in THE NORTH AMERICAN FREE 
TRADE AGREEMENT: A NEW FRONTIER IN INTERN A TIONAL TRADE AND INVESTMENT IN 
THE AMERICAS 375 (Judith H. Bello et al. eds., 1994); MAG RAW, supra note 524; 
Frederick M. Abbott, The NAFTA Environmental Dispute Settlement System as Prototype 
for Regional Integration Arrangements, 4 y.B. INT'L ENVTL. L. 3 (1994); Block & 
Herrup, supra note 531; LaRue Corbin et aI., The Environment, Free Trade, and 
Hazardous Waste: A Study of the U.S.-Mexico Border Environmental Problems in the 
Light of Free Trade, 1 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 183 (1994); Scott C. Fulton & Lawrence 
I. Sperling, The Network of Environmental Enforcement and Compliance Cooperation in 
North America and the Western Hemisphere, 30 INT'L LAW. III (1996); Jack I. Garvey, 
Trade Law and Quality of Life-Dispute Resolution under the NAFTA Side Accords on 
Labor and the Environment, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 439 (1995); Sandra Le Priol-Vrejan, The 
NAFTA Environmental Side Agreement and the Power to Investigate Violations of 
Environmental Laws, 23 HOFSTRA L. REV. 483 (1994); Reid A. Middleton, NAFTA & 
The Environmental Side Agreement: Fusing Economic Development with Ecological 
Responsibility, 31 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1025 (1994); Kal Raustiala, The Political 
Implications of the Enforcement Provisions of the NAFTA Environmental Side 
Agreement: The CEC As a Model for Future Accords, 25 ENVTL. L. 31 (1995); J. Owen 
Saunders, NAFTA and the North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation: A 
New Model for International Collaboration on Trade and the Environment, 5 COLO. J. 
INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'y 273 (1994); Richard B. Stewart, The NAFTA: Trade, 
Competition, Environmental Protection, 27 INT'L LAW. 751 (1993); Christopher Thomas 
& Gregory A. Tereposky, The NAFTA and the Side Agreement on Environmental Co-
operation-Addressing Environmental Concerns in a North American Free Trade 
Regime, 1. WORLD TRADE , Dec. 1993, at 5 (1993). 
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diplomatic notes among Canada, Mexico, and the United States stating 
that the supplemental agreement on the environment had entered into 
force. 58l Presidents Clinton and Salinas and Prime Minister Campbell 
signed the NAAEC in their respective capitols on September 14, 1993.584 
The NAAEC is applicable throughout the territory of the United 
States and Mexico. The Agreement binds Canada with respect to all 
matters subject to Ottawa's control.585 Canada is committed to using its 
best efforts to make the Agreement applicable to as many provinces as 
possible.586 Canada is restricted in its ability to invoke the dispute 
settlement process to the extent of provincial participation.S87 As of late 
1997, only Quebec and Alberta have signed the Environmental 
Cooperation Agreement. 588 
The NAAEC does not amend any NAFT A provisions, but does 
supplement the rights and obligations contained therein. The Agreement 
specifically commits the Parties to effective enforcement of their 
environmental laws, although its key feature is its institutional provisions. 
The Agreement establishes the Commission for Environmental 
Cooperation (CEC), whose competence covers any environmental or 
natural resource issue that may arise among the NAFTA Parties.589 In 
addition, any environmental issue-from the protection of endangered 
species to transboundary pollution-may be the subject of consultations 
between the interested Parties under CEC auspices.59o 
Despite its trailblazing features, the NAAEC has not received 
58l See NAFTA Implementation Act § IOI(b)(2), 19 U.S.c. § 3311(b)(2) (1994). The 
Act also authorizes the establishment of the multilateral and bilateral commissions and 
administrative offices created under the NAAEC. See id. §§ 531-533, 19 U.S.c. §§ 
3471-3473. 
584 See NAAEC, supra note 529, 32 I.L.M. at 1496. 
585 See id. art. 41 & Annex 41; see also Zen Makuch, The Environmental Implications of 
the NAFTA Environmental Side Agreement: A Canadian Perspective, in INTERNATIONAL 
TRADE AND THE ENVIRONMENT, supra note 5, at 387. 
586 See NAAEC, supra note 529, Annex 41 :7. 
587 See id. Annex 41 :3. The NAAEC dispute resolution provisions are not available to 
Canada until provinces representing 55% of Canada's gross domestic product have 
signed. This requirement means that Ontario's accession is critical. 
588 Ottawa drafted the Canadian Intergovernmental Agreement Regarding the North 
American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation through which the provinces 
commit to the NAFT A Environment Agreement. A text of the Canadian 
Intergovernmental Agreement is available from Environment Canada at (819) 997-7475. 
589 See NAAEC, supra note 529, art. 8. 
590 See id., arts. 22, 23. 
HeinOnline -- 22 Wm. & Mary Envtl. L. & Pol’y Rev. 482 1997-1998
482 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'y REv. [Vol. 22:375 
universal acclaim. Some fear that NAFTA, even with the Environmental 
Cooperation Agreement, still will result in a "ratcheting down" of the 
enforcement of environmental laws by the Parties.591 One commentator 
has described the Environmental Cooperation Agreement as "tepid," 
"lukewarm," an agreement that gives NAFTA's environmental provisions 
"some dull teeth."592 This criticism persists in the face of a comparative 
study of Mexico's environmental laws, standards, and regulations 
conducted by the V.S. Environmental Protection Agency in 1993 that 
concluded that the V.S. and Mexican environmental regulatory regimes 
are designed to achieve comparable levels of protection. 
1. Preamble and Objectives 
The NAAEC's preamble reaffirms the international principle of 
good neighborliness, that is, the responsibility of states to ensure that 
activities within their territory do not cause damage to the environment of 
neighboring states. The preamble also reaffirms the principles declared in 
the 1972 Stockholm Declaration and the 1992 Rio Declaration, discussed 
above. 593 
The NAAEC has an ambitious agenda. Among its ten enumerated 
objectives are protecting the environment, promoting sustainable 
development, fostering cooperation on environmental law enforcement, 
and promoting transparency and public participation in the development of 
environmental laws, regulations, and policies.594 
2. Obligations 
The Agreement generally obligates the Parties to (1) prepare 
reports periodically on the state of the environment, (2) promote education 
in environmental matters, (3) promote the use of economic instruments for 
the efficient achievement of environmental goals, and (4) consider 
prohibiting the export to other NAFT A Parties of pesticides or other toxic 
591 Statements and letters from interested business and environmental groups addressing 
NAFTA and the environment, both in support of and in opposition to NAFTA, are 
collected in MAGRAW, supra note 524, at 629-755. 
591 See Joel L. Silverman, The "Giant Sucking Sound" Revisited: A Blueprint to Prevent 
Pollution Havens by Extending NAFTA 's Unheralded "Eeo-Dumping" Provisions to the 
New World Trade Organization, 24 GA. 1. INT'L & COMPo L. 347, 359, 364,365 (1994). 
593 See NAAEC, supra note 529, pmbl. 
594 See id. art. 1. 
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substances whose use is prohibited within the Party's territory.59S 
Article 3 directs the Parties to maintain high levels of 
environmental protection.596 More specifically, Articles 4 and 5 require the 
Parties to adopt fair, transparent, and impartial domestic administrative 
and judicial procedures so that private parties who are nationals of the 
Party have a means of redressing violations of that Party's environmental 
laws. S97 Decisions must be in writing and state the reasons on which they 
are based.598 
Article 6 requires that private persons have a means of requesting 
their government officials to investigate alleged violations of that Party's 
environmental laws, as well as access to administrative and judicial 
forums for enforcing that Party's environmental laws and regulations. 599 
NAFTA Parties, however, are not obligated to give nationals of another 
NAFTA Party any access to their courts or administrative agencies.600 
3. Institutional Provisions 
Part Three of the NAAEC establishes the Commission for 
Environmental Cooperation, consisting of the Council on Environmental 
Cooperation, a Secretariat, and a Joint Public Advisory Committee.601 
a. The Council 
The Council is comprised of cabinet-level representatives of the 
Parties and is required to meet at least once each year.602 The Council 
serves as the CEC's governing body and performs the following functions: 
(1) it serves as a forum for discussion of environmental matters; (2) it 
oversees the implementation of the NAAEC; (3) it has oversight 
responsibility for work of the Secretariat; (4) it addresses questions and 
595 See id. arts. 2.1, 2.3. 
596 See id. art. 3. 
597 See id. arts. 4, 5. 
598 See id. art. 7.2(a). 
599 See id. art. 6.1-6.3. 
600 See id. art. 38. 
601 See id. art. 8. For a summary of the CEC's operations through 1997, see Operation 
and Effect of NAFT A, supra note 526, at 132-36. 
602 See NAAEC, supra note 529, arts. 9.1, 9.3. See generally Jason Coatney, The Council 
on Environmental Cooperation: Redaction of "Effective Enforcement" Within the North 
American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, 32 TULSA L.J. 823 (1997). 
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differences that may arise between the parties regarding the interpretation 
and application of the NAAEC; and (5) it approves the CEC's annual 
work program and budget.603 
In connection with the CEC's annual cooperative work program, 
five major themes have been identified as the focus for 1997 and 
subsequent years: environmental conservation, protection of human health 
and environment, enforcement cooperation, environment and trade, and 
public outreach.604 Regarding environmental conservation, the CEC 
Secretariat is coordinating efforts with NGOs to identify areas important 
to the long-term viability of bird populations.60s The CEC also is 
coordinating efforts to conserve marine ecosystems, including regional 
implementation of the Global Program of Action for the Protection of the 
Marine Environment from Land Based Activities, signed by 101 countries 
in November 1995.606 Regarding the protection of human health and 
environment, regional action plans are being developed for the 
management and/or elimination of four toxic substances: PCBs, DDT, 
mercury, and chlordane.607 A program also is being developed to monitor 
and assess long-term air quality in North America, transboundary air 
pollution, and greenhouse gases.608 
The CEC has oversight responsibility for the North American Fund 
for Environmental Cooperation. The Fund was created in 1995, but with a 
budget of less than $2 million.609 The Fund supports community-based 
projects and studies on local environmental issues within the NAFTA 
Parties.610 Thirty-five projects were approved under this program for 1996. 
603 See NAAEC, supra note 529, art. 10.1. 
604 The CEC 1997 work program includes projects on (1) environmental conservation, (2) 
protecting human health and the environment, (3) environment, trade, and the economy, 
(4) enforcement cooperation and law, and (4) information and public outreach. See 
Comm'n on Envtl. Cooperation, Annual Program and Budget 1997, May 14, 1997 
(visited Jan. 16, 1998) <http://www.cec.org> [hereinafter CEC Website]. 
605 See CEC Website (visited Jan. 16, 1998) <http://www.cec.org/english/resources/ 
publicationslbudgol96. cfm#O 1 >. 
606 See id. 
607 See id. 
608 See id. 
609 See CEC Website (visited Jan. 16, 1998) <http://www.cec.org/english/nafeclflyer. 
cfm?format=2>. 
610 A summary of the projects approved by the CEC under the North American Fund for 
Environmental Cooperation is available from CEC Website (visited Jan. 16, 1998) 
<http://www .cec .org/englishlnafec/index.cfm?format= 1 >. 
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Thirty-two projects have been approved for 1997.611 " 
b. The Secretariat 
The CEC Secretariat is headquartered in Montreal and is headed by 
an Executive Director who is appointed by the Council for a three-year 
term.612 The position rotates consecutively between nationals of the 
NAFTA Parties.613 In the performance of their duties, and in a striking 
parallel to the independence that Commissioners appointed to the EU 
Commission must have from their home governments, the Executive 
Director and the Secretariat's staff must neither seek nor receive 
instructions from any government or any other authority external to the 
Counci1.614 
The Secretariat is responsible for providing technical, 
administrative, and operational support to the Council and to committees 
and groups established by the Council.615 The annual program and budget 
of the CEC is prepared by the Executive Director, subject to Council 
approva}.616 The Secretariat also is responsible for preparing the CEC's 
annual report.617 
Finally, under NAAEC Article 13, the Secretariat may prepare a 
report on any matter within the scope of the CEC's annual work 
pro gram. 618 In response to a complaint from private groups concerning 
massive migratory bird deaths at the Silva Reservoir in Mexico, the 
Secretariat prepared an Article 13 report in 1996.619 In response to that 
report, the NAFTA Parties negotiated a resolution that called for scientific 
cooperation on the problem.620 
c. The Joint Public Advisory Committee 
611 See id. 
612 See NAAEC, supra note 529, art. 11.1. 
613 See id. 
614 See id. art. 11.4. 
615 See id. art. 11.5. 
616 See id. art. 11.6. 
617 See id. art. 12. The CEC's annual reports are available from its website. See CEC 
Website (visited Jan. 16, 1998) <http://www.cec.org>. 
618 See NAAEC, supra note 529, art. 13. 
619 See id. arts. 13, 14. 
620 See id. art. 13. 
HeinOnline -- 22 Wm. & Mary Envtl. L. & Pol’y Rev. 486 1997-1998
486 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'y REv. [Vol. 22:375 
The last of the three CEC institutions is the fifteen-member Joint 
Public Advisory Committee (JP AC). As its name suggests, the JP AC 
provides citizen advice to the Council on any matter within the scope of 
the NAAEC, and technical, scientific, or other information to the 
Secretariat. 621 
The NAAEC is maddeningly short on detail as to the role of the 
JP AC.m Only one article, consisting of seven sections, is devoted to the 
JP AC. Given the lack of infrastructure, the absence of clearly defined 
functions, and the requirement that it meet only once a year, JP AC's role 
within the CEC may be ad hoc.623 
4. The Private Petition Process 
The Secretariat may consider a submission from any NGO or 
private person asserting that a NAFTA Party is failing to enforce 
effectively its environmental laws.624 To be in proper form, a submission 
must meet the following six criteria: (1) it must be in writing and in the 
language designated by the Party that is the target of the submission; (2) it 
must clearly identify the person or NGO making the submission; (3) it 
must provide sufficient information to allow the Secretariat to review the 
submission; (4) it must appear to be aimed at promoting environmental 
enforcement rather than at harassing industry; (5) it must indicate that the 
matter has been communicated in writing to the responsible authorities of 
the Party and indicate the Party's response; and (6) it must be filed by a 
621 See id. arts. 16.4, 16.5. Each NAFTA Party appoints five members. See id. art. 16.l. 
622 See id. art. 16. 
623 See id. art 16.3; see also Saunders, supra note 582, at 295-96. Additional information 
on the JPAC and its members is available from the CEC website. See CEC Website, 
supra note 604. 
624 See NAAEC, supra note 529, art. 14.1. To assist persons in the preparation of Article 
14 submissions, the Secretariat has prepared a booklet, GUIDELINES FOR SUBMISSIONS ON 
ENFORCEMENT MATTERS UNDER ARTICLE 14 AND 15 OF THE NORTH AMERICAN 
AGREEMENT ON ENVIRONMENTAL COOPERATION. See CEC Website, supra note 604, at 
<http://www.cec.org/englishicitizenlGuide08.cfm?format=2>. For critiques of the 
petition process, see Jorge A. Gonzalez, Jr., The North American Free Trade Agreement, 
30 INT'L LAW. 345 (1996); Michael J. Kelly, Bringing A Complaint Under the NAFTA 
Environmental Side Accord: Difficult Steps Under a Procedural Paper Tiger, But 
Movement in the Right Direction, 24 PEPP. L. REV. 71 (1996); Jay Tutchton, The Citizen 
Petition Process under NAFTA 's Environmental Side Agreement: It's Easy to Use, but 
Does It Work?, 26 ENVTL. L. REP. 10018 (1996). 
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person or NGO residing in a NAFTA Party.625 Given the broad discretion 
vested in the Secretariat in screening submissions, petitioners must 
necessarily depend on the Secretariat's good faith administration of Article 
14. 
If a submission meets these six criteria, the Secretariat next 
determines whether it merits a response from the target Party.626 To guide 
the Secretariat in this threshold determination of merit, Article 14.2 
instructs the Secretariat to consider (1) whether the submission alleges 
harm to the person or NGO making the submission; (2) whether the 
submission raises matters whose further study would advance the goals of 
the NAAEC; (3) whether private remedies are available under the Party's 
laws and, if so, whether they have been pursued; and (4) whether the 
submission is drawn exclusively from mass media reports.627 
After the Secretariat concludes that the submission warrants 
developing a factual record, it notifies the Council. The Council in turn 
instructs the Secretariat whether to develop a factual record.628 In 
preparing a factual record, Article 15.4 provides that the Secretariat may 
consider virtually any relevant technical, scientific, or other information 
submitted by the NGO, by the responding NAFTA Party, by the Joint 
625 See NAAEC, supra note 529, art. 14.1. As oflate 1997, a total of 13 citizen petitions 
had been received by the Secretariat under Article 14 (two in 1995, four in 1996, and 
seven as of January 1998). The Secretariat maintains a Registry of Submissions on 
Enforcement Matters. See CEC Website, supra note 604. 
626 See NAAEC, supra note 529, art. 14.2. 
627 See id. NAAEC Article 14.3 gives the affected Party up to 30 days, or 60 days where 
exceptional circumstances warrant, to apprise the Secretariat whether private remedies 
exist and have been pursued, and whether the matter is the subject of a pending 
administrative or judicial proceeding. In the event of a pending domestic proceeding, the 
Secretariat must terminate the Article 14 proceedings. See id. art. 14.3. 
628 See id. art. 15.2. An affirmative vote of the Council requires a two-thirds majority. In 
August 1996, for example, the Council instructed the Secretariat to prepare a factual 
record regarding the environmental impact assessment done on a public harbor terminal 
in Cozumel, Mexico. As of September 1997, the Council had not yet directed the 
Secretariat to prepare a factual record in any of the seven citizen petitions submitted in 
1997. Four of those petitions involve Canada, one the United States, and two involve 
Mexico. 
Under Article 13, the Secretariat also has the option of preparing a report for the 
Council on any matter within the scope of the annual program. In response to a 
submission concerning massive migratory bird deaths at the Silva Reservoir in Mexico, 
the Secretariat prepared an Article 13 report, which lead to a negotiated resolution of the 
matter among the NAFTA Parties. See CEC Website, supra note 604. 
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Public Advisory Committee, or developed by the Secretariat itself.629 The 
Secretariat's function under Article 14 is inquisitorial, rather than 
accusatorial. 
A draft factual record is submitted to the Council for its comments 
on accuracy.630 Once the Secretariat completes the final factual record and 
submits it to the Council, the Council may make it publicly available 
within 60 days.631 
For the petitioning private party, the Article 14 petition process 
ends with the transmittal of the final factual record to the Council. The 
NAAEC does not provide private remedies and does not create any private 
right of action against a NAFTA Party.632 A petitioner must either 
persuade its own government to pursue the matter further under NAAEC 
Article 23, or persuade an NGO or private individual who is a national of 
the offending NAFTA Party to pursue available domestic legal remedies. 633 
As of December 1998, the Secretariat has received nineteen Article 
14 submissions, concerning· all three NAFTA Parties.634 Three have 
concerned the United States, six have concerned Canada, and four have 
concerned Mexico.63S A few of those submissions have been rejected by 
the Secretariat under Article 14.1 for not involving a failure by a Party to 
enforce its environmental law (e.g., a 1995 Endangered Species Act 
petition, a 1995 National Forest Logging petition, and a 1997 Canadian 
Environmental Defence Fund petition).636 
5. InJormation Exchange 
Part Four of the NAAEC, Cooperation and Provision of 
Information, requires the Parties at all times to endeavor to agree on the 
interpretation and application of the NAAEC.637 Article 20.2 requires each 
Party, to the maximum extent possible, to notify other Parties of any 
629 See NAAEC, supra note 529, art. 15.4. 
630 See id. art. 15.5. 
631 See id. art. 15.7. A two-thirds vote in the affirmative is required. As one commentator 
has noted, making the factual record publicly available is not the same as publishing and 
disseminating it. See Kelly, supra note 624, at 81. 
632 See NAAEC, supra note 529, art. 38. 
633 See Kelly, supra note 624, at 82. 
634 See supra note 582 and accompanying text. 
635 See id. 
636 See Gonzalez, supra note 624, at 355-56; Kelly, supra note 624, at 91-95. 
637 See NAAEC, supra note 529, art. 20.1. 
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proposed or actual environmental measure that might affect materially the 
operation of the Agreement. When requested by another Party, a Party 
must provide promptly information and respond to questions pertaining to 
any such proposed or actual environmental measure.638 The Parties are free 
to notify any other Party if credible evidence exists of possible violations 
of the latter's environmental laws. 639 
Article 21 requires a Party to provide information to the Councilor 
the Secretariat when so requested that is necessary to the preparation of 
reports or factual records.640 If a Party declines the Secretariat's request, it 
must notify the Secretariat of its reasons for doing so in writing.641 
6. Dispute Settlement 
In addition to the mechanisms available to private persons to 
submit petitions about a NAFTA Party's failure to effectively enforce its 
environmental laws, Part Five of the Agreement creates a mechanism for 
Party-to-Party dispute resolution in the event there has been "a persistent 
pattern of failure by [a] Party to effectively enforce its environmental 
law."642 
Article 45 defines the three key terms "persistent pattern," 
"effectively enforce," and "environmental law."643 The term "persistent 
pattern" is defined as "a sustained or recurring course of action or inaction 
beginning after the date of entry into force of this Agreement."644 Rather 
than state when a Party has failed to "effectively enforce its environmental 
law," Article 45.1 instead states when a party has not failed to "effectively 
enforce its environmental law": 
[W]here the action or inaction in question by agencies or 
officials of that Party: 
(a) reflects a reasonable exercise of their discretion In 
respect of investigatory, prosecutorial, regulatory or 
638 See id. art. 20.3. 
639 See id. art. 20.4. 
640 See id. art. 21.1. If a Party deems a request from the Secretariat to be unduly 
burdensome, it may notify the Council, which may in turn revise the Secretariat's request 
by a two-thirds vote. See id. art. 21.2. 
641 See id. art. 20.3. 
642Id. art. 22.1. 
643 See id. art. 45. 
644 See id. art. 45.1. 
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compliance matters; or 
(b) results from bona fide decisions to allocate resources to 
enforcement in respect of other environmental matters 
determined to have higher priorities .... 645 
Finally, Article 45.2 defines "environmental law" as any statute or 
regulation whose primary purpose is the 
protection of the environment, or the prevention of a danger 
to human life or health, through 
(i) the prevention, abatement, or control of the release, 
discharge, or emission of pollutants or environmental 
contaminants, 
(ii) the control of environmentally hazardous or toxic 
chemicals, substances, materials, and wastes ... , or 
(iii) the protection of wild flora or fauna, including 
endangered species, their habitat, and specially 
protected natural areas in a party's territory.646 
The term "environmental law" does not include any statute or regulation 
the primary purpose of which is managing the commercial harvesting or 
exploitation, including aboriginal harvesting, of natural resources. A 
provision's primary purpose is determined by reference to that provision's 
primary purpose, not to the primary purpose of the statute or regulation of 
which it is a part.647 
Article 22 establishes a Party-to-Party consultative mechanism by 
which these issues are addressed first. In the event the consulting Parties 
are unable to reach a mutually satisfactory resolution of their dispute 
within sixty days, Article 23 permits either Party to request a special 
session of the Council.648 The Council may attempt to resolve the matter. 
To that end, it may call upon technical advisors, establish working groups, 
make recommendations, and have recourse to good offices, conciliation, or 
mediation.649 If the Council is unable to resolve the Parties' dispute, it may 
645 Id. 
646Id. art. 45.2. 
647 See generally Fulton & Sperling, supra note 582, at 129-31; Garvey, supra note 582; 
Raustiala, supra note 582, at 40-43; Thomas & Tereposky, supra note 582, at 27-32. 
648 See NAAEC, supra note 529, art. 23.1. 
649 See id. art. 23.4. In addition, Article 23.5 provides that if the Council decides that a 
matter is more properly covered by another agreement to which the Parties are 
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refer the Parties to arbitration in a narrow range of cases, described next.650 
a. Arbitration 
The NAAEC establishes a detailed, regularized arbitration 
procedure for resolving Party-to-Party disputes.651 The arbitration 
procedure is only available, however, where the alleged persistent pattern 
of failure by the responding Party to enforce effectively its environmental 
law relates to a situation involving "workplaces, finns, companies or 
sectors that produce goods or provide services: (a) traded between the 
territories of the Parties; or (b) that compete, in the territory of the Party 
complained against, with goods or services produced or provided by 
persons of another Party."652 
1. Panel Selection 
Panelists are selected from a roster of forty-five individuals 
established by the Council.65J Appointments to the roster are for three-year 
renewable tenns.654 Arbitral panels are comprised of five members.655 The 
signatories, it shall refer the matter for appropriate action in accordance with such other 
agreement. For example, if the dispute concerns the transboundary shipment of 
hazardous waste, the Council might refer the Parties to the Basel Convention for 
resolution of their dispute. 
650 See id. art. 24.1. 
651 See id. arts. 24-32; Saunders, supra note 582, at 299-302. The third NAFTA Party 
may intervene as a complainant as of right if it has a substantial interest in the matter. See 
NAAEC, supra note 529, art. 24.2. In any event, upon proper notice to the disputing 
Parties and the Secretariat, a nondisputing Party is entitled to attend all hearings, to make 
written and oral submissions, and to receive the disputing Parties' written submissions. 
See id. art. 29. 
652 [d. art. 24.1. 
653 See id. art. 25.1. Roster members are selected using the following four criteria: (1) 
they must have expertise in environmental law or its enforcement, technical or 
professional experience or expertise, or experience in resolving international trade 
disputes; (2) they must be selected strictly on the basis of their objectivity, reliability, and 
sound judgment; (3) they must be independent of, and not affiliated with or take 
instructions from, any party, the Secretariat, or the JPAC; and (4) they must comply with 
the code of conduct established by the Council. See id. art. 25.2. Roster members with a 
contlict of interest in the particular dispute are disqualified from serving as a panelist. See 
id. art. 26.1. 
b54 See id. art. 25.1(a). 
b55 See id. art. 27 .1. 
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panel chair is chosen by agreement of the Parties within fifteen days after 
the Council votes to convene a panel. In the absence of such agreement, 
the chair is selected by one of the disputing Parties, with the selecting 
Party chosen by lot, but the chair may not be a citizen of the selecting 
Party.656 Within fifteen days after selecting the chair, each Party to the 
dispute selects two panelists who are citizens of the other disputing 
Party.657 If a disputing Party fails to make its selection, panelists are 
selected by lot from among roster members who are citizens of the other 
disputing Party.6S8 This default selection provision creates an incentive for 
disputing Parties to participate in the arbitral proceeding.659 
Panelists are selected normally, but not exclusively, from the 
roster.660 In the event an individual is selected as a panelist who is not on 
the roster, a Party may exercise a peremptory challenge.661 . Similarly, if a 
panelist has been selected from the roster whom another Party believes is 
in violation of the code of conduct, that panelist may be removed if the 
disputing Parties so agree.662 
11. Conduct of the Hearing 
Panel proceedings are conducted under the Model Rules of 
Procedure established by the Council.663 The Model Rules include a right 
to at least one hearing before the panel, the opportunity to make written 
initial and rebuttal submissions, and anonymity of panelists insofar as 
which panel members are associated with majority or minority opinions.664 
Unless the Parties otherwise agree, a panel's standard terms of reference 
(i.e., its competence or subject matter jurisdiction) are as follows: "To 
examine, in light of the relevant provisions of the Agreement, including 
656 See id. art. 27.I(b). 
657 See id. art. 27.1 (c). 
658 See id. art. 27.I(d). 
659 In cases involving a dispute among all three NAFT A Parties, the selection of panelists 
is modified. The responding Party selects two panelists, one who is a citizen of one of 
the complaining Parties, and another who is a citizen of the other complaining Party. 
The complaining Parties together choose two panelists who are citizens of the responding 
Party. The default selection procedures are the same as those applicable in bilateral Party 
disputes. See id. art. 27.2. 
660 See id. art. 27.3. 
661 See id. 
662 See id. art. 27.4. 
663 See id. art. 28.1. 
604 See id. 
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those contained in Part Five, whether there has been a persistent pattern of 
failure by the Party complained against to enforce effectively its 
environmental law, and to make findings, determinations and 
recommendations in accordance with Article 31(2)."665 
Under Article 30, on request of a disputing Party or on its own 
initiative, a panel may seek information and technical advice from any 
person or body that it deems appropriate, subject to any terms or 
conditions the disputing Parties may impose.666 
The panel submits an initial report and a final report. The initial 
report is submitted within 180 days after the last panelist is selected.667 
The report is based on the submissions and arguments of the Parties, 
together with any information furnished to the panel under Article 30.668 
The initial report consists of (1) findings of fact, (2) the panel's 
determination whether there has been a persistent pattern of failure by the 
responding Party to effectively enforce its environmental law, and (3) in 
the event of an affirmative determination, a panel recommendation for the 
resolution of the dispute.669 A typical recommendation would suggest that 
the responding Party adopt and implement an action plan sufficient to 
remedy the pattern ofnon-enforcement.67o 
A disputing Party may submit written comments to the panel on its 
initial report within thirty days.671 In light of those comments the panel 
may request the views of the other participants, reconsider its report, and 
make any further examination that it deems appropriate.672 
Article 32 requires the panel to submit its final report within sixty 
days after its initial report.673 The disputing Parties must in tum transmit it 
to the Council within fifteen days, along with their comments, on a 
confidential basis and the final report is published five days after it is 
transmitted to the Counci1.674 
b. Implementation of Final Report 
665 Id. art. 28.3. 
666 See id. art. 30. 
667 See id. art. 31.2. 
668 See id. art. 31.1-31.2. 
669 See id. art. 31.2. 
670 See id. 
671 See id. art. 31.4. 
672 See id. art. 31.5. 
673 See id. art. 32.1. 
674 See id. art. 32.2-32.3. 
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If the panel's final report is affinnative, the disputing Parties are 
free to conclude a mutually satisfactory action plan.67S If the Parties are 
unable to reach such an agreement within sixty days after the final report, 
or if there is disagreement over whether the responding Party is fully 
implementing an action plan, a disputing Party may request that the panel 
reconvene.676 
When a panel has reconvened under the first circumstance (i.e., 
failure to reach agreement on an action plan), the panel must either 
approve the responding Party's action plan or establish one of its own that 
is consistent with the responding Party's environmentallaws.677 The panel 
also may impose a monetary penalty, where warranted, no greater than 
.007 percent of the total trade in goods between the Parties during the most 
recent year for which data are available. 678 In detennining the amount of 
the assessment, the panel is to take into account the following factors: (1) 
the pervasiveness and duration of the party's persistent failure to 
effectively enforce its environmental law, (2) the level of enforcement that 
could be reasonably expected of a party given its resource constraints, (3) 
the reasons given by the party for not fully implementing an action plan, 
(4) efforts made by the party after the final report to begin remedying its 
pattern of non-enforcement, and (5) any other relevant factors.679 Any 
penalty is paid into the North American Fund for Environmental 
Cooperation controlled by the CEC for the improvement of the 
environment. 680 
When a panel reconvenes under the second circumstance (i.e., 
failure to implement an action plan), the panel must detennine whether the 
responding Party has, in fact, failed to implement fully the action plan.681 
The panel may impose a monetary penalty if it detennines that the Party 
complained against has failed to implement fully the action plan.682 
675 See id. art. 33. 
676 See id. art. 34.1. If no action plan is agreed upon, a request to reconvene is untimely 
unless it is made within 120 days after the final report is issued. If an action plan was 
agreed to but allegedly is not being fully implemented, a request to reconvene may be 
made no sooner than 180 days after the action plan was approved. See id. art. 34.2-34.3. 
b77 See ld. art. 34.4. 
678 See lei. art. 34.4, Annex 34.1. 
679 See ld. Annex 34.2. 
680 See id. Annex 34.3. 
681 See ld. art. 34.5. 
oS2 See id. art. 34 .S(b). 
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Determinations of a reconvened panel, including penalty assessments, are 
fina1.683 
c. Suspension of Benefits 
If a responding Party fails to pay a monetary assessment within 
180 days, Article 36 permits a complaining Party to suspend the 
application ofNAFTA benefits in an amount no greater than that sufficient 
to collect the monetary assessment.684 Suspension ofNAFTA benefits may 
include an increase in the rates of duty on goods from the responding 
Party, not to exceed the lesser of (a) the rate that was applicable when 
NAFTA entered into force, or (b) the applicable Most-Favored-Nation 
duty rate on the date the Party suspends benefits.68s 
In considering what tariff commitments or other benefits to 
suspend, a complaining Party first must attempt to suspend benefits in the 
same sector as that in respect of which there has been a persistent pattern 
of failure to enforce environmental laws (e.g., suspension of benefits on 
agricultural goods in retaliation for non-enforcement of environmental 
laws affecting agriculture).686 Failing that, a complaining Party may 
suspend benefits in other sectors.687 
The Council may reconvene the panel to determine whether the 
monetary assessment has been paid or the action plan fully implemented. 
In either case, the suspension of benefits is to be terminated.688 The 
Council also may reconvene the panel to determine whether the 
suspension of benefits is manifestly excessive.689 
To date, there have been no requests to initiate the Article 23 
dispute resolution process. 
7. General Provisions 
683 See id. art. 34.6. 
684 See id. art. 36.1. 
68S See id. Annex 36B. Special enforcement and monetary assessment collection 
procedures apply to Canada that require panel reports to be filed with a Canadian court 
and judgment entered thereon, which then becomes enforceable in Canada. See id. 
Annex 36A. 
686 See id. Annex 36B(2). 
687 See id. 
688 See id. art. 36.4-36.5. 
689 See id. art. 36.5. 
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Part Six of the NAAEC contains a number of provisions of general 
application. First, Article 37 makes clear that nothing in the Agreement 
empowers a Party to undertake environmental law enforcement activities 
in the territory of another Party.690 Second, Article 38 provides that no 
Party may provide for a right of action under its domestic law against any 
other Party on the ground that another Party has acted in a manner 
inconsistent with the Agreement.691 In other words, the right of private 
persons within one NAFT A Party to make submissions to the Secretariat 
under Article 14 alleging that another NAFT A Party has failed to enforce 
effectively its environmental law is exclusive.692 Third, Article 39 protects 
from disclosure business confidential and proprietary information.693 
Finally, Article 42 carves out a national security exception that permits 
Parties to take any action they consider necessary for the protection of 
their essential security interests relating to arms, munitions, and nuclear 
weapons.694 
D. U.S.-Mexico Border Environment Cooperation Agreement 
The United States and Mexico have concluded a supplemental 
bilateral environmental agreement to develop environmental infrastructure 
in the border area. 695 The Border Environment Cooperation Agreement 
creates two institutions. The first is the Border Enforcement Cooperation 
Commission (BECC), consisting of a Board of Directors, a General 
Manager, a Deputy General Manager, and an Advisory Counci1.696 The 
BECC's responsibility is to help border communities plan and develop 
environmental infrastructure proj ects. 697 
The second institution is the San Antonio-based North American 
690 See id. art. 37. 
691 See id. art. 38. 
692 See id. art. 14. 
693 See id. art. 39. 
694 See id. art. 42. 
695 See Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the 
Government of the United Mexican States Concerning the Establishment of a Border 
Environment Cooperation Commission and a North American Development Bank, Nov. 
16, 18, 1993,32 I.L.M. 1545 (1993) [hereinafter BECCINADBank Agreement]; see also 
Gonzalez, supra note 624, at 356-57; Steinberg, supra note 112, at 245-53. 
696 See BECCINADBank Agreement, supra note 695, art. III, §§ 3-5. 
697 See id. art. I § I; Gonzalez, supra note 624, at 357. Additional information on the 
work of the BECC is available on the internet. See BECC Website (visited Oct. 25, 
1998) <http://cocef.interjuarez.com>. 
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Development Bank (NADB ank) , which is responsible for generating 
financial resources for infrastructure construction of pollution-control and 
waste-water treatment facilities. 69B NADBank was funded with $225 
million by the U.S. and Mexican governments. These public funds are to 
leverage up to $3 billion in private money in capital markets to finance the 
construction of border environmental projects.699 
The BECC has certified sixteen projects. NADBank has approved 
the financing for four of these projects, two on each side of the border. 
The BECC also has received a $10 million grant from the U.S. EPA to 
identify, develop, and assist water-related projects in both countries. In 
1996, the two countries signed an agreement to improve air quality in the 
EI Paso-Ciudad Juarez area. Some water pollution problems also were 
being addressed in 1996 by the BECC and NADBank. Seven water 
treatment plants had been certified by BECC as of 1996.700 
E. U.S.-Mexico Border XXI Program 
Another bilateral spin-off agreement from NAFT A is the 1996 
Border XXI Program designed to improve the environment of the U.S.-
Mexico border area. The program is the successor arrangement to the 
Integrated Border Environmental Plan, a bilateral arrangement between 
the United States and Mexico concluded in February 1992. That Plan in 
tum built on the 1983 La Paz Agreement between Mexico and the United 
States.701 The Border XXI Program now forms the core of the U.S. 
environmental cooperative relationship with Mexico.702 It is designed to 
provide for the long-term protection of human health and the environment 
along the U.S.-Mexico border area. Its objectives are (1) to strengthen 
enforcement of existing environmental protection laws, (2) to reduce 
pollution and improve the quality of the border area through new 
initiatives, (3) to increase cooperative planning, training, and education, 
69B See Raul Hinojosa-Ojeda, The North American Development Bank: Forging New 
Directions in Regional Integration Policy, 60 1. AM. PLAN. ASS'N 301 (1994). See 
generally, NADBank Website (visited Oct. 25, 1998) <http://www.nadbank.org>. 
699 See Steinberg, supra note 112, at 247. 
700 For a summary of the activities of the BECC and NADBank, see Operation and Effect 
of NAFTA, supra note 526, at 126-32. See also Robert Bryce, US and Mexico Tackle 
Air Pollution, But Set Water Issues Aside, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, May 16, 1996, at 4. 
701 See Agreement on Cooperation for Protection and Improvement of the Environment in 
the Border, Aug. 14, 1983, U.S.-Mex., T.I.A.S. No. 10,827. 
702 See Operation and Effect ofNAFTA, supra note 526, at 116-23. 
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and (4) to improve understanding of the border area environment. 
IV. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION: INTEGRATING OPEN TRADE AND 
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 
As the foregoing amply demonstrates, the United States and the 
other Members of the WTO have committed to a comprehensive 
international trade law regime under the auspices of which all trade-
environment disputes are to be resolved in a multilaterallbilateral forum. 
The core GATT obligations not to discriminate against imports regardless 
of their origin (the Article I MFN commitment), the obligation not to 
discriminate against imports vis-a-vis the domestic like product (the 
Article III national treatment obligation), and the commitment not to 
impose quotas on imports (the Article XI prohibition on quotas) create a 
legal framework that ensures that trade in goods will not be impeded. 
Regardless of whether this legal regime now is deemed to be harmful to 
the environment, the inescapable fact is that the United States and the 
other WTO Members have made a legal commitment to these rules. 
Unilateralism has been forsworn. 
Beyond these three core GATT obligations, the Uruguay Round 
Agreements dealing with SPS measures, technical measures, subsidies, 
and dispute resolution put a substantial amount of flesh on the bare bones 
of the core GATT commitments. As has been shown, the scope of these 
agreements is broad. They establish a comprehensive legal regime that 
regulates the imposition of border measures on the grounds of health, 
safety, and other environmental concerns. The binding dispute settlement 
mechanism established under the DSU gives WTO Members an adequate 
forum for resolving trade-environment disputes bilaterally. Once again, 
unilateral responses to trade-environment disputes are rejected. 
In addition, the NAFTA environmental side agreement, NAECA, 
is even broader in scope than the WTO agreements to the extent that it has 
established an institutional framework for the study, negotiation, and 
resolution of environmental issues among the three NAFT A parties. 
Indeed, the cooperative nature of the NAFTA environmental programs 
could serve as a possible model for the WTO membership. 
As the foregoing has shown, the GATT-WTO system and NAFTA 
have in place a number of institutional and substantive provisions 
designed to address trade disputes in the context of the environment. 
Their overarching goal is to prevent trade protectionism while at the same 
time protecting the environment. Their institutional framework calls for 
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the resolution of trade-environment disputes in a multilateral and/or 
bilateral context. Unilateralism is rejected totally as an option. 
The United States, as a signatory to both the WTO Agreement and 
NAFTA, is obligated to perform its obligations under those agreements in 
good faith. Its resort to unilateral trade measures to resolve trade-
environment disputes, in the face of international agreements that provide 
a bilateral/multilateral dispute resolution mechanism for resolving such 
disputes, violates international law. Beyond the question of the validity of 
unilateral measures to resolve trade-environment disputes, as a policy 
matter the United States has learned the hard way that unilateralism is a 
double-edged sword. In its recent dispute with the EU over the use of 
leghold traps, the United States came close to being on the receiving end 
of a unilateral EU import ban on fur from animals caught with leghold 
traps. It was only after extensive bilateral negotiations that the parties 
were able to reach a mutually satisfactory settlement of their dispute.703 
The GATT -WTO rules are deeply sensitive to the fact that a 
national regulation that is nominally for the protection of the environment 
may be pretextual, that is, it may be nothing more than a thinly disguised 
trade protectionist measure. The Stockholm Declaration704 does not 
directly address the question of the impact of environmental regulation on 
growth and international trade. The Rio Declaration does provide in three 
places a broad framework for harmonizing environmental and trade 
concerns, essentially giving trade issues primacy over environmental 
concerns in the event the two conflict.70s In Principles 11, 12, and 16, the 
Rio Declaration specifically warns that pursuing aggressive environmental 
policies may have a potentially adverse impact on international trade.706 
First, Principle 11 states that "[environmental] [s ]tandards applied 
by some countries may be inappropriate and of unwarranted economic and 
social cost to other countries, in particular developing countries."707 In 
other words, Principle 11 reminds countries that when developing 
international environmental standards, compare apples to apples. In 
addition, Principle 11 mildly admonishes developed countries to avpid 
!leco-imperialism" (i.e., the act of demanding that developing countries 
703 See EU, u.s. Reach Accord on Phaseout of Leghold Traps, Averting Fur Import Ban, 
14 Inn Trade Rep. (BNA) 2076 (1997). 
704 See Stockholm Declaration, supra note 25. 
705 See Rio Declaration, supra note 26. 
706 See id. princs. 11, 12, 16. 
707 Id. prine. 11. 
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adopt excessively stringent, costly, and arguably inappropriate 
environmental standards or risk import bans on shipments of goods to 
developed countries). 708 
Second, Principle 12 addresses the crux of the environment-trade 
debate, namely, environmental measures that are disguised trade 
protectionism. It weighs in on the side of trade: 
States should cooperate to promote a supportive and open 
international economic system that would lead to economic 
growth and sustainable development in all countries, to 
better address the problems of environmental degradation. 
Trade policy measures for environmental purposes should 
not constitute a means of arbitrary or unju~tifiable 
discrimination or a disguised restriction on international 
trade. Unilateral actions to deal with environmental 
challenges outside the jurisdiction of the importing country 
should be avoided. Environmental measures addressing 
transboundary or global environmental problems should, as 
far as possible, be based on an international consensus.709 
Principle 12 has a substantive and procedural message. On the substantive 
level, when trade measures are used in the name of environmental 
protection, means and ends should be linked closely and causally. On the 
procedural level, unilateralism and extraterritorial application of domestic 
laws are unacceptable. Multilateral approaches and consensus building are 
stronglyencouraged. 710 
Third, Principle 16 expands on Principle II's direction to compare 
apples with apples, and Principle 12's charge to avoid unilaterally imposed 
environmental measures that are a disguised form of trade protectionism. 
Principle 16 counsels against the adoption of environmental policies that 
might distort world trade patterns: "National authorities should endeavour 
to promote the internalization of environmental costs and the use of 
economic instruments, taking into account the approach that the polluter 
should, in principle, bear the cost of pollution, with due regard to the 
public interest and without distorting international trade and 
708 See id. 
709 Id. prine. 12 (emphasis added). 
710 See id. 
HeinOnline -- 22 Wm. & Mary Envtl. L. & Pol’y Rev. 501 1997-1998
1998] ILLEGALITY OF UNILATERAL TRADE MEASURES 501 
investment."711 Principle 16's "polluter pays principle" is tempered by 
Principle II's warning to developed countries not to impose 
environmental standards on developing countries and by Principle 12's 
rejection of unilateral ism and avoidance of trade protectionism in the name 
of environmental protection. 
If the Stockholm and Rio Declarations are reasonably accurate 
reflections of world opinion on the interrelationship of trade and the 
environment,712 then a consensus exists that economic growth should not 
be sacrificed or the open world trading system wrecked in the name of 
environmental protection. Both Declarations encourage states to reflect 
carefully before pursuing economic policies that could damage the 
environment. Conversely, both Declarations urge states to exercise 
restraint and avoid environmental policies that could damage the world 
trading system it took fifty painstaking years to build.713 
The GATT -WTO system predates the emergence of a significant 
environmental movement by at least two decades.714 Nevertheless, when 
measured against its liberal trade philosophy, the Stockholm and Rio 
Declarations are in large measure harmonious with the GATT -WTO 
system. The two declarations stress the importance of balancing trade and 
economic growth with environmental protection. Similarly, GATT -WTO 
rules stress the importance of open, unrestricted trade, but recognize that 
importing countries have legitimate health and safety concerns and, on 
those grounds, may restrict or ban certain imported goods. 
Few will quarrel that protecting the environment should be a high 
priority for every country, and especially for the developed-country 
Members of the WTO. Are the GATT -WTO system and NAFT A 
obstacles to achieving this goal? Although environmentalists portray them 
as being at best indifferent to environmental issues and at worst hostile to 
them, can environmental concerns be accommodated adequately under the 
GATT-WTO systemTI5 
711 Id. prine. 16. 
712 The vote on the Stockholm Declaration was 103 countries for, zero against, and 12 
abstaining. See BURNS H. WESTON, ET AL., BASIC DOCUMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 
AND WORLD ORDER 943 (1990). The Rio Declaration was adopted by consensus by the 
175 countries attending the Rio Conference. See Kovar, supra note 30, at 119. 
713 See StockholnlDeclaration, supra note 25; Rio Declaration, supra note 26. 
714 See Goldman, supra note 16, at 1289. 
715 See generally K. Gwen Beacham, International Trade and the Environment: 
Implications of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade for the Future of 
Environmental Protection Efforts, 3 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'y 655 (1992); 
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The need for greater integration of trade and environmental 
policies is undeniable. As an initial matter, such policies need not be 
mutually exclusive.716 As one economist has observed, "[mlost 
environmental policies are not in conflict with basic GATT rules."717 
Environmentalists seem to have an endless list of grievances with the 
GATT -WTO system. If their real concern is that liberal trade may reduce 
worldwide environmental standards to the lowest common denominator, 
then the problem lies with the market's failure to reflect environmental 
costs in prices and in government subsidization of polluting industries.718 
Resorting to trade sanctions to address environmental issues may 
be misguided for several reasons. First, trade sanctions, such as a ban on 
imported goods produced by polluting production processes and methods, 
rarely, if ever, attack the root of the problem. Second, such trade 
sanctions, when advocated by environmental groups with the support of 
domestic business groups, may have as its primary aim trade 
protectionism, not environmental protection. Such advocacy can be 
especially pernicious because it is so socially respectable. 719 Trade 
sanctions can in tum lead to an escalation of trade tensions that trigger 
retaliatory trade responses from exporting countries. 
Economic studies have shown, moreover, that tough environmental 
standards at home do not, standing alone, cause companies to relocate 
abroad.720 Other factors, such as labor costs, transportation infrastructure, 
market access, and political stability figure more prominently in the 
Dunoff, supra note 298, at 1047; Jackson, supra note 14; Kevin C. Kennedy, Reforming 
u.s. Trade Policy to Protect the Global Environment: A Multilateral Approach, 18 
HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 185 (1994); Thomas 1. Schoenbaum, International Trade and 
Protection of the Environment: The Continuing Search for Reconciliation, 91 AM. J. 
INT'L L. 268 (1997). 
716 See. e.g., CONFRONTING TRADE AND ENVIRONMENTAL CONFLICTS: PROSPECTS AND 
PRACTICAL ApPROACHES (ABA 1993); C. FORD RUNGE, ET AL., FREER TRADE, 
PROTECTED ENVIRONMENT: BALANCING TRADE LIBERALIZATION AND ENVIRONMENTAL 
INTERESTS (1994); TRADE AND THE ENVIRONMENT, supra note 581; DAVID VOGEL, 
TRADING UP: CONSUMER AND ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY 
(1995); Jonathan Scott Miles, Doing the Right Thing for Profit: Markets. Trade. and 
Advancing Environmental Protection, 44 DRAKE L. REV. 611 (1996); Wold, supra note 
56. 
717 Piritta Sorsa, GATT and Environment: Basic Issues and Some Developing Country 
Concerns. in INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND THE ENVIRONMENT, supra note 5, at 327. 
718 See id. at 325 n.3. 
719 See Anderson, supra note 12, at 441. 
;"0 See The Greening of Protectionism, ECONOMIST, Feb. 27, 1993, at 26. 
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location/relocation decision.721 
It is not surprising that international trade measures have become 
the mechanism of choice for responding concretely to other countries' 
behavior that threatens the environment. First, trade sanctions are high 
profile and, therefore, potentially of great symbolic value. Second, trade 
measures do not involve or threaten the use of armed force (excepting, of 
course, "quarantines" such as the one imposed against Cuba by the United 
States during the Cuban missile crisis or against Iraq during the Gulf War). 
When trade sanctions are imposed, generally no soldier is deployed in a 
theater of war and ordered to put his or her life in harm's way while 
performing a combat role. Third, building a national or international 
consensus on the need for or the wisdom of imposing trade sanctions 
presents policy makers with a supremely delicate challenge.722 
Nevertheless, it is undoubtedly easier to build a consensus on unilaterally 
initiating trade sanctions than it is to commit and deploy troops abroad 
either unilaterally or multilaterally, absent an act of war by the target 
country against the sending country or the special case of an Iraqi invasion 
of a Kuwait.723 
Against this backdrop, it comes as no surprise' then that 
environmentalists have borrowed a page from the national security and 
human rights book and embraced import bans and restrictions as the 
preferred method for forcing nations that trade with the United States to 
adopt measures to protect the environment. Indeed, the use of trade 
measures to enforce environmental standards can be compelling 
particularly when international trade is the direct cause of the 
environmental damage as, for example, with trade in hazardous waste or in 
endangered species. 
Although trade sanctions have an obvious and understandable 
appeal, the one question environmentalists have either failed to ask or have 
ignored is whether trade sanctions are effective. Do trade sanctions work? 
The symbolic value of trade sanctions, highly touted in the human rights 
arena, should not be discounted completely even when the ends are 
721 See id. 
722 A perennial example is the tug-of-war between Congress and Presidents Bush and 
Clinton over China's continued most-favored-nation trade status. See Senate Sustains 
President's Veto of Bill Conditioning MFN Status for China, 9 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 
518 (1992); Ann Scott Tyson, China Reacts to US Trade Decision, CHRISTIAN SCI. 
MONITOR, May 25, 1990, at 3. 
723 See Alan O. Sykes, Constructive Unilateral Threats in International Commercial 
Relations: The Limited Case for Section 30 I, 23 L. & POL 'y INT'L Bus. 263 (1992). 
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environmental. At the same time, the role of symbolism should not be 
overrated or overemphasized. Symbolism may be a necessary condition 
for imposing trade sanctions against a country with a less than exemplary 
environmental track record, as measured by U.S. standards. Symbolism 
standing alone, however, should never be a sufficient condition for 
imposing such sanctions. 
Moving beyond symbolism, the primary focus needs to be on the 
effectiveness of trade sanctions as a tool for achieving certain 
environmental ends. The question that needs to be asked and answered in 
the affirmative before unilateral trade sanctions are imposed is whether the 
imposition of sanctions will cause the exporting country to change its 
environmental policies. The effectiveness of trade sanctions ought to be 
the initial focus and, ultimately, the bottom line. Otherwise, legitimate 
environmental concerns, when coupled with strong trade protectionist 
pressures at home, can result in the imposition of trade sanctions that are 
imposed ostensibly on environmental grounds but which have the 
potential for delivering a crippling blow to the world economy. 
Environmental protection, in combination with trade 
protectionism, can lead to an undisciplined, . discriminatory use of trade 
sanctions. Consequently, when trade sanctions are invoked on 
environmental grounds, they need to be used in a very disciplined and 
discriminating fashion.724 Once a country imposes trade sanctions, it may 
be impossible to avoid the downward spiral of retaliation and counter-
retaliation, leading to an all-out trade war.725 In any such war, the 
environment could be the big loser. An importing country's use of trade 
restrictions to block imports in the name of environmental protection may 
actually be at cross-purposes with the goal of environmental protection. 
724 For a 1990 case study on the use of economic sanctions as a foreign policy tool that 
offers some insights to this question, see GARY C. HUFBAUER, ET AL., ECONOMIC 
SANCTIONS RECONSIDERED, HISTORY AND CURRENT POLICY (1990). To the question, 
"Are economic sanctions effective?" Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliott give a guarded 
answer of "sometimes": 
Although it is not true that sanctions "never work," they are of limited 
utility in achieving foreign policy goals that depend on compelling the 
target country to take actions it stoutly resists. Still, in some instances, 
particularly situations involving small target countries and relatively 
modest policy goals, sanctions have helped alter foreign behavior. 
ld. at 92. The authors conclude that sanctions are seldom effective in bringing about 
major changes in the policies of the target country. 
7"5 See. e.g., Clayton Jones, Japan Fires a Shot Over the Bow of Clinton's "Managed 
Trade . . , CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, May 11, 1993, at 1,4. 
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Such restrictions may promote environmental degradation by protecting 
less efficient manufacturers and producers from !pore efficiently produced 
imports. 
In the name of environmental protection, a substantial volume of 
import trade could be affected significantly through the use of trade 
measures imposed ostensibly to advance environmental goals but which 
are in fact pretextual and nothing more than disguised nontariff barriers to 
trade.726 Domestic business interests and unions anxious to erect barriers 
to import competition from low-wage countries may drape themselves in 
the green flag and join forces with environmental groupS.727 Together they 
may forge a coalition to pressure government regulators to keep the 
playing field level by restricting imported products that are manufactured 
or processed by heavily polluting industries in countries where 
environmental controls are either less stringent, loosely enforced, or non-
existent. 
One writer has compared this infonnal coalition among 
protectionist domestic business interests, unions, and environmental 
groups to an unholy alliance between the Baptists and the bootleggers.728 
The environmentalists are the Baptists who support prohibition on grounds 
of morality and health. Business and labor groups are the bootleggers who 
support prohibition in order to preserve jobs and their share of the 
domestic market from import competition. The lesson here is beware of 
domestic manufacturers and unions who lament the state of the 
environment in other countries. The environment may not be their real 
concern. 
In short, instead of viewing free trade and environmental protection 
as mutually reinforcing, environmentalists' working premise is that the 
GATT -WTO system is an obstacle to environmental protection. Short of a 
no-growth economic stance, this is a false premise. The GATT -WTO 
system and free trade are not environmental villains. As explained by one 
726 See John Dillin, With US Jobs at Stake. Congress Takes Wary View of Trade Pact, 
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Mar. 17, 1993, at 4 C"[S]ome Mexicans worry that the US will 
use environmental standards as a form of protectionism against their products"). 
727 As reported in The Economist, "[0 ]ne recent attack on GAIT by Public Citizen 
[headed by Ralph Nader] was signed by over 300 groups. They included the 
International Ladies' Garment Workers Union, the United Methodist Church, the 
American Cetacean Society and the Sierra Club." The Greening of Protectionism, 
ECONOMIST, Feb. 27, 1993, at 25. 
128 See David Vogel, Discllssant's Comments, in INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND THE 
ENVIRONMENT, Sl/pra note 5, at 245. 
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economist, "Environmental problems arise from various types of market 
(prices not reflecting environmental costs) and government failure 
(subsidies to polluting activities) or lack of clear property rights."729 In 
other words, if GATT -WTO disciplines were honored less in the breach 
and more in the observance, then the GATT -WTO system would be at 
least a partial solution to the world pollution problem. By opening 
markets and lifting government restrictions on trade as GATT directs, 
resources will be consumed by the most efficient producers, causing less 
damage to the environment in the long run. 
m Sorsa, supra note 717, at 325 n.3. 
